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ABSTRACT:

Collisionsat sea have been a problem to mariners since the
earliest vessels engaged in commerce.whenthe first vessel
was launched, the risk of collision was zero. However, with
the launching of the second vessel there was some degree of
risk that the two would collide. While early records fail
to reveal the fateof these two ships, in more modern times
thousands of vessels and lives have been lost due to colli

sion.
Several methods have been developed to minimize the incidence
of collision, the Rules of the Nautical Roads, V.H.P., Radar,

Traffic Seperation Schemes, vessel Traffic Services, Auto
matic Radar plotting

Aids, and other measures. Somewere
thought by many to provide the ultimate solution, but the
improvementin the situation is still far behind the accen

table range .
Hhydormneoftheseuneasures provide the hoped ultimate solution?

This project analyses the collision risk and examines the
major measures taken to reduce it‘s incidence, trying to find
out where the deficiencies could be and present a reasonable

solution.
The examination of the various methods gives a light on the

potential benefits / disbenefits of each with an emphasis on
radar and ARPAas considered the most beneficial

a direct contribution to solve the problem.

tools having

INTRODUCTION :

Safety at sea has long been a preoccupation of maritime
community. Collision between ships has always been a promi
nent problem in maritime history and continue to occur with

alarming regularity.
Lloyds Register indicates that during the 2nd and 33g quar
ter of 1978, 17.8%of the world fleet losses resulted from

collision. The research division of NorskeVeritas indicates
that collision

involving Norwegian ships comprises25%of a11

Norwegianship‘s casualties. Liverpool underwriters statistics
indicate that 50%of all ships casualties comprised collisions
and grounding.

The developments occur in the shipping industry have led to

this high percentage of collision and pushing strongly to al
ways give a serious attention to the safety and efficiency of

fleet operations.
Sea-going vessels are increased in number, speed, and size
and becoming more complex. World trade itself

is such that

traffic flows lead to congestion at certain areas around the
world.

Larger and larger amounts of cargoes of noxious or dangerous

nature which have the potential for pollution of the earth's
environment are being movedby sea-going vessels every year..
At the same time many vessels in service are old and some are

in questionable condition with respect to their systems and
officers competency.

The analysis of marine casualities and their distribution
‘L-'eI‘:L"!-3

is one of the most important methods to explore ways by
which safety and accuracy can be increased, and the effec

tiveness of collision avoidance and navigation practices
on board ships can be improved.

Merchant marine casualties are often the result of a number
of factors involving a series or combination of events and
c-1'r,cumst'anC€S.- It has been estimated

that the greatest

numberof collisions can mostly be traced to the compli
Cation in the traffic situation and the errors in human
judgement.

In response to the persistent need to assist the watch offi
cer in his collision avoidance tasks numerousextensive stu
dies, research work, and experiments have been conducted and
arestillgohm-onleadhw
to the development of several mea
sures to reduce
this risk and put it under control.

The implied promise in this development is that these measures
will provide an answer to the collision avoidance problem.
Someof these measures are related to the ship itself to in

crease its operational efficiency and someadopted at sea to
improvethe situation, while others are established ashore to
cooperate in increasing the safety standard.
The question is : Howmuch aid in avoiding collisions

called collision-avoidance systems provide ?

do the so

The rules Of the mautical roads were adopted and revised

to organize collision avoidance actions. The rules are not

a deterministic device, but a set of guide lines to help
the naV193t°r to take the correct collision avoiding action.
Problems arised by the officers who did not abide by them,
either by negligenceorby tmdng conflicting action which
"Ede the situation even worse and mostly 1ed to collision.
It was found that the best is to make a contact between the
ships engaged in a dangerous situation to ensure a consis

tent safe action, avoiding any risk. V.H.F. radio telephony
is involved for ship-to-ship communication, but again some

officers neglect this effective tool and others used in
adequate calling methods.
‘El

To ensure the maintenance of a sharp visual lookout, good

attention, and most efficient navigational operations, a
suitable bridge design and arrangement is necessary. Much
effort is given to provide the watchkeeping officers and
captains with a well arranged operating centre to increase

the nautical safety.
Someattention

has been given to other ship systems to im

prove ship handling characteristics. The rudder effective
ness to give the required result, the reliability of the
steering gear to avoid any failure in critical situations,
and the akﬁne procedures and maintenance to always answer

the orders in time.
Whenradar was first

introduced to the merchant fleets,

m3“YPeople felt that a practical solution to collision
avoidance problem had been found. However, a review of the

world-widecollision statistics for the past years reveals
that in spite of the expandeduse of radar, the overall
collision rate remains alarmingly high.
Beacauseof radar‘s less-than a perfect record for preven
ting ship collision, developmentof various types of threat
assessment systems has taken place.
Vessel traffic systems start to contribute to solve the
problem. Vessel traffic seperation schemesstarted in the
congested areas to assist in reducing the encounter rate.
Somecaptains did not accept this imaginary roadways inked

in on the chart and proceed against the traffic causing a
tremendousdanger. Shore based stations for traffic sur

veillance start to interfere to put the situation under
control and help in the threat assessment process giving
navigational warnings and advices to those ships involved
in a dangerous situation.
The introduction

of ARPAhas improved the effectiveness

of these stations as well as the traffic data processing
on board ships.

It basically providesthe navigator with a quicker and better
appreciation of the traffic around his ship which could lead
him to an early and effective action to avoid collision.
All these measures and procedures provide the mariner with
a precious information. and good working conditions to assist
in reducing the work load, minimize the humanerrors,

creasing the ship reliability,
as a whole.

in-'

and improvingthe situation

However,a great burden still fallsupon the navigator,
requiring to always be attentive, competent, and cautious to
arrive at the right judgment and take the proper action.

International organizations. national administrations and
various institutions have taken . great steps to provide
the mariners with efficient education and training pro
grammesto promote the competency, increase the practicle

experience and attain an adequate standards on board ships.
Moreover, due to the IMUrequirements and the efforts

of

national administrations, a casualty investigation system
is established in several maritime countries to contribute
in finding general recommendations which could improve the

situation.
Eventhough, somedeficiencies still exist here and there
which should be remedied and somepositive steps still
need to be taken hoping to have a better future and colli
sion becomes some thing of the past.

SECTION

I

I.I

COLLISION AVOIDANCE PROBLEM :

Collisions at B83 have been a problem to mariners since the
earliest vessels engaged in commerce.The continous increase

in the volume of marine traffic, the growth in size and speed
of vessels, the increasing numbers of cargoes of noxious or
dangerous nature, and, thenmﬁer of ships not complying with

internationally agreed standards, all stress the increasing
seriousness of the marine safety problem. This situation has
lead to increased numbersof collisions involving the prob
able loss of life and or pollution. In addition, if the haz
ardous nature of the cargoes carried today is taken into con
sideration, such casualties are no longer only the concern
of the mariner, shipping companies and their insurers. They
have a direct effect on populations and their governments
and thereﬁme these risks have become unacceptable.

The collision

avoidance problem is seen as a co-operative

game, involving

(most often) two players who have to choose

a course of action independently. The concept of level of

safety is not one that can be defined very easily, it need
to determine the combinations of actions that are good and
those that are bad. The matrix of possible actions for each
ship, and the outcomes of these combinations presents the
general collision avoidance game.

The level of safety in a situation is improvedby consistent
action on the part of both ships, remains the same if neither
ship takes any action, and is decreased if they take con

flicting action.

Before the wide spread use of the radio and radar on merchant

vessels, the primary collision avoidance tools of the mariner
were:
Look out

-

The Pelorus

The Binoculars

-

The Rules of the Road

The pelorus and binoculars were certainly

not as the compass
repeaters of today. In fact any stationary object on the ship
was used for determining a change in relative bearing of a

traffic ship-crude but effective.
The rules for manoeuvring to avoide collision

at sea were
derived from rules designed for quite a different purpose.
These original rules were primarily commercial lows concerned
with the apportionment of damagesafter a collision had occur
ed, ruther than guide lines to help ships avoid collisions.
The first record of a specific rule of the road dates back to
Lord Howe in 1776. By 1864, a code of conduct for ships at

sea had been defined and agreed to by over 30 maritime nations.
The rules were revised three times in 1948, 1960 and 1972 to

suit the infinite variety of maritime circumstances and con
ditions after studying most of the collisions and taken into
account the development of technology such as the use of

radar and the introduction of traffic seperation schemes.
The introduction

of radar to the maritime communityhas not

brought a definite dramatic reduction in collision freguency.
Manualradar plotting with its several aids was thought by
manyfprovide the ultimate solution but these thoughts were
severely jarred by the Stocholm and Andrta Doria collision
in 1956. The reason could be due to the following fa°t°r5‘

1- The increase in the number of ships at r15k.
2- The growing number of fast ships.

3- M15086/ misinterpretation

of radar information.

4- The tendency of ships using radar to proceed at higher

speedsin restricted visibility.
5- The emergence of large, deep draft ships.
6- Lack of knowledge of the manoeuvring characteristics
of own ship.
7- Failure to keep a good lookout.

8- Technological improvements that, along with scheduling

pressures, increase incentive to risk exposure.
In the period between the two world wars there wasrelatively little

change in the world-wide pattern of marine traffic.

The total

number of ships in service and the average size and speed of

trading vessels remained fairly constant. During the last
thirty years considerable changes have taken place. There
has been a six-fold increase in international trade by sea
which has been accomplished partly by an increase of over
100%in the number of ships and partly by increases in the

size and speed of ships and by reduction of the time spent
in port.

In 1975, 2530 new steam and motor ships went to

sea compared with 1006 in 1965 and 134 in 1955. In 1978 the

total world ships of over 140,000 tons gross (270,000 tons
dead weight) were 59 ships.
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Table (1 ) Numbersof trading ships in service according

to size category (g_r.t1
Year

100-999

1000-9999

10000 and over

Total

1950

5.100

11,200

1,100

1960

7.400

12,300

3,000

22,700

1970

11.400

13,000

6,200

30,600

1980

11.800

13,600

9,500

34,900

The figures are based on the statistical

17,400

tables of Lloyd‘s

Register of shipping and on data published by the General

Council of British shipping.

Table (2 )

Trading vessels in commission by type
1950 - 1975

Type of ship

oil tanker
General cargo

Bulk carriers

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

2,783

3,538

4,146

5,209

6,067

6,577

14,598

15,914

18,500

20,540

22,400

22,600

300

1,000

2,100

3,400

Table (3 )

Comparisonof the estimated daily traffic
in certain sea areas 1969 L 1980

flow

Ships Per day
Region
1969

1980

English channel

400

340

Coast of Japan

100

190

Cape of good hope

211

225

Strait of Gibraltar

160

180

Malacca strait

85

180

Masqat (Arabian Gulf)

80

180

Increasing the size and speed of ships and the density

of

traffic tends to bring greater risk of collision.
During this period various measures have been taken to im

prove the safety at sea.
A rather comprehensive work was performed to assess

human

factors in radar utilization. In this study, the effect of
different types of radar displays were investigated using a
simple radar simulator. A substantial report regarding radar
problem-solving capabilities was published. The results indi'
cated that the reason for unsatisfactory degree of progress
that would be expected with wide spread use of radar could be

due to deficiencies in training, knowledge,attitude, or ex
perience of mariners. Accordingly, a radar observer certifi

cate is now required before the award of a second mate's

ticket.
In 1959 Oudet proposed a traffic seplration scheme for con
gested areas as Dover strait. The establishment of routing
schemescaused a significant reduction in collision where

traffic density is high particularly in restricted visi

bility.
The first

traffic

schemewas introduced in Dover strait

in

1967, and such schemes have since spread rapidly throughout
the world. IMOrecommendthe use of the existed ones, and its
use became mandatory by 1972 regulations.

Another approach to the problem is the attempt to find a mathe
metical model of manoeuvringfor collision avoidance, the first
substantial attempt was presented by Hollingdale in 1961. During
the subsequent 15 years, there have been a number of attempts at

analyzing, understanding, and then solving the collision problem.
Manyjournal articles have appeared describing ship manoeuvring
diagrams which purport to provide the solution. However, def
iciencies have been noted in each of the manoeuvring diagrams
and no particular diagram has gained wide spread acceptance.
In 1975 Liverpool Polytechnic Maritime Operations Unit, (recently
has compared the effec
tiveness of various electronic collision avoidance systems. The

CAORFresearch centre at kings point),

resultsobtained from test subjects in an artificial

environment,

indicate that use of a CAScauses a dramatic improvement in per
formance.

Accordingly, united states required a collision avoidance sys
tem to be fitted on vessels carrying hazardous cargoes arriv
ing in their waters since 1982, and it becamecompulsory for all

-14
De“ 5h1P5 0f 10o000 9-r-t- and over, and all existing tankers
of 40.000 9-r.t. and over to be fitted with an ARPAsince first
of January 1984.

A new concept is "collision

vessel traffic

avoidance from the shore‘. The

managementservices (V.T.M.S.) offered by the

maritime surveillance centres for preventing collisions is a
newfactor in maritime operations.
The objective of this concept is to provide a shore service
for preventing collision

The criteria

which is a muchmore ambitious task.

is to alert the operator in the centre before a

rnarmiss and once the operator has been alerted, he himself
interpret the situation and warn the ships concerned. The
officer of the watch on board will naturaly retain full res
ponsibility for manoeures. Provided the shipsinvolved in an
encounter situation have been identified, the only thing the
operator can do is to warn the vessels concerned and possibly
put them in touch.
The system still under development, and areascovered need to
be extended.

As a result of these analyses, studies, and research work, IMO

have taken effective steps to tackle the collision problem,
some of which are:

l- The amendmentof the collision avoidance regulations to al

ways suit the present situation and conditions.
2- The 1974 SoLAS (came into force 25th of May 1980). and the

1978 SoLASprotocol

(came into force 153 of May 1981), which

contain a detailed regulations covering ship’s safety, equip
ment etc.
3- The STCWconvention

1978 which came into force in 28 of April

-15
1984, which set up the minimumrequirements of training

certification

and

to ensure a certain standard of knowledgeand

training of seafarers.
4- The significant financial and technical help to newest
ablished academies particularly those in developing count
tres to enable these countries to improvethe level of their
maritime industry.
5- IMOrequirements concerning the investigation of marine cas
ualties by contracting governments, and the regular examina
tion of these investigations by the Maritime Safety Committe
to recommendactions which increase safety at sea.
6- The establishment of the world Maritime University (NMU)in

July 1983 to help the mariners of all nations particularly
those of developing countries to improve their training and
their practicle background.
Efforts and developments still

going on trying to reach a signi

ficant improvementin the situation hoping that the following
years will showa considerable reduction in casualty figures.

- 15 

Table (Q) Annual incidence of collisions of merchant ships in open
sea: Coastal Waters. and narrow straits.

Year

Reported

Additional

BYL1°Yd'3

Japanese cases

mtals

Both Ships

Detailed

over 1000 tons

cases

1948-55 _

_

_

_

13

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

_
_
_
_
_

80
68
65
76
70

46
46
41
45
so

4
6
4
11
17

359

228

77
57
87
83
94

51
41
48
51
41

80
68
65
76
70
359

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

77
27
87
83
94

_
_
_
_
_

398

25
9
19
22
21

398

232

1966

81

6

87

48

1967

63

10

73

36

30

1968

77

10

87

45

39

1969

94

11

105

55

52

1970

89

11

100

52

55

452

236

404

28

1971

80

25

105

41

60

1972

67

18

85

45

45

1973

68

9

77

34

44

1974

70

23

93

40

54

1975

77

17

94

57

57

454

217

362
1976

69

10

79

34

44

1977

61

20

81

36

43

1978

68

7

75

46

24

1979

71

_

71

43

1

1980

65'

_

65'

35'

334 '

371'

194 '

Totals

1857

2034

1107

732

' Estimates have been made for 1980 based data obtained for 11 month
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1.253 The conce t of collision

oint and dan erous area:

In any 9ncounter,risk of collision mayexist. If target true
motion isiutmn the point of possible collision can be esti
mated and defind as a point on the earth surface. when a cer

tain passing safe distance is required in a two ship encoun
ter, the probable area of danger can also be estimated and
defind on the earth surface.

1.2 The concept of collision point:
The collision

can be defined and, its position depends on;

a) The speed ratio

(E)

b) The relative

heading (H)

c) The position of the two ships.

1.2.1 Sampledefinition of a collision:

6 nan ;.,;.r
0} Q//['5/OI‘

Tnqd :1/f f ‘
Ccnfra pugpt

O.‘&rl/as (1/7
6'-en/re Po/at

Figure

(

3 )

0‘
‘\

’

-19
Consider the dynamic situation

of a two-ship encounter in- 

volved in exact collision.
Such a situation appears in the above Figure which illu
strates the geometry of a collision situation between two
ships on converging courses. At an instance (t1) the two
ships (0) and (T) are at a distance (R1) and are moving
3C°°rd1“9 t° the 5Peed Vectors (V0) and (VT). For the sake

of simplification the two true velocities are assumedto be
uniform.

The relative bearing of ship (0) in relation to ship (T) is
the angle (Q) or the aspect.
If both ships maintain their velocity they will collide at
point (Pc). The intersection angle at this point is the rela
tive heading (H), and the following relation holds constant:
V° / VT =

So / sT

E

where E is the speed ratio
From the two triangles

(0 g_K and TQK)

Sin (Q) = b / ST .'.
Sin (H+Q)= b / So .'.

ST = b.Cosec
S0 = b.Cosec

(0)
(H+Q)

Then
1 /E = ST/So = sin

(H+Q). Cosec (Q) = Sin (H+Q) 1 Sin 0

.'.

cos (B) + Cos (Q). Sin (H) ) I Sin (Q)

1/E= ( Sin(Q).
= Cos (H)

+ Cot

(Q) . Sin

And Cot (Q) =(1 - E Cos (H))/ E sin

.'.

(H)

(H)

Tan (o)= E Sin (H) /(1 —E Cos (3))

-20
This equation gives A sample definition of a collision situa
tion in a two-ship encounter in terms of two indepentent
variables

(E) and (H).

0 is the limiting aspect for collision.
This case is a sample when the relative

speed (BLis less

than one. To find the circle of collision points and the
limiting aspect of collision for the different cases of the
relative

speed (B) when E«< 1 ,

following technique can be used.

E = 1,

and E )

1 the

-21
1.2.2.

Locus of future point of collision:

1.2.2.1.

when the relative

Assuming that,

the relative

e.g:

V'1‘ = 4 V0 and the initial

s eed E 13 1355 th n one;

speed 3 = vo /VT .

o_25

distance between ownship and

target equal 10 miles.

To find the radious of the circle of the limiting aspect
we can proceed as follows :
1- ST

+

so

=

10

s,r

=

10

-

so

4 so=

10

-

so

.'.so

=

2

s

=

8

and

2-

sq,

— so

so

=

= 10

0.25

sq.

=

10

' ' 0.75 sT

sT = 13.33

Thenthe radius of the circle of limiting aspect of collision
(centra point C) equal (13.33 - 8) / 2 = 2.665

£4’//I/on Po/It

Figure

( 4)

-22..
Q - 14.5° is the limiting aspect of collision, pc will be
the only collision point where b /a - E =:2.57 [ 10.3.
OPCwill be the course of own ship to produce one colli

sion which will exist at a distance equal to b.
If the aspect is reduced to be less than Q then collision
will occur at P; or P; where
e/d=g/(d+f)=E
For P; to occur own ship course should be oP; and
For ﬁe to occur own ship course should be oﬁz

The principle of the previous method:

£30.35

Figure ( 5)
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If own shiP'5 3Peed -

V0 and target

_ vo / VT - -%§— -

say

speed - VT

0.25

p - P.P.C. the point of possible collision
Q - target's

aspect which is the limiting aspect for

collision.
R a

Sin

Distance between own ship and target

Q =

op / TP

then Q in this case
Tan

Q =

but op

=

oc / op

=

v

say

= 10 M

/ VT = 3

= 14.5
=

op / R

R tan Q

. . oc

= op tan Q

. . oc

= R tanz

Q

=0.67 in this case
If

TP is made to equal unity

.'.

op

.'.

tan

I/;

=

E and R2

=

1

Q = OP / R

— E2

.'.

R

= ( 1 - E2 )

.'.

u
tan Q = E / (1 -E2)‘

= 14.5° in that
case

..0C=Rtan2Q

.'.oc=RE2/(1-B2)=

.

= 0.67 in that case

Sin Q = OC / PC
but Sin Q =
.'.

Pc

.'.

= oc / E = R B2 / E ( 1 - E2)

50 equations to be used are
oc

= R E2 /

Redius
Sin

( 1 - E2

= R3 / ( 1 - E

Q =

E

Pc

= oc / sin 0

E

)

2

)

=

RE /(1

- E21
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1.2.2.2.

whenthe relative sgeed E is greater than one:

Assuming that E = 1.25, initial
ships

1-

2-

distance between the two

2 M

sT

+

so

2

=

1.25 = vo / VT

.'

1.25 sT = 2 —sT

so - sT

.°.

= 2

— 2

1.25 sT = 2 + sT

.'.

so

= 2 - 5T

.'.

v0

= 1.25 vT

.'

5T = 2 / 2.25 = 0.39

.'

so

.'.

sT = 2 / 0.25 = 8

= 2 + sT

then the radius of the circle of limiting aspect of collision
aqual to

Figure ( 6)

( 3 + o.e9 ) / 2 =

4.445
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g :7 53° is the limiting angle for own ship (course OP) which
produce one collision at P at a d13tance b where b [ a I E

For smaller angle say 44°, collision point will exist at
different position on the arc ( P‘) produced by different
course of own ship and target but for same value of R and E

which means that the position of collision point (for a par
ticular target course) and the associated ownship course
can be found if 9!5 the limiting angle.
By following the same mathematical procedure as in case of
B-( 1 the needed equations can be found:

Tan 6» - T‘;
.'.

= %

CT = TP tan ¢

but

TP = R tan

¢

CT = R tanz ¢
gg = E

, if

OP is made to equal unity

Sin 95 = 1 /E
(o1>)2

=

('r1>)2 + R2

R2 = 1 -

.'.R

=(£:2-1)’/'/B

.'.

= TP / R

Tan ¢

.

. . Tan¢ =

1 E

X E

_

.'.c'r

=R/(E2-1)

s1n¢

=—%'——

but Sin ¢

= 1 / E

.'.1>c

=RE/(E2-1)

so equations to be used

c'r=

R

E2 - 1

'

pc = si§T¢

--:-2

1

(E2_1)//,
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Radius

=

Sin ¢

=

1.2.2.3.

when the relative

sgeed E = l

:

For the case when E = 1, the collision point is always loc
ated on the bisector of the line between own ship and the

target- There will be only one oossible collision.
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1-2-2-‘‘-

C_°lC_1:U_%_°_N=

1- If the target is slower than ownship (e.g. E)1). It is
always possible for own ship to produce a collision
since it can pursue the target if necessary but one and
only one collision could exist. This collision point is
always on the track of the target.

£0,131
'0If
it

4;¢ﬁaJ.uVl¢

‘ *

/atrcf 0/I ﬂu/I/1'0/'
Figure ( 10)

2- If the target is faster than ownship (E<1): there are

three possibilities:
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—No collision

can be produced by own ship if it is not

fast enough to reach the target’s
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In this particular case it is possible if ownship reduce
her speed (e.g. E becomes smaller), the two collision points
approach eachother and emerge in one collision point at cer
tain value of E.
If ownship stops,E will equal zero and collision could only
occur when the aspect is zero.

If the target stop, B will tend to infinity and the redius
of the collision circle will be zero, collision then could
only occur if ownship proceed directly to the target.
we can say, the larger the E the greater the radius of the
dangerous circle will be if E < l and
The smaller the E the greater the radius of the dangerous

circle will be if E ) l.
3- If the target

speed and ownship speed is the same ( E =

1), only one collision could exist and the collision point
is always located on the bisector of the line joining the
two ships.

The greater the aspect the further awaythe collision point
will be. Theoretically the limiting aspect in this case is
90 degrees, but in that case the collision point would be at
infinity, and hence the aspect of some 85° is considered the

practical limit.
4- If

E < l the collision points, if any, will be at own

ship side of the bisector of the line joining the two ships,
but if E ; l the collision point, if any, will be at the

target‘s side of this bisector.

'.-%-n--—.-.~«——..
‘- ..
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5- whenthe target is the faster ship and one collision does
exist it will lie on the perpendicular through (0) the own

ship position but if two collision points exist they will
lie either side of the perpendicular through (0) and not eq
ually spaced.

E)!

E<I
'

i7""

g/&u.s4%aa.

° ,5aJi stint

Figure (14 )
6- The movement of the collision
Q = arc

Sin

point when E > 1 and

1 / E

In the following situation, the collision will exist at
1230

own ship speed

= 20 knots

target's speed = 10 knots
E = 2 and limiting angle of collision
...—.—.
...._...~

¢ = 30°

17

vol

I: -:

/4:’-' 0/: (5,;

Figure (15)
The radar display (Relative motion ship head up) of ownship

(52) will predict the single collision point on the heading
marker moving downas the collision situation develop.
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7- The movement of the two collision

Q<arc

points when E < l and‘

sin 8

In the following situation,

the two collision points exv

ist
ownship

speed

=

Target's

speed

= 12

2

=

0.75

9
,

and

Q =

4d

,-""1!-‘i(""

I‘
no
DI‘

II

J/adcr 0/:

,

Ta‘?
-9
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...p..

9.63
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16.6
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0.00
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Figure ( 17)
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one of the collision point will move downthe heading marker
while the other towards own ship on a fixed hearing at fast

er rate, the two points will always be on the target’: track.
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Example:

A target (T) steering 0500 true with a speed of 12 knots at
a range of 5 miles.
0
The aspect is 40 green
ownship speed is 9 knots

Find:

1- Course (S) for ownship to produce collision
2- Distance (8) at which collision (5) occur.

(S)

3- Speed of ownship to just miss the target.
4- Speed of ownship to clear the target by 1 mile.
2

£:=9/12=o.75, R= 5,
§_§_ = 3,57

Figure (20)

oc= —1f—E§3—=
6.43, radius

=

Twocollision points exist with course 330° at 3.3 miles
and with course 031° at 9,3 m11e,
00‘/ To‘- 4.15 / 6.5 - 0.64

sin 40° - E - 0-64 -

since targets speed is constant 12 knots and B - V0 / VT
'
0.64 - V0/12
.'. Ownship speed should be just

less than 7.7 knots.
To clear the target by one mile, B should equal oo*/ To‘
-'- E * 2-9 / 6.5 = 0.446 = V0/12
.'. V0 = 5.35 knots
So to clear the target by one mile own ship‘s peed should be

equal to or less than 5.35 knots.

The following formula fits well for this particular request.
To satisfy a particular miss-distance, Q should be greater
than,arc
Sin

sin E plus
Q.> arc sin
Q>

E

+

arc sﬁmr / R
E + are sin

r/R,iF r<KR then

r / R

if we try it here, it gives the correct answer.
0>

are

sin

sin Q - 1/5
0.643 - 1/5

V0 :; 5.32

E + are

sin

1 / 5

= E
= E =

knots

0.448

= V0 / 12

1.3

The concept of dangerous area and the arc of dangerous
COUIIBBI

l.3.l.The arc of dangerous courses:

In a two-ship encounter, there will be two possibilities to
satisfay a required miss distance, either ownship steer to
pass ahead or astern of the other ship. The are between these
two limiting courses is the arc of danger. It ownship course

is within this are the missdistance will be less than that

required giving a close quarter situation except a particu
lar course which will lead to collision. The dangerous arc
depends on; the speed ratio (E), the desired miss-distance
(R), and the target aspect (Q).

-45
If two lines are drawnparallel to target’s track at a dis
tance equal to the required miss distance, the area bounded
by the two limiting courses (the one for passing ahead and
the other for possing astern), and these lines is the dan
grous area. If ownship should cross this area then she will
be at a distance less than the desired distance from the

target.
U = Target speed for a certain period of time.
V = Ownship speed for same period of time.

R = Required miss distance.
oP = Ownship's course which lead to collision.

P = Expected collision

point (P.P.C.)

oB = Ownship’s course to pass ahead of target at dist.

R.
oA = Ownship's course to pass astern of target at dist. R.
AoB=Arc of dangerous courses.

uk£= Dangerous area.

Q = Target‘s apect.

B = Point of passing ahead of target.
A = Point of passing astern of target.
So if own ship is faster than the target (E ) 1); only One
collision point could be exist (as previously shown)at a
particular course and a single cross ahead and cross astern
position could be generated.

1.3.1.2

If own ship speed ( V ) is less than or equal to
target speed ( U ):

In Both cases different

situations could happen depending on

the speed ratio (E) and the aspect (0). but in case of V < U
or 3 4 1 much more possibilities
may occur.
when V = U ( E = l ) the expected situations are:

a—one collision, one cross - ahead, one cross astern.
b- One cross - astern only.
c- None

WhenV < U (E < 1)

abcd-

Twocollision,
Twocollision,
Twocollision,
one collision,

e- Twocollision

only.

f- Twoastern only.

9- One astern only.
h- None.

the possibilities

two crossone cross
two cross
two cross

are:

ahead, two cross - astern.
- ahead, two cross - astern.
- astern.
- astern.

1.3.1.3

Case one:

when the angle between the target track and the cross-ahead
motion line (m) is greater than 90°

forIt, /rut I

Figure ( 22)

when:

V < U , no collision,

no cross-ahead, no cross-astern

(None).

, no collision (at infinity) also no cross-ahead
or astern
(None).
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when the angle between target track and cross - ahead motion

line (m) is less than 900 but the aspect (Q) is greater than
90°.

Figure ( 23)
When:

—..'_..‘.‘..—.
--:....~

v = U,

one cross-astern

only

V = U sin m,

one cross-astern

only

V-< U sin m,

none

1.3.1. 5- Case three:
When Q <

Figure (24 )

90°, but

m)

0

when

3

v -

U, one collision.

one cross- ahead, one cross 

astern
<

V’

V -

C

sin (Q +er). Twocollision, two cross-ahead.
two cross - astern.

U sin (Q +-1). Twocollision,

one cross ahead,

two cross - astern.
U sin (Q +'<) > V > U sin Q, Two collision,

two cross

astern.
= U sin Q, one collision,

two cross - astern.

sin 0 > V > U sin m, Two cross - astern.
ll
<
C‘.

U sin m, one cross - astern

<~ U sin

m. None

1.3.1. 6- Case four:

when target aspect is reduced such that;
o( =

Figure

Q + B

( 25 )

, but

Q >.

3

when :

U > V ) U Bin (Q *°<).

Two collision,

two cross

ahead, two cross-astern.
V ' 0 Sin (Q +-¢),

Twocollision,

one cross

ahead, two cross-astern.
U sin (0 +04) > V ) U sin 0, Two collision,

two cross

astern.
V = U sin 0

, one collision,

two cross

astern.
U sin Q ) V ) U sin B

, Two cross—astern

only.

V = U sin B

, one cross-astern

only.

V

. None.

41 U sin

B
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1.3.1.7

Case five:

whentarget aspect is reduced such that:
Q‘ -

Q

Figure

+

Bo

but

Q <

B

( 26 )

when :

i

U )

V )

U sin

(o( + Q),

V <1 U sin (a( + Q),

two of each

two collision,

two cross

astern
V <: (J sin B,

two collision

V <1 U sin

none

Q,

points only

1.3.1.8

Conclusion:

1- If V-< U, two sectors of dangerous course
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\\

AfD 31 i 82 0 A2 defining

two dagerous areas.

P1 and P2 are the two collision

points.

A1 and A2 are the 135 and the Zgg point at which own ship

pass astern of target.

31 and B2 are the 155 and the Zng cross-ahead point.

It is noticed that Al is closer to the target than 31 while
B2 is closer to the target than A2.
If V > U,on1y one dangerous area exist and always the cross

astern point is closer to the target than the cross-ahead
point which even further away than the collision point.
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3- Since the two side limits of the dargerous area are the
ownship courses for cross-ahead and cross-astern points,
then the shape of the dangerous area will vary considerably
with:
a- Desired miss-distance
(R)
b- ne1at1ve ‘peed (3)
c- Aspect

(Q)

4- In the two cases four and five (where Q =a< —3), for

ownship to pass astern of the target, course involved steer
ing away from traget‘s track e.g. the course is divergent.
There-fore, the dangerous area is more easly defined as a
circle around the collision point with a radius equal to

the desired miss-distance,
5- when Q =a¥ - B and V<.U sin B, no collision

is possible

but it is also impossible to keep clear from the target by
the required miss-distance.
There-fore, the dangerous area is more suitable to be de
fined as a circle around ownship with a radius equal to

the desired miss-distance.

r

1.3.2. ______.____.3___
Real area of dan er:
In a two-ship encounter, the dangerous area within which

the collision point exist can be defined as follows:
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COMMENT:

The produced shape for the dangerous area looks like an

ellipse, the major axis is nearly equal to the difference
of the cross-ahead and cross-astern distances as measured
from the target, the minor axis is also nearly equal to
twice the desired miss-distance.
It should be noted that the point of possible collision
(P.P.C.) is not necessarily at the centre of the GIBB
As time advances, both P.P.C. and the PADwill change their

position on the screen, the target will moveaccross the ra
dar screen on its relative track with its P.P.C. and its PAD
attached.
If the P.P.C. lie on own ship heading marker only the range

will change but if the PADis not intersected

by the H/mit
will change in position and shape as time progresses.
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1.3.2.1

Howthe concept of dangerous area is adopted in

practice:
1.3.2.1.1

ppc / PADFundamentals:

The following figure illustrates

a hypothetical encounter

with a slower target detected on the starboard bow. A head

up stabilized

display is assumed. Heading marker is subdi

vided into 6 min. elements depicting
V€CtO1'S .

Figure (29)

ownship w.spd / HDG

Point (N) ' relative position of ownshipat all cases (
passing ahead or astern, collision, C.P.A.)
Point (N)  relative position of target in case of collision
Point (B)  relative position of target whenpassing ahead
of ownship

Point

(A)



true position of target whenpassing ahead of
ownship

Point (D)  true position of ownship when target passing
ahead

Point

can be estimated by drawing a line parallel to
(TN) from pont (A) to intersect the collision

(D)

course at (c), then taking same distance (NC)

on the course of ownship which let the target
passes ahead.

Point

(E)

=

relative position of target whenpassing astern
of ownship

Point (s)

=

true position of target whenpassing astern of
ownship

Point

(F)

=

true position of ownship whentarget passing,
astern point (P) can be estimated by same way
as point (D)

Point (I)

=

true position of target at the closest point of
approach when passing ahead.

Point
Point

(H)

=

(CPA2)

true position of ownshipat the closest point
of approach in that case

= relative position of target at the closest
point of approach when passing astern

Point (CPP1)- relative position of target at the closest
point of approach when passing ahead

Point (J)

- true position of target at the closest point

Point (K)

of approach when passing astern
- true position of ownship at the closest point
of approach in that case

Point H,I,J and K can be obtained by constuction.

1.3.2.l.2

The gractlcle

Figure ( 30)

construction

of the PAD:
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At the mid point of the line (AS), a line is drawn perpen

dicular to the target’: track and extend in both direction
(for a distance equal the CPA) to point X and Y.
The ellipse is drawn passing through (AXSY).
The hexagon is drawn by joining
and E.

the points A, B, C, S, D

COMMENT:

The concept of presenting CPAdata in a true motion for
mat superimposed on a relative motion PPI is beneficial.
The computer aided radar data processor provide the flexi

bility to display target data in respect to each of the
relative motion lines (passing ahsad,collision, and pass
ing astern) in a true motion format in relationship to
the fixed single ownship time scale established by the
heading marker.

The critical heading for collision is visualized as being
projected from the PPI centre to a point of intersection
with the target track. This intersection defines the lo
cation of the PPCwhich represents a future position that
the target will occupy and separated from ownship's pre
sent position by a specific time interval and azimuth.
Hazard category is established immediately in term of the
location of the PPCin respect to ownship's marker.
A PPC on or near the heading marker represents

Real HAZARD

which relates to ownship‘s present motion and will require
subsequent evasive action, while a PPClocated else-where
on the PPI represents.

POTENTIALHAZARD
which must be tak

en into consideration whenever ownship contemplates a man
oeuvre. The location of the PPC, there-fore, conveys more

intelligence about the hazard the target is capable to pre- 
sentto ownship than does any specific target parameter such
as range and bearing,speed, heading or even alphanumeric
indication of CPAdata, which is associated with a specific
value of ownship's motion.

Acharacteristic of the collision heading is that the tar
get‘s bearing remains fixed if ownship were to adopt it.
Hence: for any future location of ownship on the collision

course, it is possible to estimate the position of the tar
get on its track. The future location of the target can
thus be related to a specific time, and hence to the loca
tion of ownship anywhere on the PPI. This permits the fut

ure passage of ownship in the vicinity of future positions
of the target to be visualized.
The concept of the predicted area of danger emerges from
this visualization. The PADdefines an area about a loca

tion on the target track that the target will entre at
some future time which if intersected

by own ship heading

marker will result in CPAdistance less than stipulated.
Ownship should always steer well clear of PADS.Hazard

representation

by means of a PADis independent of own

ship’s heading at the momentof observation, though the
subsequent motion of PADSon the relative motion PPI is

determined almost exelusively by the reciprocal of own
ship’s vector. Hence CPAdata can be seen directly, for all

possible headings of own ship at present speed, or on re

quest at any other trial speed.
A simple evasive manoeuvre recommendsit-self
whenever ownship‘s heading marker intersects

instinctively;
one or more

PADS,real hazard is predicted and the heading marker must

be movedaway byan alternation

of heading, or alternatively

the PADSmay be moved off the heading marker by an altera

tion of speed, taking into account other PADSexist on the
PPI.

The first generation of sperry CASdisplays an elliptical
PAD, but the Zng generation

displays

a hexagonal PAD.

1.3.2.1.3 Information content of PFC/ PADdisglnx:
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Data presented on a relative-motion indicator, stabili
zed in either north up or ship‘s heading up. Plot inputs
are

W. SPD / HDG.

This kind of presentation provide:
CPAdata consisting of; clearing ownship headings to
preserve a CPAdistance and available time to manoeuvre.
Ownship and target

6 mins W. SPD / HDGvectors

Target aspect and estimate of speed ratio.
Relative track for data confirmation.
Time interval to PPCand crossing target track.
Independent confirmation of PPClocation.
Estimate for time of CPAon clearing heading.
Estimate for future PPC / PADlocations

for any ownship

heading.

Direct and simple indication of Real and potential hazard
and its variation as ownship manoeuvres.
Manoeuvreconvention for hazard elimination by taking
heading marker away from PADS.

Eliminate sequential trial and‘error variation of vector
modesand prediction time, firstly to determine hazard
and subsequently to select an adequate manoeuvre.

1.3.2.2

Movementof P.P.C. with time:

1.3.2.2.l

If ownship is faster than target E > 1 :

a- Target passing astern:
(S /-J! I T‘ 3 lo.’ IAJJI:/J.’
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Figure
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1.3.2.3

The movement of the PAD:

Ownship will pass either ahead of or astern of a slower

or a taster target respectively.
These four cases are illustrated
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In the case of the slower target, either sense of passing
produces controlled and predictable event-passing in front
of the PADis equivalent to passing in front of the target
5 vice-versa.
Hazard is established

by relating

PADlocations to ownship

line of progress.
Comparision of the tips of ownship and target vectors pro

vides an accelerated forecast capabilities.
Hazard will be seen to diminish before the target reaches

its CPAposition though slower target are classified as non
hazardous, i.e. displayed with a 6-minutes unit vector with
out a PAD, only when the PADis beyond the display

range of

the P.P.I.
A more complex set of events occurs when manoeuvering in the

vicinity of the PADof a faster target.
In general, if ownship is clearing such a target whose PAD

is off the heading marker, inevitably the target will change
its status during the encounter to non-hazardous and the PAD
will disappear. Prior to this, a dual PADwill comeinto di
splay range and merge with the primary PAD.

An example of this phenomenonoccurs with a faster overtaking

target which will be declared non-hazardous when it begins to
draw ahead of ownship. The sequence of events is different

for cases of passing ahead or astern of the target.
The additional complexity in the case of passing ahead of a

faster target is a clear indication of the risks associated
with this type of manoeuvre. The dual PADof the faster tar

get is an important item of information which can not be
ignored.
High and low speed navigation:

In low speed navigation, where the general sample of tar
gets is faster than own ship, the dual PADphenomenonwill
come into play.

Manoeuvring in the vicinity

of a dual PADfollows the con

vention established for the single PADof the slower target:
Pass behind the primary PAD, pass behing the target.
Pass infront of the primary PAD, pass infront of the target.
The late situation is equivalent to passing between the pri
mary and dual PAD.

It follows that passing outside both PADSor on either side
of merged PADSresults

in the target passing ahead. A merged

dual and primary PADrepresents

the disappearance of the ab

ility to cross ahead of a faster target.
In high speed navigation, the speed ratio Vo / VTis large,
so the PADlies close to the target at all times. Hence, a

rule of thumb is that by steering away from targets,

one is

steering away from hazard. Displaying the PADmakes this ac

tivity morecertain.
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2 Marine collision causes and reduction methods:
2.1 The major Collision causes:

In order to analyse marine accidents and initiate

preventative

BCt1°na it 13 "e°°333rY to have a clear understanding, based
on good information, of the causes of the risks involved.

The nature of accidents at sea is rather complicated and to
collect enough information it is not that easy. The actual
sequence of events prior not only to a collision but also to
a near misses should be accurately known. An automatic recor

ding of the operational data on board could provide a good

clarification of the events prior to a casualty.
Potential causal factors of the casualty are often circumstan
ces or conditions present to a varyﬁuyextent during all ship
transport operations and not only in the cases where casualties
occur. A collection of data on near-misses can there-fore pro
vide insight into potential causal factors, and should one ma
ke comparisons with situations that led to that cesua1tY.0ne
then possibly identify the most critical circumstances or con

ditions that lead to casualties.
Det Norske Veritas research devision carried out a research

work to find out the cause relationships of collisions and
groundings, the project done in the period 1977-80 and has
given a good light on that problem. Vmﬁtas was interested

in finding out the reason for the large numberof collisions
and groundings on a world wide basis.

Veritas wantedto evaluate its classification rules for ships

in light of the conclusions from such an analysis and to dc‘
ermine its rate in the endeavour to minimize such casualties.

Collision risk problem could be constructed in three parts:
a- The ship itself

with its social and technical system and

man/machine communication.

b- The environment represented by traffic,

weather and waters.
c- The society represented by shipyards, manufacturers, natio
nal and international organizations, marine authorities, ow

ners, and classification societies.
The latent risk can manifest itself

in manyways such as; acc

idents, incidents or near misses and “lived through" or experi
enced risks.
In the operation and maintenance of a ship there are men and

machines involved and they cooperate. This cooperation is con

trolled by a system of rules concerning procedures and the di

stribution of tasks and responsibilities. These rules are est
ablished by authorities, classification societies and shipping
companies and only a fraction of them originate on board. The
rules, the men, and the machines encounter each other in diffe
rent interfaces,

of which the best knownis ergonomic: How

well is the machine fitted to man? The ship operates in an en
vironment which can be of various kinds.

The casualty can thereby be regarded as a result of the inter
play between the conditions and situations that the man/machine

system is set to operate under, and the system's inability to

fulfill the requirements.
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2.1 The probability of marine collision could be affected by
many ﬁactorﬂa the major ones are:

1- Traffic condition;
a- Ships engaged in the traffic

(size, speed and standard)
b- Type of encounter (heading on, overtaking, crossing or

fine crossing).
c- Traffic density.
External influences;

a- Weathercondition (visibility,

darkness).

b- Waterways.

c- Other ship fault or deficiency.
Ship technology;
a- Manoeuvring quality.

b- Ship‘s control system.
Navigational system;
a- Bridge design and arrangement.

b- Bridge routines and procedures.
c- Bridge equipments.

Navigational aids;
a- Sailing regulations.
b- Communications.

c- Vessel traffic systems (traffic seperation schemes:
vessel traffic surveillance and services).
Humanfactors;

a- Violation.
b- Comptence and experience.
C- Work load and social climate.

Therefore, the following factors could be considered as the

major factors causing collision risk;
Traffic condition
External influences
Suddentechnical failure
Humanerrors

.2

the major measures taken to minimize the effect
these causes are:

Navigational system
Navigational aids

Greater reliability

of ship‘s control system

Education and training philosophy
In addition

Marine casualty investigation technique to check the effec
tbﬂﬁss of the above measures and explore new adequate ideas.

Nowwe can analyze the items of these measures to highlight

howeach item is contributing in solving the collision pro
blem, trying to find out the defeciencies, to be able to
present the recommendations which could improve the situa

tion.

2.2.1. Navigational system:
23.1.1 rid e desi n and arran ement:
The ¢1ffN1”tl€5 facing watchkeeping officers

while conducting

safe navigation, particularly in congested areas, are increa
sing with the increment in ships size, speed and number which
are considered as contributing factors enhanceingthe occurance

of collision risk. These circumstances are pushing strongly
towards seeking for the most efficient navigational opera
tions. Since the bridge is the operational centre of the
ship, its design and arrangement is very important and must
be optimized to improve the safety of navigation under all

operating conditions.

Several analysis of marine casualties, especially collisions
and grounding, show that manywere attributed

to failure to

keep a good lookout, which must be interpreted

in the broadest
terms. In addition to keeping a visual lookout it has meant

failure to observe changes in the weather, including visibi
lity,

failure to observe properly the movementsof approach
ing vessels, failure to observe the radar and /or echo sound
er, and failure to observe that the course is accurately ste
ered and that helm orders are carried out correctly.
TOavoid all these possible

deficiemﬁesmore emphasis on bri

dge design. layout, and arrangement are needed.

It is probably true in the case of manyvessels that insuffi
cient attention is paid to the design of the navigating bridge.
design being often left to the builder or, even the engineer
superintendent.

Traditional bridge layouts are shownto be inefficient with
respect to the work utilized by mariners at sea. Massive in
Ittumﬁﬂt PGDG13Often ﬁited 50 as to deny the officer

of the

watch, the ability to get close to the bridge windows, poor
instrument layout within these panels, and a randomscatter
of equipment making a mockery of ergonomics have all been too

readily accepted by too manyofficers

for too long time.

This short coming is very significant

today with the current

impact and range of modern equipment and the tendency to re

duce manning, making it necessary to examine not only the in

dividual instruments found on the bridge, but to step back and
take an objective look at the whole. The bridge arrangement

should ensure that the officer can more effectively discharge
his duties. There is a need of wide arcs of visibility and a
sensible layout of instrument and equipment for the most eff
icient operation. The benefits to the operator should be ease
of opcration of instruments, comfort and considerably improv
ed working environment.

International organisations, national administrations, various
institutions and the navigators themselves are nowincreasing
ly concerned about bridge functions, layout and instrumenta

tion for increasing nautical safety. The operational safety is
considered as an important sector of the total safety of the
ship and its complement,

The bridge design should be evaluated in relation to the re’
quirements of functional analysis and forthcoming internatio
nal regulations, it should allow the housing of new technology

V1th0Ut n995t1Ve1Y3ff°Ct1n9 existing functions and routines.

If an owner's design is evaluated on the basis of functional
analysis, with consideration to possible future change; ;n 1"
strumentation, the result should ensure operational effeciency
and safety while being of maximumbenefit to the user.

It isumxaaﬂne to produce one basic design which will be suit

able for all classes of vessels as the space available, the
manning and the equipment will vary considerably.

However,

it is possible to lay downcertain lines of guidance. This is
best expressed by grouping equipment according to function,
which means having regard to inter alia usage, circumstances,
presentation and back—upfacilities.

The first requirement of a bridge officer is to be able to ke
ep a good lookout visually,

as well as having the ability to

moveabout freely without obstruction and observe such instru
ments as required. Further, only equipment which are actually
required for the navigation and manoeuvring of the ship should
be placed in front of the navigator and all other equipment
relegated to the back of the bridge.
Before showing one of the proposed bridge design and layout.

it is perhaps desirable to give a few examples of comon faults:
a- Wheelhauuestructure does not provide enougharc of visibili
ty and its windowsvertical causing light- reflection prov
blems.

b- The fore end cluttered up with switches and controls, many
of which are not required for navigation, and so placed that
when anyone leans on the fore-end they may be inadvertently

activated.

c- Failure to duplicate controls or place them where they may

be required.
d- No consideration to possible future changes in instrumenta

tion.
e- Instruments sited outside normal reading range.

f- Instrument so sited that the data is not instantly visually

available.

The number of alarms on the bridge is tending to increase, and
to avoid confusion in momentsof stress, a centralised alarm

and control panel is required.
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The sketch shows the principles of a bridge destgn arrived at in the Norwegtan SDS projtﬂ tn the mtd- 70:. Thesolutton meets t e
requirementsof today and the near future
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Dot yorske Veritas has comnﬂed a drgft proposal for a c1a.s_

ification service entitled “Nautical safety‘, to contribute
in increasing operational safety and to offer relevant pro

fessional assistance in this field.
Anyway,a continuous contact with ship designers, builders
and operators is essential to ensure that the wheelhousede
signer is supplying what the user needsfor most efficient
actions. A concern for ergonomics has becomea necessity in

today‘s maritime industry.
A well planned wheelhouse layout is surely a positive step

towards greater safety.

2.2.1.2

Bridge routines and producers:

The causes of manycasualties

are found to be related to inade

quate watch keeping, lack of planning, and lack of systematism
in carrying out the bridge functions. Moreemphasis should th
erefore be placed on better watch keeping organization and on

greater use of established procedures. This will ensure that
the necessary tasks are carried out at the right time and an
adequate contingency plan is available during critical phases
of the voyage.

Adeguate coverage of the watch, avoiding slovenliness in exe

cuting properly the vital tasks is a very important matter whi
ch seriously affect the safety at sea.
Watchkeepingofficer leaving the bridge staying long time in
the chart room, inadequate attention and absent lookout, off
icer felt asleep on the watch or affected by alcohol, no fre
quent check of navigation lights‘ course, speed, compasserr

or, and visibility, not calling the master is case of poor vis
ibility or in situations where his skill and experience are ne
eded lack or rong fog, manoeuvreor warning signals, insuffic

ient distance whenpassing other ships, excessive speed under
thecnrcumstances, neglect bridge to bridge communication, not

listening to navigational and traffic warnings in congested ar
eas, ignorance of the rules of the nautical roads, neglect vis
ual observation, and depending on one source of information with

out considering its limitations, are all dangerous factors gene
rated by the carelessness and violation of the watchkeepingoff
icer and affect the navigational safety.

They are contributing factors which lead mostly to serious
accidents and consequently must be completely avoided. That co
uld be 5Ch1eV°dbY well defined job requirements, extensive br
idge procedures, and strict watch rules and orders followed by
consecutive check and serious control by the master until he is
sure that all officers obide by them.
Good bridge producers may depend on:

1- Bridge manning

2- Bridge instruction
3- Bridge organization, referring to the division of responsi
bilities between the persons involved in the execution of
the passages
4- Pre-planning and briefing of sea passages
Safety could be improved to a considerable extent by proper
manning of the watch in various conditions.

Double manning of

bridges in certain areas is advisable. Twoofficers on watch
maybe necessary where navigational hazards (ice, several oil
rigs, severe weather condition with heavy deck cargo etc.), hi

gh traffic density, or restricted visibility is expected.
These areas can be recognized by the beforehand planning and bri

efing of the voyage.
way of pointing only one seaman per watch at

The traditional

night should also change during these conditions which need
enough vigilance during all watch period.

Ship's safety and efficiency greatly be rectified and increased
by the issuance of extensive watch instuctions and procedures
for the bridge functions. Formalizing work routines and practi
ces on the bridge is necessary and not the traditional belief
which is to leave it up to the individual navigator.

shipping has long traditions which often are said to be the
strength of this industry, but from a safety point of v1eu

these traditions in the attitudes are quite often the weak
ness in shipping.
Shorebased management as well as the masters on board ships

are both responsible for the establishment of efficient ope
rating procedures on board their vessels.
Captain instructions

must be extensive and clear enough, spe

cially the night orders, taking into consideration all the
watch phases and particulars including; procedures for radar
plotting, procedures of passing other vessels in restricted
waters, checking of marks and lights, alternative references
for positioning, procedures in poor visibility, exchangeof
information whenencountering other vessels, ... etc.
If we shall overcome the wide spread improvisation on the br

idge which too often results in accidents in the merchant fl
eet, a change in attitude is of the greatest importance.
Several nautical colleges have bridge-instuctions and prep1ann
ing of seapassages in their curriculum, but bridge teamwork
training however still seems to be far behind.
Nautical colleges can make a valuable contribution by implemen

ting bridge organizations in the sense of bridge teamworkin
their education as a special subject and in a modernway.
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2.2.1.3.

Bridge equipment:

Navigation is that science which enables a craft to travel from one

place to another in safety. For marine navigator this implies that.
he must be able to obtain and plot ship's position frequently. monitoring

of potential hazards to navigation, evaluating and processing the

traffic situation to avoid collision with other ships. The advent of
electronic navigational aids has alleviated the problems to a consi

derable degree. particularly in conditions of reduced visibility.
In the past 50 years there have been increasing developments in elec
tronic equipment for the operation of ships and many of them have been

applied in all vessels.
These equipments can be devided into two main categories:

l- Systems which have a direct contribution to collision avoidance
procedures,

such as V.H.F., Radar. and ARPA

2- Systems assisting in collision avoidance which either provide ship's
position such as Decca. Loran. Omegaand satellite

or help in

estimating the ship's position such as the echo sounder and logs.
V.H.F. radio telephony has been used for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship
communicationand when used effeciently

cidence of collission.

successfully

reduce the in

It's effect will be mentionedin moredetails

later in this section.
Radar 15. perhaps. one of the most useful aids that has been given to

the navigator. Despite initial

problems, it is recognized today as

an extremely useful piece of equipment which. if used

correctly,

can provide an immenseamount of information to the

navigator.
Fixed objects and prominent landmasses are visible on the PPI

display, as well as other ships in the immediatevicinity.
Collision between ships have always been a serious problem,

particularly in poor visibility. weather conditions have lit
tle effect on the use of radar, so that it can be used in coll
ision avoidance in both clear and foggy weather. By plotting,
the course of an approaching vessel on the PPI, the closes po
int of approach and the necessary avoiding action can be deter
mined.

However, in a multi-ship situation, which is typical of many
coastal waters, the job of plotting the tracks of more than
one vessel can be time consuming. By using the recently intro
duced computing radars (ARPAS),the navigator is able to ob

tain rapidly the closest point of approach of up to 20 targets.
Also the proposed change in course or speed, or both, can be

fed into the equipment to check the effectiveness of the manoe
uvre to avoid a dangerous target and that will not result in
another hazardous situation. FU11 details about radar and
ARPAwill be given in the next section.

The second category of the electronic navigation aids is con

taining the equipments used in position fixing technique. their
exsistance had increased the ship's safety and efficiency by
obtaining it’s position whenneeded for economical operation
and

to avoid knownhazards. Accordingly, they share in re

ducing the work load of the watchkeeping officer

leaving more

time for him to eva1uate the traffic situation and take the
correct action in time to avoid collision or any dangerous

close quarter situation.
Echo sounders are used to get the water depth to determine
not only that the vessel may be approaching a grounding sit
uation but also to provide location information using contour

navigation.
Radio direction finders receivers makeuse of the directional
properties of a loop aerial to get the bearings of knownrad
io beacons.
Conventional logs measure both speed and distance through um wa

ter while dopplerlogscanmeasure the speed of the vessel over
the ground.
Hyperbolic systems; Decca, Loran and Omegause the concept

of an imaginary hyperbolic grid superimposed on the earth's

surface. The constituent hyperbolea are derived by measuring
the time and /or phase difference between the arrivaldf $"Wh"

onised transmissions from two station pairsgiving a position

line.
Decca, is used for coastal navigation, Loran-c, is suitable
for use in both oceanic and coastal naviagation, Omegais.
normally used for oceanic navigation but it may be good en

ough for coastal navigation if the differential

The transit satellite

modeis used.

system can provide accurate position

fixes any where but the biggest drawback of the system is the

interval occurs between reliable fixes which varies according
to the ship's latitude.Navstar (Gps) satellite system is a mut
ch heralded system, which is expected to have extremely far
reaching effects on not just position fixing but on the Wh°1e

spectrum of navigation. The system is still in the developing
stage, but the expected big advantage is its ability to prov
ide accurate position fixes continuously, in all weather, th
rouhgout the world. It could becomethe ultimate navigation
system.

Inertial navigation system is a recent introduction in mari
ne navigation but it is still too expensive for general use.
Thus there is a great variety of systems available for navi
gational tasks on board ships, which overlap or complement

each other in manyaspects of their application. At present
the task is to reduce those methods to the required extent and
to intergrate them into a navigation system covers extensively
the problems of the operation of the ship and track guidance.
Integration

of two system, such as Satnav/Omegaand Loran/Sat

nav, provides the user with not only all the featurers of each
individual system, it also helps to counteract each one's def

iciencies.
Therefore, one can say that technology is keeping up with the

navigational system with consideration to increase service ab
ility and accuracy, display enough and clear information in a
simple form, and provide mariners with all needs and require
ments during the various circumstances to reduce his work load.
Today a new technique is introduced performing the second half

of the position fixing task to avoid leaving the bridge to the‘
chart roomat possibly vital moments.The instrument is called
the Bowditch navigator which automatically and continously dis
Plays the vessel’s current position on a standard nautical chart.

It is used in conjunction with the ship‘s electronic position
fixing aids.
The most important and essential
lsary training

procedure now is the nece

for the proper use of all

this eQU‘iP|T|enT-

The mariners have to knowthe correct setting.

adjustment, and

reading of these equipments to avoid any faulty operation or
ma1'fUnCt10n Of any system. They must well understand the adva
ntages and limitations of each and know how to analyze and get

the full benefits of the informations available.
The navigators should also check the performance of these sys

tems prior to sailing, prior to entering restricted or hazar
dous waters and at regular and frequent intervals throughout
the passage, never rely upon so completely on single electro
nic navigational device that its failure mayjeopardise the

safety of the vessel.

2.2.2

Navigational aids:

2.2.2.l.5ailing Regulations:
The function of the international regulations for preventing
collision at sea is to direct the actions taken by mariners so
that a safe conduct results. They are the most important means
of avoiding collision. Therefore, the rules must be well desi
gned to deal with all classes of encounters, very clear to av
oid ambiguity, and simple enough to be used easﬂy and correc
tly. They should also be analysed and amendedfrom time to ti

me to cope with the development of technology and clarify

cer

tain difficulties if any.
The rules were established

in 1864 and revised inl948, 1960 and

1972to suit the infinite variety of maritime circumstances.
The new regulations

came into force since 1977, but there is

still a prevalent tendency of the parties involved to disreg
ard the basic rules.

In manycollision

cases on which judgments

have been passed, at least one of the two ships involved has
been found to have contravened the international regulations.
Captain/Wylie, Kemp, Hopkins and others said that 1972 rules

are still

have some deficiences,

Complex,and the verbiage is

not likely to help matters. They said that; the regulations
allow escape action on the part of the stand-on vessel when it
becomes apparent that the

give-way vessel is not manoeuvring

as it should. The point at which a manoeuvre should be made is

not, however, laid down in the regulations. Since the pog51
bility exists that stand-on ship could makean escape ac
tion before the give-way vessel makes its manoeuvre, the give
wayvessel will be aware of this possibility. The rules also

do not specify what escape action should be taken in that case,
either very drastic escape action is necessary or gone kind of
manoeuvre which takes into account the likely action from the
give-way ship. It is desirable that the rules should prescribe
manoeuvreswhich are geometrically and logically consistent.
Moreover, under these regulations the restriction on the beha

viou9;§hips in collision-avoidance situations in poor visibili
ty is not enough.

In addition to that comment,they belive that the verbiage of
somerules is poor and if the existing english version is going
to be used as the basis for translation into other languages th
ere certainly will be dangers ahead unless something is done be

forehand to improve the text.
The problems developed in the analysis of the role and appli
cation of a collision avoidance rule are nowbeing approached

experimently. In particular, the extent to which the interpre
tation of the current regulations varies across individuals,
the way in which navigators in practice overcome the various
logical problems associated with the regulations, and the way

in which the regulations are extended to cover multiple-ship
encounters are under investigation.
To alleviate some of the problems, amendmentstake place from
time to time. In June 1983 several amendments where made, mai

"1! relating to the carriage of lights and shapes. Twonewpara

gramwwere added to rule 10, Traffic Separation schemes. to

sxemt vessels restricted in their ability to manoeuvre.which
are engaged in an operation for the maintenance of safety of
navigation or in the laying or servicing or picking up of a
submarine cable, from complying with the requirements for ves
sels navigating in or near a traffic seperation scheme.
Further amendments are being considered

by the IMOSub-Commi

ttee on Safety of Navigation to resolve someambiguities or to
clarify the Rules. Rule 10 will probably be amendedto make it

clear that, whencrossing a traffic lane, it is the course st
eered which should be at right angels to the direction of tr
affic flow, and to give a better indication of which vessels
are permitted to use inshore traffic zones.
There is also likely to be an amendmentrelating to the term
"avoid impeding the safe passage", as used in Rules 9,10 and 18.
At present there is some confusion as to the respective respon

sibility of vessels required to avoid impeding the passage and
vessels required to keep out of the way. It will be several ye
ars before these further amendmentswill be agreed and brought

into force.
Eventually it is
more predictable
ning and careful
rve the mariners

hoped that the behaviour of mariners will be
in the problem encounters by additional trai
adjustment of the rules which will have to se
of manycountries and the safety of their shi

ps. passengers and cargoes, and not be a possible cause of some

indecision or confused interpretation.

All ships officers must be well prepared and trained to abide

to these regulations carefully, intelliggntly, and correctly
in time without any hesitation

since they are the most impo

rtant meansfor avoiding collision at sea.
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Course alteration

diagram, intended primarily for use in

avoiding a vessel detected by radar‘and out of sight.
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Logic flow diagram for two—shipencounter

in open sea following International Rules
of the Nautical Roads

2.2.2.2.

Communications:

Oneof the most important violations for collisions is the in
sufficient and ineffective use of communication. It was found
that failure in communicationwas either a causal or a contri
buting factor in manycollision cases.
One example is the Delta Norte/African pioneer collision 18
February 1982 in the Gulf of Mexico, the conclusion indicate
that the accident might have been prevented if the master of
the Delta Norte and the chief mate of the African pioneer had
contacted each other using the V.H.F. radiotelephone and had
established a meeting arrangement.
Another example is the collision between a bulk carrier (14,
000 g.r.t.)

from Portsmouth (NewHampshire) and an oil tanker

(17,000 g.r.t.) approaching Boston. The collision occured in
Massachusetts Traffic seperation schemeat 1713 in daylight,
the investigation indicatedthat the methodof calling on V.H.F.
radiotelephony used by the bulk carrier was inadequate, and if
V.H.F. radiotelephony had been used properly by both ships the

collision might have been avoided.

Communication is extremely important, the possibilities of
communicationwith other traffic is a decisive factor. The sa
fe conduct of shipping can be well improved if ships communi
cate their intention while approaching each other and exchange

anti-collision advice.
To reduce accidents resulting from navigational encounters in
volving uncertainty about the other vessels intentions, effec
tive bridge-to-bridge communicationis required. It will be
valuable if bridge-to-bridge comunications is improvedby.

for instance. regulations and training to ensure greater c1;

cuit discipline.
During last decade virtually every merchant vessel of any con
sequence has been equipped with V.H.F. radiotelephony equip
ment. It had been hoped by many that the emergence of this re
markable and widely available communication facility would ha
ve been recognized in the 1972 agreed international regulations

for preventing collisions at sea, as a means of helping to en
sure that no cancelling actions would be taken by two vessels
trying to avoid each other. This opportunity was not grasped
by the IMOworking party on the collision regulations for a
variety of reasons and consequently was lost at the interna
tional conference held in October 1972.

It should be noted however, that although the 1972 regulations

do not specifically acknowledge the existence of V.H.F. fhey
do statethat "all available means" should be used to make a

full appraisal of the situation and for determining the risk
of collision (1972, Rules 5 and 7). It is quite likely there
fore that such "means" could be considered by a court of law
to include V.H.F. communication.

Oneof the possible difficulties

related to V.H.F. communica

tion is the lack of a language commonto those wishing to com
municate, which could be misunderstanding what was said and

misconstruing intennous and agreements. The international code
of signals provides an International phonetic Alphabet (IPA).
and an International

code (INTERCO)to help to overcome this

difficulty, although, perhaps regrettable, an ‘anti-collision
message‘ section has not been included in the cod¢$.Such a sec

tion could be useful and its content would need to be closely
aligned with the international regulations, it wouldbe nece
asary amongst other things to be able to describe the class
and aspect of a vessel. Moreover, adoption of a seperate wor
ld-wide V.H.F. channel for use during ship encounters in in
ternational waters will ensure that the passing of vital navi
gational and anti-collision information is not prejudiced.
Communications with other ship can further

beimmwvedby

fitting the vessel with adequate equipment and by careful or
ganization of the layout of the operator's place to avoid di
fficulties in establishing communications,the problemof id
entifying other vessels could be solved by using transpoder
system connected to V.H.F. or radar.
However, more restrict

regulations

and training i5 StlV'fWEd€d

to avoid problems such as, not listening to proper frequency,
not using bridge-to—bridge communication in situations
it would be 6f help

or agreeing to an infeasible

where

passing.

On the other hand, the link between ships and shore must be

promoted to inform the ships off certain coasts of the world
with the necessary intelligence of the traffic and local en
vironment through which they pass, to know what is going on

around them or ahead of them. This is quite useful in areas

°f heavy shipping traffic particularly whenbad visibility
11ke1y to occur such as Dover Strait.

Wheretraffic

is_

separation

schemes are used, it will be very important to inform ships in

the area about the vessels and ferries intend to cross the la
nes or moving in unexpected direction.

this will help muchin

reducing the possibility

of collision

and thus ‘Increasesthe saf

ety of navigation.
One of the new systemlwhich is designed to serve ships and pro
vide them with needed informations is the Navtex. It is an in

ternational single frequency system providing vessels with an
edited series of coastal warningsor advisory messages printed
out on the ship‘s bridge. The subjects covered include navi

gational warnings, meteorological forecasts and gale warnings,
ice information, electronic nav-aids warnings and initial dis

tress messages.
Generally, the development of satellite systems give an indica
tion that satellite communicationin the future will be the
predominant communication tool on board ships.

- 105 

2.2.2.3.

Vessel traffic systems:

Vessel traffic

systems of one form or another have been used for over

thirty years. Early systems were primarily used for ports and canal
approaches.

Due to the considerable increase in the volume of marine traffic

and

the growth in size and speed of ships. catastrophic collisions occu
red in the congested areas such as English channel. Dover strait,

North Sea. where shipping situation
control and a collision

and

started to be completely out of

was taking place every few days. The loss of

ships and men was both fearsome and senseless and pollution was extreme

ly high.

In 1959 Oudet proposed a traffic

seperation scheme in Dover Strait which

was accepted by IMO. by l964 other schemes are suggested for other areas

such as North Sea. Baltic Sea and the Strait of Gibralter.

The first

traffic

seperation schemeswere introduced on voluntary basis

in 1967-68 off the coasts of North West Europe and the United States
of America.

Compliancewith the principles

of traffic

seperation was made compul

sory for the ships of some countries in the period 1972-77, and for

all ships in July 1977 when the revised Collision Regulations came into

force.

Since the encounter rate bears a relation to the collision rate in a given
area of sea. consequently it is desirable to minimize the encounter rate.
the Effect of routing is to reduce the total numberof encounters in sea

area of a high density of shipping, hence increasing safety of navigation.

An analysis of collisions in the Dover Strait area in the se
ven years period before and after 1967 has been carried out
by the Nautical Maritime Institute. The overall trend shows
a decline in the numberof collisions due to the introduc

tion of routing.
While it maYbe comparatively

international application,
quite another matter.

easy to pass a law which has

the enforcement of such a law is

The supervising authorities were up against shipmasters of
manynationalities and varying degrees of competency, all of
them had one object

in commonand that was thepmosxmtnma of

their voyage with the utmost dispatch. To them, the shortest
distance between two points was in a straight

line and not

via an imaginary roadway inked in on the chart. The incidence

of rogues, or vessels proceeding against the traffic flow, or
otherwise contravening

the IMOrecommendations was tremendou

sly dangerous.
Studies accomplished by US Coast Guard,Brfﬁsh

and French

authorities and other national and international bodies re
connended the improvementof the effectiveness of the vessel traffic

su

rveillance and services to ensure the safety conduct of ship

Ping. The justification of thisrecomendation is the continu
ous increase in; traffic flow in certain areas (in English
Channel it is now at an average rate of one vessel everY five
minutes). the number of cargoes of a noxious or dangerous na

turep and the numberof ships not complying with internation

ally agreed standards and rules.
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The use of radars increased the accuracy significantly.
V2558‘ trlfflc

A nulber of

Systems» U51"9 specially developed radars. have been

available for more than ten years. However. it has not been until

last few years that standard marine radars have been adopted to pro

vide low-cost. low-maintenanceand highly reliable vessel traffic
systems.

An example of this new system is that presented by Norcontrol. Nor

control utilized the related experience gained in the production of
marine automation systems. marine training simulators. integrated navi
gation systems, and anti-collision

radar systems to produce an accu

rate flexible system that fulfills

the requirementsof vessel traffic

management.Tracking targets,

together with the display of afterglow.

their course. speed and identity may be initiated

tically.

manually or automa

Additional computer programmesprovide alert or alarm strate

gies to warn the operator about hazardous traffic situations. such as.
deviation from required routing, excessive speed in a channel. buoy

damage. vessel dragging its anchor, etc.

In addition the display of traffic

infonmation, which can easily be

seen in daylight. a data recording system for the storage recovery
of vessel movements at any given time has also been developed. A full

radar coverage of a given area can be obtained through a carefull

assessment of available sites and the deploymentof sensors.

Todaya shipmaster entering a congested traffic

area assisted by

V.T.S. no longer has to look forward to a twenty-four hours passage

through bedlam. The rules are strict
to abide by them need have no fear.

and the shipmaster prepared
A network

of

radar surveillance stations monitors his progress, correct
his mistakes and warn him about any possible danger in n13

path.
Vessel traffic systems nowprovide information that will en
sure the free, but planned flow of traffic in congested or
difficult seaways so reducing the risk to life, environment,
and ecology.

Traffic seperation together with developedtraffic surveill
ance and services have been found to be very effective in re

ducing the incidence of collisions especially meeting and fi

ne crossing collisions in poor visibility and particularly
in the Dover Strait

two following tables.

and Southern North Sea, as shown by the

Table ( 6 )

Collisions

in the Dover Strait according to

encounter situation
1957-61

Opposite directions
Broad crossing
Same direction
Not known

Totals

Table ( 7 )

1962-66

1967-71

1972-76

1977-81

45

47

27

7

3

0
6

0
7

0
8

o
5

2
7

1

2

1

1

0

52

56

36

14

12

Collisionsin

the Southern North Sea according to

encounter situation
1957-61

Opposite directions

1962-66

1967-71

1972-76

1977-61

51

58

46

11

11

Broad crossing

7

6

7

9

4

Same direction

11

9

6

6

3

Not known

10

3

7

3

1

Totals

79

81

66

29

19
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The next steps which could be needed to ensure navigational

safety particularly in congested areas are:
1- Extend the requirement for compulsory pilotage (already

practised in several parts of the world for different re
asons) to cover all vessels of over, say 100,000 tons, and
all vessels carrying dangerous cargoes, Toxic, inflammable

or nuclear.
2- Extention of shore based radar surveillance system and im
proved identification methods to ensure the prosecution of

offenders, perhaps including compulsoryfitting of trans
ponders and more severe penalties.
3- we may also need to improve buoyage. The buoyage system in

troduced in NW-Europefrom April 1977, based on a combina

tion of the cardinal and lateral

systems removedambiguity,

but the buoys themselves must be made more reliable.

2.3 Ship's control system:

A particular attention and high consideration has been given
to the ship's systems which have a direct relation to the ef
fectiveness of the handling of the ship. Rudder, steering ge
ar, main engine, and auxiliary machinery are very important
systems which need special care. Any failure or serious def
eciency in one of these systems could either be an accident
or a cause of an accident. The risk that a technical failure

could lead to a casualty is especially high in restricted ar
eas where near-misses are likely to occur.
A vessel‘s ability

to avoid collision by manoeuvrecan be ex

pressed in terms of stopping and turning characteristics.

In

the same time the accuracy and success of an avoiding action

will depend mainly on the degree of rudder effectiveness

the reliability
In practice,

and

of the steering gear and machinery.

ships are said to be dynamically stable whenthe

spiral test shows a unique relation between rudder angle and
the rate of turn. A normal ship will becomeincreasingly sta
ble as the rate of turn incnames, e.g. as the rudder effectiv

eness increases.
The reliability of steering gear and machinery can be impro
ved by using a back up or parallel systems which can be acti
vated instananaxsly , like the stand by spare units or com
ponents or using an alternative control path.
The navigator must knowthe exact rate of turn of his ship

under various conditions and the forces affecting it, to be
able to determine inadvance the behavior of the ship during
the avoiding manoeuvres. The main engine must be well main
tﬂinedo 511 m3°h1"erY Parts are checked frequently,

and en

gine roomroutines are well arranged, clearly recognized,
and strictly followed particularly during stand by periods
to ensure that all bridge orders will be answeredcorrectly
in time.
The advanced technology and the rules and recommendationsof
SOLASconvention have added some improvements to the ship's

process and technique.

For example, SOLASamendments require

that the steering systems should be designed to permit isol
ation of a failed componentand to permit the operator to
promptly resolve lost steering using an alternative control
Path or component to avoid any dangerous sequences due to a

sudden failure in the steering gear.
Today the standard of computing techniques on the one hand,

and the possibilities of describing the track of ships under
the influence of various forces on the other hand, have rea
ched a level which enables a system to be developed for the

determination of optimumrudder and propeller handling to
steer the vessel. Thus subjective decisions by the navigating

officer impairing the ship's safety can be eliminated and
the risk of collisions is avoided or reduced.
There is a trend nowadays towards developing alarm and con

trol systems for marine use which complywith stringent saf

Qty requirements. Norsk Hydro control systems has introduc
ed a computerised system-Covac- for data collection. moni

toring and remote control on board ships.
Accordingly, we may say that the situation can be generally
further improvedby greater use of fault-diagnosis and con

trol systems, greater use of strict state of readiness proc
edures, using standardized formats for presenting clear co
cise manoeuvring data such as basic turning and stopping da
ta for practical use, readily available in the ship's wheel
house, and by placing greater emphasis on the ergonomical as

pects associated with the manoeuvringof the ship.
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2.2.4.

Eduction and training:

It is evident from statistics

that an extremly high proportion of

accidents at sea are caused by the erronoua

being. A quantitative

behaviour of 3 human

assessment of the primary causes of maritime

collisions indicates that about 85%of all collisions are due to
faulty humanjudgement of the officer

on watch of one or both en

countering ships. associated with navigational and steering errors.
Therefore. proposals are madeby the authorities of nearly all tra
ditional nations to prevent collisions by upgrading education and

training of ship personnel.

The risk caused by humanunreliability

or deficiences in the social

system manifests itself as erroneous. delayed or neglected actions.
The individual

may also be unaware of what the situation

from him. which results

demands

in an omitted action. The bases for a correct

action are serious intention. absence of fatal distractions. adequate
decision and the capability to perform the action. Sufficient and effi

cient education and training are therefore necessary to fulfill

the

need and improve the situation.

College courses and educational tools must be well arranged and deve

loped to meet the requirements of and keeping abreast the developments

in the maritime industry. The courses must contain the necessary
syllabus and sound as a long-term investment to an industry where tech

niques and technology are changing rapidly. Entry qualifications
be high and not

less

must

than "A level" with minimumaccademic attainment in suitable

subjects such as mathematics, english and science and I per
sonally believe that the "hose pipe‘ system must be stopped.
The first filter for applicants should be the academicpro

wess together with the physical fitness.
A course for navigators on procedures aimed at the avoidance

of collisions is seems necessary. within that course they ha
ve to study special cases with the aim of finding causes and
recommendmeasures, plus discussion and analysis of the mari
ne casualty statistics.
Such a course ought to be madeavail

able in the education programmeat the navigational colleges.
It can be considered as a direct preventive measure.
Continual pressures to reduce manning, bigger and bigger ships
with more and more equipments and greater use of automation

suggest that providing ship crews more thorough training in
ship's equipment, handling and operating procedures would re

sult in significant safety benefits.
Environmental conditions do not inevitably lead to collisions
but are only causes if the individuals facing the conditions
do not know how to handle them or to respond effectively

to

their changes due to inadequate skills and training. There
fore, extensive training is essential to promoteofficers’sk

ills to be able to act correctly and intelligently as required
The failure to appreciate both visual and radar aided traffic
information, insufficient ability to interpret data or complete

utilization

of information. errors in judgment, faulty ope

ration of equipment and erroneous/delayed evasive manoeuvre,

are serious deficiencies which considerably increase the pro
bability of collisionsat sea. These deficiencies can only be
minimized by upgrading mariner‘s qualifications, developing
the teﬂt materiﬂls and using advanced training techniques.
Hhatever strict

and comprehensive the rules.

whateversophes

ticated the equipment, it is all useless if an incompetent
officer defies the rules or misuses the equipment. Poorly

qualified and trained officers will have insufficient abili
ty to cross the seas in safe.
Instruction in the handling of collision situations ought to
be an integral part of upgraded and extended training.
Manoeuvring simulators are now accepted as an important tra

ining tool to promote the practical

experience and overcome

the navigator’s failing shiphandling abilities. The training
is close to reality and can be done under different environ
mental and ship condition. Simulators can make significant
progress in identﬁwing and improving the navigators skill to

effectively handle their ships and avoid collision risk.
The Internatinal
fication

Convention on Standards of Training, Certi

and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,

1978 (STCWConvention)
recently came into force and may eventually bring about some

improvement but now is the time to look at the problems of im

plementation. IMOis trying to assist memberstates to ensure

that all ships will maintain the required standard. Flag State
and port state should also give a hand to find out any sub

stsndard ship.Sn1ps not Complyingwith internationally
agreed standards can be considered as a moving h.z.,¢
and must be stopped.They can easily cause disasters and

often not only to themselves.

2.2.5 Marine casualty investigation technique:
Effective and competent investigation of accidents at sea are
the fOUnd3t10ﬂ50! 311 Buccessfull safety work. A reduction in

the probability of collisions can not be achieved to a signi
ficant extent unless a serious investigation for collision
cases is carried out, which should be based on accurate infor
nations. so thatreconnendations

can be made which are likely

to

lead to the adoption of effective measures to prevent a recu

rrence of similar accidents.
Developing a successfull system for collecting, analysing and
presenting marine casualty data is necessary to recognize wh
ere and howthey occured to arrive at a quantitative

and qual

itative description of the causal factors, and accordingly de
termine the possible preventative measures.
Investigations are seen as a form of preventing Fmdlchwthr
ough the processes of finding out the causes of the occurren
ces, acquiring

knowledge there from and recommending or some

times imposing ways to prevent recurrences. Such investigatio
ns have resulted in major improvements in areas such as ship

construction, navigational aids and equipment, levels of com
petence of seamen, saerch and rescue, traffic and other rules.

such as the Internatinal
Collisions at Sea.

Regulations for the Prevention of

A modern system of casualty investigation
as follows:

can be characterized

1- The investigation system must be flexible and suitable for
the country.

2 Independent investigation

team. e.g. not belonging to the Marine

Safety Authority.
3 The investigation

team should consist of professional casualty

investigators. the best qualified for getting as close as possible
to the truth of howand why an accident occured. The investigator
should have an open mind, able to express himself in speaking and

writing. and clever enough to getuzontact

with peopie built on

confidence.
5I

The type of casualty should determine the composition of the inves
tigation group who should then have a specialzed experience about

this particular type of casualty and have sufficient knowledgere
garding the environment where the accident occured. The investiga

tion team should also invite, if necessary, someorganizations to

join the workwhenit is related to their speciality.

It is vital that the investigation starts rapidly while the mate
rial to be investigated is fresh and before time has changed or

wiped out important evidence, e.g. accurate recall of witnesses.
The investigation does not seek to be incriminating, i.e. the pur
pose is not to look for a scape-goat. The investigation
be flexible

board can

about personnel and method of work. The investigation

can take place on board the ship or elsewhere in informal surround

ings. The witnesses should be more relaxed and co-operative.

be easier to get at the complete truth.
The method of investigation

also

permits

the examination

It will

of witnesses to take place at the same time as the techni

cal inquiry. In this way findings at the casualty site can
influence the interview of witnesses, and evidence given by
a witness can influence the orientation of the investiga

tion.
Public reports on investigation results should be given
rapidly to the Marine Safety Authority.
A proposal for.measures to be taken to prevent a recurren
ce is made as soon as the necessary facts have been gath
ered. The investigation board ensures that the Safety Auth

ority gives further instructions about what steps to take
on the basis of their proposal.
A suitable investigation technique could be as follows:
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Obtaining all the facts which will be needed to explain the circum

stances of the accident. making a thorough analysis of the issues
what may be related to the causes of the accident and determining
adequate recmnmendations which are practicable

and economically

acceptable while considering the existing standards and howthe
ship was complying with them. then presenting a fonmal report

including the proposals which could improve the standards and/or

prevent the recurrance of such type of accident.

Actually, the objectives of casualty investigation systems differ
considerably from one country to another and vary from strictly
penal systems to systems solely oriented towards safety. with many

variations in between.

The investigation processes, as well as the reports and their use.

are directly affected by the nature of the objectives pursueud.
depending on whether strictly

safety purposes or whether discipli

nary or civil considerations are taken into account.
Most countries have two types of inquiries,

preliminary investiga

tions and formal hearings, with some of the countries placing empha

sis on the former, and others on the latter,

at least with respect

to the numberof investigations.

IMOhas undertaken a somewhat limited role as regards marine casual

ties. at least comparedto the International Civil Aviation Organi
zation (ICAO). which has established a well structured and active

international systemfor investigation and reporting aircraft acci
dents.

The f0110U1ﬂ9extracts from international Conventions (which
are binding once adopted by a country) and Resolutions (which
are only recommendations) indicate the extent of IMOrequire
ments .
1)

International

Convention on Load Lines, 1966.

Article 23, Casualties:
1-Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation
of any casualty occuring to ships for which it is respon
sible and which are subject to the provisions of the pres
when
_
ent ConVentioﬁV1t Judges that such an investigation may as
sist in determining what changes in the Convention might

be desirable.
2-Each Contracting Government undertakes to supply the Organi

zation with the pertinent information concerning the find
ings of such investigations. No reports or recommendations
of the Organization based upon such information shall dis
close the identity or nationality of the ships concerned or
in any manner' fix or imply responsibility
person
2)

upon any ship or

Resolution A. 147 (November 26, 1968). Reports on Accidents

Involving Significant Spillages of Oil:
‘The Assemlbly‘

For the purpose of promoting rapid action by the governments

concerned in cases of significant spillages of oil following
accidents,

Having in mind the recommendation of the Council of the Inter

national
session.

Maritime °'9anization at its third extraordinary

Recommendsto governments that they

Require masters of all ships to report immediately through
the channels which may be found most practicable and ade
quate under the circumstances, all accidents in which their
ships are involved which have given or may give rise to si

gnificant spillages of oil. Suchreports should, if possi
ble, include details on the nature and degree of pollution,
the movementof the oil slick and any other useful infor
mation as appropriate;
Appoint on appropriate

officer

formation may be referred.

or agency to whomsuch in

Such officer or agency would al

so be responsible for transmission of relevant details to
all governments concerned;

Ensure that any such reports received by any authority in
the country be forwarded to such an officer or agency with

all despatch;
Provide the Organization with information concerning the
appointment of such officer or agency for circulation to
governments."

Resolution A. 173 (November28. 1968). Participation

in ott

icial Inquiries into MaritimeCasualties:
‘The Assembly,

Noting that there is a variation in the practices of Member
States with regard to official inquires into maritime casual
ties, and other proceedings directly consequent upon such in

quires,
With a View to ensuring

that States

SEVNWSIY
affected

by or

having a substantial interest in maritime casualties, parti
cularly where oil pollution to their coasts has resulted, sh
all have an opportunity of being represented at inquires in
to, or other such proceedings relating to, such casualties,
and

Desiring to encourage international unification of practice in
relation to such inquiries and proceedings,
Recommendsto governments that if a State other than the State

of the flag is knowto have been seriously affected by or to
have a substantial interest in a maritime casualty to a ship of

the flag State (particularly where the coast of that other State
has been polluted by oil) as a result of the casualty:

1)a)

The State of the flag should, unless an inquiry is he1a
by the State as a matter of course. consult Uiththat ot
her State as to the holding of an inquiry into the casua

lty by one or other of the States, complying u1th the Pt.
ovisions of sub-paragraph (2);
b 3 If such an inquiry is held as a matter of course by the

flag State, the other State should be informed of its ti
me and place;

2) Such an inquiry should be so conducted that, subject to the

national rules relating to the special conditions under which
inquiries are held in camera,
3) The public is permitted to attend;

and

b) Arrangements are made which would, subject to the discre

tion of the authority holding the inquiry, allow a repre
sentative of the other State concerned to attend and par
ticipate in the inquiry at least to the extent of:
(1) questioning witnesses or causing questions to be put
through the authority; and

(ii)

viewing all relevant documents;

3 If an inquiry is held by a State seriously affected or haves

ing a substantial interest, a representative of the State of
the flag should be given similar facilities.

If one or other of the conditions of sub-paragraph (2) above
cannot be complied With 3‘ the 1nQU1rYitﬂelf.

this recommen

dation shall be treated as being complied with if the condi
tion not previously satisfied in proceedings directly conse
quent upon the inquiry. Nothing in this recommendationshall
affect or apply to holding of any preliminary or informal in
quiry or any other proceedings.
A State shall not be treated for the purposes of the recommen

dation as being affected by or having a substantial interest
in a maritime casualty by reason only that it is the flag State
of one of two ships in collision, nor should the fact that one
or more of its nationals has a commercial interest in the ship

or its cargo in itself confer such an interest".
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS)1974. Regulation 21 - Casualties:

a) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation

of any casualtyeccurring to any of its ships subject to
the provisions of the present Convention whenit judges that
such an investigation may assist in determining what changes
in the present Regulations might be desirable.
b

he

Each Contracting Governmentundertakes to supply the Orga

nization with pertinentinformation concerning the findings.
of such investigations. No reports or recommendationsof the
Organization based upon such information shall disclose the
identity or nationality of the ships concerned or in any man

ner fix or imply responsibility

upon any ship or person

Resolution A. 322 (November 12, 1975). The Conduct of Investi

gations into Casualties:
‘The Assembly,

Drawsattention

to the obligations of Contracting Governments

concerning the investigation of casualties set out in the ab
ove-mentioned Conventions.

Urges Contracting Governments to provide the Organization with

relevant information regarding lessons to be learnt and conclu

sions derived from the investigation of casualties.
Requests the Maritime Safety Committee to examine regularly

such

reports supplied by Contracting Governments and to recommendac

tion as necessary;
Further requests the Maritime safety Committeein consultation
with the Secretariat to consider whether the Organization should

take the initiative in listing serious casualties and in reque
sting Administrations to give information regarding the inquiries
-¢.-.-.-—

held into them end their findings and thereafter to take any ap
propriate action to this end."
Resolution A. 440 (November 15. l979)- Exchange Of IDf°rmat1°“

for Investigations into MarineCasualties:
‘The Assembly,

Nothing that the Maritime Safety Committeehas considered reports

of investigations into serious marine casualties and has recog
nized the importance of a free exchange of information between
Governmentsand, in particular, the need for providing details

of those casualties.
Being Awarethat investigations into casualties, especially in
the case of collisions, are often hamperedby lack of exchange
of information where ships under different flags are involved.
Having considered

the recommendation made by the Maritime Safe

ty Committeeat its thirty-ninth session,
Urges Governments to co-operate on a mutual basis in investiga

tions into marine casualties and to exchange information freely
for the purposes of a full appraisal of such casualties.
It should be been noted that in

the Load Line and 50135

Conventions, the obligation of the participating to investigate
and to report to IMOis conditional upon their sole judgment as

to whether or not an investigation mayassist in bringing about
changes to those Conventions. In the case of the Resolutions.
only recommendations are made which are not binding although the

majority of participating countries wouldgenerally feel morally
obligated to comply.

Resolution A. 173, which recommendsthat participating

of a for

aig State be allowed, particularly where oil pollution to the
coasts of that state has resulted, is applicable only wherea
public inquiry is held and not where preliminary or informal in
quiries only are carried out, nor in the case of collisions nor
where a national of the foreign state has a commercial interest

in the ship or its cargo. In aviation, foreign countries repre
sentatives are given at least an observer status at all investi
gations where they have an interest.
On July 1, 1978, IMOstarted

ualties',

to require reports on ‘Serious cas

which are defined as "casualties to ships of not less

than 1,600 gross tonnage which are a total loss (including con

structive total loss) and casualties to ships of not less than
500 gross tonnage involving loss of life", excluding pleasure
boats, The process followed is that first a list of serious cas
ualties is prepared, based on information contained in Lloyd's
Register of Shipping Quarterly Casualty Returns and the Liverpool
Underwriters Association Monthly Returns, and then a report on

each casualty is requested from the Administration concerned.
The report Form requires only a brief summaryof the casualty,

the probable cause, search and rescue assistance, damage, lives
lost, and certain other particulars. FromJuly 1, 1978, to Decem
ber 31, 1982, 4l7 serious casualties were listed, of which only
123 reports (29%)were recieved from Administrations. A list of

such reports has nevertheless been prepared indicating the prin
cipal findings and recommendations.

The only analyses carried out by IMOover the last few years
have concerned serious casualties to seagoing tankers of 6000
deadweight and above; until 1980 the analyses were limited to

l0,000 deadweight and above, The casualty data upon which the
analyses are based are provided by Lloyd's Register of Ship
ping and not by the participating_countries. Proposals to carry
out analyses of casualties to all types of ships have so far
been turned down, apparently because of budget considerations.

Accordingly, the role of IMOhas been very limited and no succ

ess has been achieved in standardizing casualty investigations.
with very few exceptions, the efforts made by various mari

time countries and their achievements in improvingsafety asa res
ult of casualty investigations are not communicatedto other
countries. Thus, there must exist considerable duplication
of investigations

which might not otherwise be needed except

to the extent required for statistical

purposes.

SECTION

III

3.1

RADAR:

Radar was invented in 1922 and rapidly developed in the ye
ars leading up to. During world war II, it was used origi

nally to detect and track hostile vessels and aircraft.
Following world war II it became standard equipment on mer

chat vessels and soon becamerequired navigation equiment

internationally.
It was considered by many as the ultimate system to deter

mine the correct action to prevent collisions using plott
ing technique, but ships continued colliding and in many

cases the collision could actually be traced to the use of
radar.
Analysis of manycollisions

indicate that the main problem
is the lnmited capability of humanbeings in operating cor
rectly and utilizing the information available on the PPI

with an adequate speed and accuracy. As the radar picture

is a present-value presentation only, and as the measure
ments normally are relative

to a moving reference (own

ship). the humaninterpretation of the situation is depend
ing on considerable skill and concentration.
Manyinvestigations

have been-done which led to the deve

lopment of many devices,

some of very simple design and

others are highly sophis-ticated, to provide the navigator
with a quick and better appreciation of the situation whi
ch can led to an early and effective action to avoid colli
sion.

During.the early years of development, effort was pri
marily directed towards improving componentand unit re
liability. Factors of immediate importance were seen to

be the simplification of unit control to allow cmpara
tively unskilled operators to obtain operable informat
ion, improvement in data accuracy by increased tube size,
gyro stabilisation, scanner design and variable range me
asurement, and attacks on the rain and sea clutter pro
blem to enhance the detection of marginal targets.
As time progressed, the ships increased in number, speed

and size associated with high traffic density, and pro
blems due to the difficult interpretation of radar data
and the unadequate manual plotting on a plotting diagram
became more prominent.

The second stage in radar development thus directed to

solve these problems. Improvedplotting faciities

and true

motion presentation were then introduced.
True motion used simple analogues to convert the log speed
and compass course of own ship to a steady scaled deflec

tion shift in the cathods ray tube origin. This shift could
then extract own ship motion from the relative motion of

the echoes. leaving displayed the real motion of the target.
It was supposed that since most manoeuvres in clear weather
were based on the real motion of the target ship, equal succ
ess uould accompanymanoeuvres madtin fog if the real aspect

of the target was available; This supposition was, unfort
unately, not true and the advent of true motion made no not

iceable impact on the radar collision statistics.

Intact

500 ‘O 309° Original operator misconceptions, true motion
was often wiewed with suspicion and was only slowly accep

ted.
Muchmore significance was apparent in the introduction of
plotting aids. Most wide spread influence in this area was

due to an on-screen manual device termed the reflection plo
tter. Perhaps an unforseen but important feature of the re
flection plotter was the contribution which it madeto a

wider appreciation of gyro stabilised displays and their re
lated north-up presentation of the radar picture.
Amongother plotting

aids which were introduced were those

which automatically recording the position of any echo, se
lected by range and bearing marker on the display, on an

ancillary plotting surface.
Another more sophisticated

equipment used a photographic
record of the targets motion over a period of several min
utes which was then made available for immediate presenta

tion as a larggségbjection on a plotting screen.
Apart -from reflection plotter, none of these systems pro
ved universally

popular. They were followed by a second
generation of what may be termed appraisal aids. These were

installations which allowed the operator to asses the track
of a target in either true or relative motion and to deter
mine whether a collision risk existed without being requir
ed to produce an actual plot.

Most luccellful

among these were the Decca Ac-marker

system and the Kelvin Hughes S.D Radar.

Both these enj°¥ed a popular acceptance because they re
movedmuch of the drudgery normally associated with man

ual plotting but left the watchkeeperand his decision
firmly in the loop.

In the late sixties microcircuitry and coputer availa
bility opened another developmentarea in the radar field,
and generated equipments which have been termed computer
aided or collision Avoidance systems (C.A.S.) ORAutomatic
Radar Plotting

Aids (ARPA).

The first of these systems, which transfer radar data into
a computer and play out a synthetic picture on the display.
was produced by the Norcontrol company (Databrideg).

The

system used dedicated computer. trackers units and synthe

tic display to showvectors attached to echoes.
Since that time, advances in both computer and display
technology have been exploited

by a number of companies who

preduce systems with a wide variety of alternative

tions of facilities

combina

showingtarget vectors except a single

company (SPERRY)which produced the Sperry C A S system

which addresses the avoidance problem more particularly

by difining the possible point of collision (P.P.C.l and
showing the Possible Area of Danger (P.A.D.l.
At the same time some small computing power was used in an

advanced appraisal aids. This equipment stored the track of
targets by recording on a video tape a coplete series of

past radar pictures. The operator could play these back
to snvisags the positions Vhich all echoes had occupied
over a discrete historical period. At the sametime. the
history of ownship‘s motion is stored so that either true
or relative motion may be played out.
Development still

keep going on to improve the use of ra

dars for both navigation and anti-collision purposes.
The Kelvin Hughes produced the Anticol ARPAwith a ground

stabili8ed.fairway chart formedby a series of parallel
straight lines and with channel widht and length set by the
user, similar but more detailed charts of selected port
approaches can also programmedand stored in the computer

memoryfor subsequent recall when required.
Atlas 7600 produced by Krupp Atlas Electronik with mem

ory-backed rasterscan colour display on 67 cmhigh-reso

lution screen. Brilliant. steady presentation of all in
formation on one display of excellent daylight quality,
avoiding fade-away of radar signals and need for viewing
hood.

Furuno has introduced a combined colour picture and plo

tter on one screen. With this system the vessel’s posi
tuion moves across the screg§%f§iormation from position
finding equipment and, at the same time, the radar dis
play indicates land masses and other vessels.
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However, to give a clear presentation of the developments
in commercial marine radar and its devices, He may devide

its lite into three periods.
During the first two periods. evolution rather than revo
lution was the established pattern or marine radar deve
lopment and plotting devices improvement, believing it is
the best procedure for achievement of the high standard of
reliability demandedby the mariner, at an acceptable op

erational cost.
In the third period, the majority of the equipents fall
into the revolutionary category, using digital computers
to track target movement, to process information and pro
duce simulated graphics on the screen.
Wemay, therefore, distinguish three successive contri
butions to the present state of the art:
1- Traditional radar sets assisted by plotting aids such

as; Track plotter, RASplotter, Reflection plotter, Auto
plot, and photographic radar plot.
2- Radar displays with built-in plotting devices not assis
ted by computer such as; Decca 66 Ac, Raytheon TH/CA,

Kelvin Hughes situation Display, and Marconi predictor.
3- Computerized systems for automatic tracking and process
ing of data such as; Data bridge, Digiplot, Raytheon
Raycas, selenia,

sperry CA5. Racal Decca.

3.1.3 Manual plotting:
The traditional radar screen does not give a complete pic
ture. Ships appear on the screen as points, both their bear
ing and their range can be observed and the observer must

plot to complete the picture as given by the eye. This te
chnique vill provide the navigator with a detailed informa
tion upon which he can make decisions.
This detailed information is of two kinds, relative to own

ship and true.
The relative data gives the degree of risk of collision of
the target in terms of the closest point of approach (C.P.A:)
on present course and speed, and the time interval before
this point would be reached.
The true information comprises the course and speed of the

other ship.
Therefore if the radar is properly used, accurate manual
plotting can enable the navigator to appreciate the situa

tion around the ship and recognise the collision risk by
comparing the distance of the closest point with the accep
ted minimumsafe passing distance and that will help him

to find the effective action to avoid close quarter situa
tions and collisions.
Relative motion presentation will be appreciated for coll
ision avoidance in open waters while true motion may be

preferred in narrow waters.

This method of tackling a collision avoidance problem may
help the.mariner to overcomethe disadvantages of the y;.
ual observational method.

The manual plotting
of its own:

technique, however, have disadvantages

1- Inaccuracy:
(a Errors in reading the ranges and bearings of
targets and the time. '
pr

(b

hr

Unsteady course and speed of own ship and tar

gets during plotting interval.
(c Errors in marking positions and in drawing lines
3

on the plotting sheet.
2- Plotting is time consumingand requires the full attention
of the navigator for several minutes per plot.
3- An unfortunate limitation in the numberof echoes that may

be satisfactorily handled.
4- The technique provides poor protection against humanblun
ders.
I

5- A necessity for continous and regular plotting to detect
any change in the situation.
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3.l.l.L

Errors in manualplotting:

Errors in plotting can be due to;
1- Errors in the bearings taken.
2- Errors in the ranges measured.
3- Wrongestimation

of course and speed of own ship during

the plotting interval.
4- Errors in the time of the plotting interval.
Effect of inaccurate bearings and ranges:
The relative plotting normally done by taking three range

and bearing of the target at regular intervals to construct
the relative vector of the target (oh). If any of these ran
ges or bearings is not correct, the resulted (oh) will be
inaccurate causing error in the estimated nearest approach,
the time of nearest approach, and the aspect.
whenthe vector triangle is completed, the true motion vec
tor of target will also be affected leading to inaccurate
estimation of target's true course and speed.
Therefore, it is advisable to take at least three ranges
and hearings whenplotting and if the three positions of
target were not laying on a straight line an average line
should be used to reduce the error as muchas possible.

[
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Figure ( 43)

Joining (0 0‘) indicate that the target should pass astern
of ownship joining (o‘A) indicate that the target should
pass ahead of own ship, while the situation is most pro
bably a collision case.

In the case of true plot, the true vector of the target
(WA)will be inaccurate causing an error in the calculated
true speed and course of the target and also the aspect.

Whenthe triangle is completed. the relative motion of

target will be affected leading to inaccurate estimation
of nearest approach and its time.

Figure ( 44)

The existence of such type of error is always possible,
its amount will depent on the accuracy of the means used
for measurementand the observer skills.

rertorloance standards for navigational radar equipmentre

quire:
Radars installed before 1.9.84

Radars 1nBtn.11a:!after 1.9.84

ruad range rugs shouldarable

';‘hetixedrangeri.I'Igaandthevari
ablerangemarku'a|:nu1denablethe
rangeofanobjecttohenaasured

the range of an daject, whose er.

ho lies on a range ring, to be
measuredwith an error not excee
dirﬂ 1.5 percent of the maxinun

withanerrormt exceding1.5\
of thenaxixnnrangeofthescale

range of the scale in use, or 70

inuse, or 70nete.rs,\h.icheveris

metres, whichever is the greater.

the greater.

Anyadditionalmeans of measur

ing range alnuld have an error
mt exceeding 2.5%of themax1

nunrange of the diqalayed scale
in use, or 120 metres whichever

is the greater.
'I‘hemeanspIOvidedforobta1.n:l.ng

hearingelnuldenablethebearing
ofatarvgetwhoseechoappears

attheedgeofthedisplayto
hemeasuredwithanaccuracyof
1 1° or better.

um“ estimation of own ship course and speed:

This kind of error will Cause incorrect true vector of own
|h1p. In case of relative plot, the position of point (R)
will be incorrect affecting the accuracy of the true course
and speed of target. The aspect will a13o be gffectgd,

In case of true plot, the position of point (01 will be in
correct affecting the relative motion line of target caus
ing error in the estimated nearest approach, time of near
est approach, and the aspect.
The estimation of own ship speed will depend on the accuracy

of the means used for calculation,

(log, ﬁ.P.M. of the pro

peller, ship's positions).
The estimation of own ship course during plotting interval
will be difficult if the ship was yawing. The skill of the

observer is also important.

Rljgfyye‘

,0./of

Figure

( 45 )

7'ra/c.Mi

Figure (46 )

3.1.1.2

égguracy of manua1_p1ott1ng:

Hhenradar plotting is used to find out the target course
and speed, and the risk of collision it any we proceed as
follow in case of relative motion:
Auauming own ship course is

36;. 1tB BPeed 15 knots.

and plotting interval is 20 minautes. Initial range of
target is 12 N.

Figure (47 1

A- The ‘accuracy of own ship yector (Ho) will degnd on;

1- The accuracy of own ship course during the plotting

interval.
2- The accuracy of the estimated own ship velocity dufing the

plotting interval.
The ggssible errors in heading are:
1- Constrtntive error .
2- Roundingoff error (error in gyro alignement).

3- Drift error.
1- Sgnstmctive error:

The frequency distribution
normally distributed
«B-9.

5-

of error can be considered as

with a maximum
va'lue of 1°

_.._z 1/3°

because the probility of plotting
of an error of 1° is considered
to be the maximum.

n...

2- Roundingoff error:

‘I r——
-.

The frequency distribution of that type of error is uni

2.9-ﬁ . n.

form also with a range of

1°

3- Drift error:
'h
I

(initialy 3°, thena--= 3/3 - 1°)

'

'

Where : C3 is constant depend on ship‘s form assumed to be 1°
H is wind speed assumed to be force 7 BF - 28 knots
V is ship's speed assumed to be 16 knots

AUis lateral

surface over water

ALis lateral

surface under water

W

(AU/AL) is assumed to be

¢><is wind direction

.'.

then

sin a< =
=

%

(1)

assume uorst

condition 90° or 270°

1

.'.

5-

6-3

of total heading error is ((1/3)2 + (1/3)2 * (1.75)2)

1

. —%%—
' (1;h

.

1

=

1.7s°

= 3.2a°°

and c‘ =
accuracy

1.a°

M95 = 2!‘ = 3.60

6-;

= V.T. tan 1.80
=

15- %% °

tan 1.8°

= 0.1676

Uhere T is assumed to be 20 minutes.

The possible speed errors are:
1- Log error

2- Constructive error
0
Log error can satisfactory be taken as 2%of own ship speed.
and estimated constructive error about 0.1%of the speed.

.'.

‘;';beed

=

2 X of

0/

v ___ 1/3

then the accuracyrcﬁ 0.7 knots.
.'.
= 1 3 .T = (1/3).(1/3)

5‘)!

(l)

knt
0 s

\
qt-I
|

‘

\
= (1/9) miles

\

I‘

\
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2

3.9.

R68 Of P011112
W3 1.1

+63)

2 W

o

/ 311-;90

- 1.1 ((o.1e7e)2 + (11912?
- 0.22
2

and R68

accuracy

of point

fgr T=20 minutes.

= 0.048

W= R95 = 5/3 R68 = 5/3

X 0.22

-

0.37

3- The accuracy of

oA will degend on:

1- Bearing accuracy.
2—Range accuracy.

Bearing accuracy:

The disturbances and their contribution to the error are:
1- Azimuth error

scanner / sweep

p2=
2- Heel or list

1/3e°°

of ship
d_3=

max heel 15°
1/900

3- Bearing cursor/EBL error
6_3=

max .£—°

max

1°

1/900

4- Roundingoff to the nearest half degree

6-3: 1/4a°°

5- Error in total correction
6_3= 6/looo
01

- Error in plot the lop into the plotting sheet
6_}=

1/3600

Total variancein Lop 6-2= 0.900

¢r~= o.95°

TM:nonna1y.distributed error in the direction of the bearing
Hnecauses an error equal to:

cf(Tangentl-

tan 0.95 X Dist. of target NM
= 1 / 60

X Dist. of target 
O.2NM

= 30.87

X Dist. of target =
370.4 metres

Range accuracy:

The disturbances and their contribution to the error are:
1- VRMerror

with a max of 1.5% of the range
6‘2$ 25 m"
62-= 625 m2 , or

in use, or 70 metres, whichever is the greater
6"~\<0.5%. range

0.25 (1o)" (range)2
2- Observer measuring error with a naximun

a"“=0.5%. range
2

6-— = 0.25 (10)

-4

(range)

2

of 1.5% of the range in use
3- Rounding off to 0.1 M readout of VRM

6%-#7
2

1

2

M
2

The sum of these variances does not give an easy expression

for the Lop error,

the following approximation can be made:

J_fran3e1.nuse<6Mt.hen¢'=5xrange1.nm1.1es+50
11;-ange1nuse>6Mt.hen6'=0.75%oft.herange
For our case

Figure

fro

( 48 )

H

metres

14.)!

= 0.0075 X 12 = 0.09

N.H

=l3.89

metres

X 12 = 166.7

R68 (one plot)

- 1.1

- 1.1 ( 6-%—tangent) +

((30.87l2

* (13.B9)2 V’

ﬁaormangw

X Distance (metres)

Since best fit relative track will be used, there-fore, it
canbe stated that the error in this regression line will
obey to the Average law. If the numberof plots is indi
cated by (n) and the radius of the 68%confidence of plot
by R68' then the cross track error (CTE)in the relative
;
track will haVe 3 5tugg%F¥aPn
D3
GTE

Figure ( 49)

which can be expressed

R

¢y"

CTE

' __6u1_z1o_n_ ' R
2/3

( n fa

68

at point (A).

From geometry

(rain I (féTE = ( TCPA+ plotting interval in minutes)/

plotting interval in minutes
.'.

cfE}A 8

crETE . ((TCPA / plotting

interval

) + 1)
V

In our case R68 ( 1 plot ) = 1.1 ((3o.a7)2
= 446.8 metres
6CTE = R68 (1 P1011-)/ 1.15

= R6 8 at point
‘rEbA = 387

accuracy

= 0.21 14.!)

R28 at (A)= 0.04 N.M

M95 =

/ 20) + 1 )= 797 metres= 0.43 N-”
2(T‘=

0.9

N.M

0.01 N.M as a safety margin

then total R2
68 at point
.'.

Total

total

Figure

= 397 metre

.'.

12

(( T.CPA / 20) + 1)

= 387 ((21.2

Taking

(A)

+ (13.e9)2)'x

( 50 )

(W) = 0.048 + 0.04 + 0.01 = 0.098 N.M

R68

at (W) = 0.3

occuracy of point

N.M

(W) = 5/3 X 0.3 = 0.5 N.M

(x1 U111be the error in the true couse of target

lino‘: '

0.3 / distance of target in 20 minutes

since (X) is small, then 6-’-‘(redl - 0.9 1 velocity or

target
In our example distance of target is 7 N.H in 20 minutes
the accuracy = 5O

-2.5°

0.3 ‘.1’1.1

(G3 dist. of target + 5-2 dist. of target)": =’

1.1 ( 2 5‘ 2 dist. of target)'4
.°.

0.09 :1 1.2

( 2 a- 2 dist. of target)

gz'dist. of target =

0.09 / 2.4

= 0.037

(in 20 minutes)

G dist. of target

= 0.19

( in 20 minutes )

6 vetocity of target = 0.57 knots

accuracy = 1.14 knots

3.1.2

Manual Plotting aid :

To assist the navigator in speeding up radar plotting to
handle a greater numberof targets and increase plotting
accuracy, several types of aids have been developed.
3.1_2_2_ Track plotter:

It can be used for either true or relative plot on pla1n
paper. The device enables the mariner to carry out the
plot without the need of using parallel ru1ers.divﬂkrS
or compass roses.
A fitted

light

over the graduation pointer permits its use

without other lights at night.

Figure

( 51 )

3.1.2.2

The R.A.S. Elotter:

It is a mechanical compass-datumplotter, designed by the
erstwhile Radio Advisory service of the Chamberof Shipping.

Plotting is carried out on a disc of transparent material
free to rotate about its centre above a slightly larger
circular disc. Attached to the axis of the plotter and
free to slide over the face of the disc, a transparent pro
tractor which can be used to draw the bearing lines and to
obtain the direction and distance of any point.

The ship's true course on the inner scale must be set ag
ainst the 000° on the outer scale each time the course is

altered.
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( 52 )

I

The two main advantages of the R.A.s. plotter are; it is
more durable, the true and relative bearing scales eliminate
the need to convert bearings mentally, and the rotating plo
tting

aurface

fI|C111"-M’-1?-9
predictions

whenown ship alters

course.

and continued plotting

- 153 

3.1.2.3 The Anti-parallax Reflection plotter;
It is a simple optical system which removes the parallax
normally associated with plotting on the protective screen
over the C.R.T., and permitted vector analysis to be con
ducted immediately over the echoes on the radar display.
The advantages are:

1- Reduction in errors of data transfer.
2- Quick and convenient marking on the screen directly.
3- Much larger number of ships could be handled.

However, its disadvantages are:
1- The need to use crude instruments as wax tipped pencils

and soft rulers,
2- A new plot is always required when the range scale is
changed.

3- whenusing a ship’s head up display and a reflection

plo
tter with a non-rotatable plotting surface a newplot may
be required when own ship alters course, and predictions

will be difficult.
4- whenusing an unstabilized display, for the sake of accur

acy, it is essential to makesure that the ship is right
on course at the momentthe positions of the echoes are

being markedon the reflection plotter. which is diffi
cult when the ship is yawing.
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3.1.2.4

Autoplot Ltd:

Its principle is based on plotting by meansof transpar
encies. It is a seperate pedestal mounteddevice which
can he used to record both true and relative plots simu
ltaneously from an existing radar.
It provides a simple and quick method of making a com

plete plot but practicaly not sufficient, need careful
adjustment and training for accurate results, and still
not efficient to deal with high traffic situation.

3.1.2.5

ghotggraphic Radar plot

( P.R,P. 1

This system was presented by Kelvin-Hughes and provides

the observer with bright

radar picture. The radar screen

is photographed at regular predetermined time intervals
and projected on the under side of a flat, horizontal squa

re trasparent plotting surface.
The basis of the plot is madeby pencilling periodically
the projected echoes on the plotting surface.
The advantages are:

1- Bright radar picture which can easily be viewed in day
light without the aid of a viewing hood, so it is possi

ble for several officers to view the picture at once.
2- Plotting can be carried out easily and large numbersof
echoes can be detected at the same time and at regular
time intervals which eleminate time errors.
3- All information over a time period may be viewed at one

time and no chance of an echo being lost through inatten

tion.
4- Weakechoes which may only point on infrequent

sweeps of

the scan have a better chance of detection due to contin
ous exposure in the same position on the film. This also
true to someextent for echoes in clutter.

The picture renewal rate selected by the observer must de

pend on the circumestances prevailing at any time. e.g.
faster rate should be selected in congested waters.

The system is reliable and simple to operate but it is
acknowledged that it has some disadvantages such as stocks

of film and chemicals must be available for its operation.
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3.1.2.6

Improving in accuracy using previous aids:

The use of these aids have improved the accuracy of manua1

plotting by avoiding someof the error sources.
For example, if the reflection plotter is used instead of
the P1°tt1n9 diagram the accuracy will be better as follows:
1- The radar-bearing error differs from the value derived in
the previous example, only the first two disturbances
mentioned before will contribute to the bearing error in
the plot.
The variance in the bearing thus amounts to 5/36°°from

which it follows that the error in the target position
in a direction perpendicular to its bearing has
Gwanget)

= 12 X distance

in _N.M(metres).

The radar-distance error is only composedof the first
two errors mentioned before for the distance. It follows

that the error in the target -.djstance has a variance =
0.5 x (1o)' 4 x (Range)2.
And from this the standard deviation in the distance of

the target can be derived to be

Gomal)

= 13¥R3n9e

in N.M (metres)
Then R68 (one plot)

19.5 X dist.

= 1.1 x( (12)

2

+ (13)

2?

.
_
X d1st- 

(metres).

If the target distance is close to the range in use which
is always advisable.

-—-; —

V

fcTE - 19.5 1: Diet. [(2/3(0)‘) at point (A)

(Eh

. ((19.5 x Dist.i[

S0 ¢rE§A- 202.6 K 2.06

1.155
-417.46
- 0.225

X(('l'C1-‘A/plotint.) + 11
metres
N.M

and the gccuracy M95 8 OAS N.M which is much better,

since

the accuracy at point (A) will be affected, the accuracy of
true course & speed of target will also be better.

3.1.3 Appraisal aids:
In 5 gurvey of collisions and from experience on board shi
p., it has been proved that in congested waters particularly
during restricted visibility a great deal of time and exper
tise is demandedfrom the radar observer to evaluate the tra

ffic situation correctly by plotting.
To reduce the load of work, the possibility

of humanerror,
and to give the observer more time to use his intelligence
in appraising the situation and keeping it under review,
radar engineers kept trying to develop the plotting devi
ces and presented more advanced ones got the name apprai

sal aids which, in one way or another, produce information
in the form needed.

The concept of these devices is generally to adopt some

available technology to enable a history of the target mo
tion to be examined without the need for the observer to
physically take ranges and bearings in the conventional way.

This type of display is sometimesreferred to as a history
display. The following give a brief mention of some of the
more commonlyinstalled

equipments.

3.1.3.1‘

Raytheon

TM ( C

:

This device has an electronically aided manual plot. A
lmall processor allows dual markers to be placed on echoes
of the observer's choice one of the markers remains at the

original position of the target while the other records
own ships displacement.

These two marks and the current po

sition of the target provide the three corners of the vector
traingle of manualplotting.

Anelectronic digital clock indicates the plot time for each
echo separately whenselected by the operator. To facili
tate measurement, A more sophisticated electronic bearing
line has a movable point of origin is madeavailable to help
in measuring true tracks or evaluate miss distance of the
target. The equipment is able to deal with 8 targets in the
same time. A trail course and speed shange can be carried
out on the most dangerous target, and is automatically app

lied to the other 7 targets.
Although computation is facilitated in this way, the plot
is basically manual and will suffer from the delays and dis

continuities of a plot on a reflection plotter, there is no
delivery of quantative information without the intervention
of the operator.
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3.1.3.2

Anti-collision

radar of Decca (66 AC) :

The equipment provides five markers which can be placed in
dividually on echoes whose movements need to be watched.

Each marker is a bright line, one inch long, and having a
bright spot at one end which is placed on the echo. The line

points directly towards own ship, so if an echo diverges
from the line, it showsthat the target will pass either
ahead or astern of own ship‘s centre, but if the echo re
mains on the marker, or very neafsit, a collision risk then

exist.
The line connecting the bright spot on the marker to the ac

tual position of the echo portrays the relative motion line
so that the predicted nearest approach can be estimated.
The tail of the echo gives an indication of the true motion
line. This information can now easily be collected and com

pleted by meansof reflection plotter.
With true motion mode the markers are moved in step with

the picture origin to preserve the collision line integrity.
This way has a simplistic

approach which permits the observer

to behave in exactly the same way as he would in the use of

conventional radar.
Since little computation is done, errors of the system are
not significant, but it is necessary to maintain a careful
watch on the echo track during the observation period to en

sure that it is constant.

There will be discontinuities

whenthe true motion resets

and when scale or mode are changed. It own ship alters
course or speed all the markers in use will have to be re

positioned on their echoes, also if a markedtarget alters,
its marker will have to be reset
In each case there has to be a hiatus while the echo moves

awayfrom the newly positioned origin, this will take bet
ween 1,5 to 3 minutes.

The figure shows the extra controls for anti—collision ra
dar, above the display.
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3.1.3.3

K.H. Situation Display:

The purpose of this unusual radar is to provide enhanced

true or relative echo trails. The radar picture is produced
on a non-persistent 3-inch cathode ray tube and is projected
on to a sensitive screen called ImageRetaining panel (I.R.P.).
The I.R.P. is scanned by a television camera and the picture
thus obtained is shown on the bridge display, which is non

persistent.
This gives clearer daylight viewing, but does not use the
signal processing adopted by the other systems previously
mentioned.
Relative or true motion can be obtained, and the extending

afterglow of the target’s history permit assessment of coll
ision risk or true course of target respectively. The length
of the trails give someindication of the target speed.
One advantage of this system is that any change in track,

either relative or true, due to target's manoeuvreis clearly
defined. Another is that when true motion is used own ship

center remains at the picture centre.
Discontinuities are numerousdue to IRP reset (the reset per
iod is 3 minutes when the range scale is 3 miles or less and

6 minutes for 6 miles range or more). The discontinuity will

last about two minutes while the trails build up sufficiently
and the picture is again displaying a full track information.
The IRP resets with similar effect when there is a change of
mode or range scale.

The operator can draw A crude plot on the tube face an on

a reflection plotter with all its time delays.

3.1.3.4‘ Marconi Predictor:

This is the most sophisticated of this group of systems.
It is an automatic electronic plotting system, but not 1n
the fully computerised sense.
The whole picture of the radar is stored on a videotape
End the“ ¥eP13Yed 1" 3 °YC1ic fashion to give indication
the echo movement.

of

It displays a continually up-dated three position track for
all echoes on the screen simultaneously. Using videotape
means that all viewed targets will appear on the history

display, this includes land, rain and sea clutter. The to
tal duration of the track is1.S,3, or 6 minutes.
Choice of these alternative speeds is under operator control
to suit the range in use and the urgency of the situation.
The track are up-dated every 10 seconds.

The presentation is permanently centred and will showeither

true or relative tracks. There is no display of quantitative
information and any needed values have to be measured by the

operator.
Trialmaneuveris possible, the relative tracks predicted as
a result of a proposed change of course and speed can be dis

played. Manual extrapolation will showthe result of the tria1
manoeuvre in terms of achieved nearest approach.
The predictor display has a number of advantages above the con

ventional display:

1- Automatic solving of velocity triangles for past and fu
ture occasions for a determined time interval, enabling
9°05 ammimxxuappreciation of the situation.
2- Bright echo track.
3- No re-setting has to be employed when using a true motion

display.
This indeed, eliminates the danger of the frequent occurrume
of late re-setting and makes the display also eminently suit
able for fast movingvessels in clear weather.

4- The ability

to moveinstantaneously to view either true

or relative motion is muchappreciated by the operator.
5- Information is represented in a form which is as easily
simulated as possible.
Although, the system has some disadvantages:

1- Nodiscrimination between targets and clutter echoes,
these unwanted echoes appear on all pictures and hence,

in relative motion particularly,
fusion on the screen.

makea considerable con

2- Wheretraffic density is high, intersecting tracks of tar
gets sometimesmakepossitive indentification difficult
despite the cyclic brightening that occurs on the target

train.

COMMENT:

However, electronically

aided systems give some informa

tion more qu1_,_-guy
than manual methods,

but when using in a

collision risk situation, one has to dependeither upon
visual interpretation unpunctuated by numerical facts,
or on manual plotting to supplement it. Either way, the
time scale will be, or will approach, that of 3 or 6 min
ute track duration,

which may not be quick enough.

With predictor, velocity triangles are solved automati
cally saving time and reducing humanblunders- (Ner,no

resetting

when using a true modewhich eliminates the dan

ger of the frequent occurrence of 1ate resett1'n9

But since the appreciation of a change of target move

ment is dependent on visual discrimination of its com

puted track, the renewal rate will equal the plot interval
in use0-5, 1, or 2 minutes which still

need to be removed.

3.2

Automatic Radar plotting

Aids

(ARPA):

up to this stage, the extraction of the information required
from marine radar in time and with adequate accuracy to aid
decision-making, was still one of the prime problems which

needed to be solved by the mariner. This is especially so in
dense traffic and in confined waters under poor visibility
condition.
There can be no doubt that man is unable to derive the amount
of knowledge necessary to handle a complex situation from man

ual appreciation of the radar data. In low traffic density,
with the aid of reflection plotters or other appraisal aids,
there may be sufficient

time available for an experienced and

dedicated man to conduct a formal plot, analyse the data and

implement an avoiding action. when the density of traffic

and
the complexity of the situation increases, manualappraisal
is no longer adequate and the level of plotting must necessar
ily be reduced to accommodatethe increasing numberof thre

ats until, ultimately, little

more than a cursory tracking of

supposed most dangerous targets is achieved.

The problem may be divided into five principal functions:
- Determine which echoes are to be suppervised.
0-‘

2- Keeping track of these echoes.
U

- Analysingcollision risk.

§-

Determine escape manoeuvres.

5- Execute the escape manoeuvre and re-establish

main course.

This demonstrable need has accelerated the application of
tschnologyin commercialmarine radar to satisfy, accelerate
and simplify, this task. Hence, more sophisticated equip
ment started to appear usﬁm computers and displays for
automatic tracking and processing of data.
The designers faced manyconstrains, no least of which is
the shipowners concern with cost benefits, problems of ship
borne maintenance and the upgrading of training methods for
proper and effective use of the system.

In 1965 the idea was conceived to establish an installation
project for evaluating how computer technology could be used
on board ship to increase safety at sﬁﬂgreduce operational

costs. Norcontrol was the project manager in this Norwegian

research project which started in 1967 as a co-operation bet
ween the Norwegian Ship Research Institute,

Det Norske Ver

itas and Norwegian shipowners.
Twoyears of extensive research and development began, and

in 1969 the world‘s first

shipborne computerized collision

avoidance and integrated navigation system ‘Data Bridge‘ was
installed on board of Hi1helmsen's M/ S Taimyr.
The design goal was to obtain a system that:

1- Is accurate and easy to handle.
2- Mayfollow a number of ships simultaneously.

3- Is easy to interprete.
4- Is up—datedautomatically.

The more recently introduced computerized systems for colli
sion avoidance promise not only a lighter work load for the
navigator in times of stress and a more timely warning of im

pending danger, but a fuller and more up-to-date and objec
tive presentation of the data on which he must make his de
cisions and a facility for assessing the outcomeof any int
ended manoeuvre.

The computerized collision avoidance system was a radical
innovation in the marine field, comparedto unassisted rad

ar. These systems represent a significant
shipping industry.

investment by the

In general, such systems can be described as automatic radar
plotting devices which possess the ability to deal with den
ser traffic situations than could be accommodatedby manual
plotting alone. It can tirelessly produce correct data on a
large numberof selected targets and widening the apprecia
tion of target behaviour.
User satisfaction has varied, muchmore has been said in its

favour than against it. It maybe danger to relinquish the
tracking duty to the computer, since errors are always pre
sent in the radar system approach, but appreciation of these
errors and their sources will permit a useful level of infor
mation to becomeavailable.

Typically the first comparative study by Liverpool Polytech

nic of theprnrup al plotting systems, a practical examination
by a group of 68 officers of widely different eiperience and
nationality involving only very brief tuition and using simu
lated displays without the ergonomic advantages of the actual
equipment, showed a very definite consensus in favour of the
A.R.P.A.- A study by quite a different source carried out on

the computer-aided operations research facility of the u.s.A.
Maritime Administration reached a similar conclusion.
The trend towards the concept of using computers in a fully
automatic radar plotting system was supported by extensive

research projects. This provide that the need for such a sy
Item is essential to meet the contigencies which always ar
ise due to the continuous increase in speed, size and num
ber of ships.
Evidence in court cases indicate that the time which passed
between the momentof realization that a high risk of colli
sion existed and the collision was between five and fifteen
minutes, with the average below ten. This time interval can
be called "escape time" which may be divided into the time

required for accurate observation, plotting (computation)

and appraisal, (called planning time), and that available to
manoeuvre clear.

As the manoeuvre required.will

not be known

until the planning is complete, it will be obvious that the
planning time must be as short as possible.
In the interest of reducing the planning time to an absolute
minimum,the information required by the observer is as foll
ows:

Firstly,

it should reach him at the earliest possible moment

after the need for it is established.
Secondly, on arrival it should be as up-do-date as possible.
Thirdly, it should be renewedat the shortest possible inter

vals.

with an escape time of less than ten minutes, the paramount

need after manoeuvringaction is initiated,

will be to watch

closely and continously the behaviour of the other ship.
Obviously, these can only be achieved by using caputers
with a very short renewal rate, in a full automatic radar
plotting system with graphical and numerical displays. More
over, this system could have the possibility of securing

earlier recognition of high risk of collision and so increas
ing the escape time.
In December 1976 the Liberian registered tanker Argo Merchant
ran aground on Nantucket shoals, producing a large oil slick

which brought the threat of heavy pollution on the coast of
Massachusetts and, althoughthere

was no appreciable damage

to the environment, this casualty brought considerable pres
sure in the USfor action to reduce the risk of similar ac
cidents.

In March 1977 th US president announced his inten
tion to develop a series of regulations which would include

a requirement that large tankers entering USwaters be fit
ted with a collision avoidance system conforming to speci
fied standards.

The USCGrequested the IMOSub-Comittee

on

Safety of Navigation to develop performance specifications
and to prescribe carriage requirements for collision avoi
dance systems.
The US request was first considered by the IMOSub-Committee
in September 1977 but it was not until September 1979, after

several meetings, that agreement was finally reached on per
formance standards and carriage requirement.

As a result of the IMOagreements, the regulations for the
fitting of an ARPAare as follows:
1)

Mandatory for all vessels of 10,000 tons gross upauus
constructed on or after September 1 1984

11) Tankers constructed before September 1 1984 shall be
fitted with an ARPAas follows:
a)

by January 1 1985 if of 40,000 tons gross and upauds

b)

by January 1 1986 if of 10,000 tons gross and upauds

but less than 40,000 tons gross
iii) Vessels constructed before September 1 1984 that are
not tankers, shall be fitted with ARPAas follows:
a)

b)

by September 1 1986 if of 40,000 gross tons and up
wards

by September 1 1987 if of 20,000 gross tons and up

wards, but less than 40,000 gross tons
c)

by September 1 1988 if of 15,000 gross tons and up

wards, but less than 20,000 gross tons.
ARPASfitted

prior

to September 1 1984 which do not

form to the performances standards

con

adopted by IMOmay be

retained until January 1 1991. Also ships may be exempted
from the ARPArequirements

in cases where IMOconsiders

unreasonable or unnecessary for an ARPAto be carried,

it

or

when the ship will be taken permanently out of service

within two years of appropriate implementation date.

The USAuthorities were not satisfied

with the progress at

IMO, towards early implementation of ARPAcarriage require

ments. In October 1978, congress passed the port and umer
safety act which require tankers of over 10,000 gross has
entering Americanports to be fitted with automatic pknthg

aids satisfying USspecifications

by July 1 1982.

To meet both specifications, collision avoidance systems
must incorporate digital computers for radar data processing
and display driving purposes. Synthetic predictive and time
history graphics are superimposed upon a slave radar display.
Alpha-numeric readout of data for a selected target will be
madeavailable in addition.
By the end of 1979 the number of ships fitted

with comauter

ized plotting aids was approximately 900, indicating a rate
of installation which has avereged about 100 per year. Under
the pressure of IMOresolutions and Us regulations on the fit
ting of ARPAsthere is a potential

market for some 10,000 at
the rate of 1000 a year until 1990 or thereabouts after which

it maydecline but still

exist for newbuildings. This con

stiunesa very tempting cake around which manufacurers in var

ious countries are each reaching out for a slice.
As considerable number of manufacturers became interested

in

this field of technology, this led to several types of sucha
system. All products must of course comply at least with the
minimumpreformance standard laid down in IMOresolution

which forces the producers for a commonidentity in respect
of main features. This could lead to a reduction in the cost

of equipment to be available at a reasonable price, but for
added attractions

suppliers

have tended to produce equipment

surpassing the minimumrequirements, which could lead to a
complicated system not simple enough for proper use and

could overwhelma watchkeeping'officer whenhe joins a diffi
rent ship fitted with such equipment.
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Adequate training in the proper use of the principle types
of ARPAsystems and their

display ChAraCter13t1cg ;hou1d be

a requirement for all masters and officers serving on ships
carrying

such equipment. The IMOSub-Committee on Safety of

Navigation has recommendeda training
tional

programmein the opera

use of ARPA(Resolution )\.482 x11 adopted on Nov.l98l) .

The Sub-Committeeconsidered that training should, in addition

to basic radar training, include the use of simulators cap
able of demonstrating the capabilities, limitations and poss
ible errors of ARPA.
However, there is a aggm to achieve an adequate improvement

in world-wide radar training standards in the near future.
Somecountries still do not have the ability to provide all
masters and mates with an extensive radar simulator course.
It seems probable that adequate improvements will not be made

in time to satisfy training requirements whichwill result
from the expected increased rate of installing ARPAto ships.
The automatic plotting aids offer advantages comparedwith

basic radar which could result in a significant reduction in
the incidence of collisions.
It remains to be seen whether, as happened when radar was in

troduced, such advantages could be lost due to improper use,

lack of understanding, tendency to proceed at higher speed
and over-confidence.
that effective

To achive the full benefits it will be necessary

action has to be taken to implement the IHOrecommendations

on world-wide standards of training.

A look at ARPAsfrom some of the major suppliers

may be 1“

teresting, though within confines of this thesis description
must necessarily be brief and therefore superficial.

3.2.1

ARPAtypes:

ARPA‘scurrently available are based on two different design

philosophies.
One, which at the same time serves a need for a second radar,

is a stand-alone single-screen system which is basically
navigational radar incorporating full ARPAfacilities.
The other,

a

aimed at ships that already have two radars, consists

of a separate ARPAdisplay unit deriving its video input fr
omone of the existing navigational radarsor, if interswich
ing is provided, from either, whether s- band or x- band.
The latter configuration is in the majority and is adopted
by among others.

- Radar Devices, Inc. of San Leandro, California;

in devis

ing their Radar Watch Series of add-on automatic plotting

systems for interfacing with virtually any type of conventio
nal radar on the screen of which it displays computer-gene
rated graphic symbols.
- The Digiplot ARPAfrom the Iotron Corporation of Bedford.

Hass.; is also an add-on system but has its owndisplay unit

separate from that of radar with which it is interfaced.
Iotron were recently acquired by Radar Devices, Inc., whohave

thus added the Digiplot to their armouryof plotting systems.

bolstering the Radar watch which has only limited acceptance
by the USauthorities.
There are two Digiplot

models, the RMand RR. Both analyse

all echoes observed by the radar within a range of 11 miles
and track and plot the 20 nearest to own ship in the case of
the R.Mand 40 in the R.R.-The 16 in. PPI picture presents

echoes in green with the synthetic display of alpha-numerics,
plotted circles, and ship vectors superimposedin orange.
Targets are acquired automatically on the computer's assess
ment of threat and tracking is also fully automatic.
Alternatively, targets can be manually acquired by joystick
control which can also be used to select targets on which in
formation in the form of a display of range and bearing, co
urse and speed, CPAand TCPAis required.

A target selected

by either means is indicated by a circle in orange around it
on the PPI.
On the 3, 6, 12 and 24 miles ranges the display can be swit

ched head-up or north-up, relative or true. Target positions
are stored in the true motion mode in the computer and any
outside an arc of 22.5 degrees on either bow and moving away

are discarded. A trial manoeuvrefacility

as required by the

specification is provided and fairway "charts" of harbours
regularly visited can be programmedand stored in the com
puter memoryfor recall when required.

Figure

( 58 )

Another ARPAof American origin

is Raytheon’s Raycas. This

too has a separate display interfaced with a standard radar
and acquisition of targets for tracking is automatic on the
ranges from 3 to 24 miles. Any target of potential hazzard
is indicated by a flashing vector and when the system is op
erating in true motion a small circle on the screen ahead of
its vector shows where collision could occur if own ship were

to steer for it. A joystick is used for a manualacquisition.
A guard zone within two adjustable

boundaries can be placed

around own ship anywhere between the 6 and 24 mile radii

and

the range and bearing of any target entering this zone, to
gether with other necessary target data, will be presented

in an alpha-numeric display.
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In addition, Raytheon have recently introduced a lower-cost
ARPAIthe RaYPath capable of acquiring

and tracking up to 10

targets simultaneously within a range band between 1.5 and
12 n.m. Acquisition is manual by roller-ball and as newtar

gets in excess of 10 are acquired earlier ones presenting le
ast hazard are automatically erased. A guard zone maybe set,

target entry into which activates alarms, and the display can
b

.

e switched between true and relative

and between head-up and

north-up while ownship's position can be offset in any dir

ection.
Although only 10 targets can be simultaneously tracked the

Raypath still complies with the IMOspecification since acq
uisition is manual and the Performance Standard demandstra
cking of up to 20 only when acquisition is automatic.

Tho Rayparh IS Ray1hoon's Iona!-cos!
ARPA

Figure
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- Sperry Marine Systems, a British

American firm with Euro

pean headquarters at Camberley in Surrey, have again opted for
the separate-unit

ARPAin their CASII. This provides for man

ual acquisition by joystick of up to 20 targets within the
maximumsearE%5%?36 n.m., with automatic acquisition

option.

as an
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All targets are tracked and the microprocessor generates a
hexagonal PAD(Predicted Area of Danger) for each and since

these are not related to own ship
the navigator needs mﬂyto
steer clear of PADsdisplayed to avoid any possibility of
collision. A PADis computed and put on the screen after 30
radar 5°a“3 °f the target - about 90 seconds - from acquisi
tion. Its appearance being preceded by a dashed line vector
the targets ship's true course and, by its length her speed

calculated on the basis of distance travelled in six minutes.
The ARPAdisplay

is offset

to show own ship head-up or north

up a quarter diameter from the rim of the screen and the user
can erase any PADSclearly

seen to pose no present or future

threat. Alpha-numeric readouts of individual target data are
shownon demandon a separate rectangular display to the ri

ght of the PPI.
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- The ARPAproduced by the Italian

company Selesmar, based

in Florence, is again a separate unit capable of being inter
faced with any navigational radar.
Designated the Prora Autotrack. Its PPI displays true or re
lative motion target vectors, targets being acquired manually
at any range or automatically within a guard zone variable
from 0.2 to 23.9 n.m. Any target penetrating this zone acti
vates alarms and then projects a vector. Electronic plotting
of target

course and speed, CPAand TCPA,can be carried

automatically or manual selection,
superimposed on the display.

Figure (62 )

out

and channel tracks can be

- Japan Radio Company's JAS-B00 ARPAis again a separate

un

it system. with either manual or automatic acquisition of up
to 20 targets which can be simultaneously displayed with
C°Ur3eo ‘Peed ﬁnd other data continually

updated. A guard
ring can be set at a selected range and audible and visual
alarms also comeinto action if a target judged potentially

dangerous by the user closes to a distance and time consid
ered to present an active threat. Vectors can be displayed

in relative or true modeswith the picture stabilised head
up or north-up and the ARPArange scalesaxe

1.5, 3, 6, 12

or 24 n.m. independent of the associated radar. A pair of

navigation lines can be set up on the display to represent
a navigable shannel or own ship's track.

._..—__...
One of the
Japanese ARPA'3
currently on the
market :3the Japan
Redto Company’!
JA5-800 unit. A

future ofthisset is
that the ARPA

renge scales are
independent from
those set on the
! euocieted reder.
I

Figure

( 63 )
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- Mitsubishi's

MARAC
IIIA. is yet another separate ARPAdis

play to be interfaced with a standard radar. This is capable
of tracking as many as 60 targets simultaneously though no
more than 30 appear on the screen at once, the remainder be

ing displayed only so long as a call-up switch is pressed.
Targets may be acquired automatically or manually by use of
a roller-ball.
with range scales of 3, 6, l2 and 24 n.m. the
display can be presented north-up or head-up vectors indica
ting the course and speed of targets. A readout of required

data on any particular target is obtained by pinpointing its
echo using the roller-ball while if no one target is selec
ted in this way the relevant data of that presenting the
earliest and clearest threat remains on display. Markerlin
es can be brought up on the PPI to show the limits of any

area of the screen deserving particular study.
- Krupp Atlas of Germany, produce their Type 8500 radar ser
ies in three versions,

last-named constituting

the AC / RM, AC / TM. and A / CB5: the

a stand-alone ARPAin its ownright

although the others do have a more limited collision-avoidance
capability.

The 8500 A / CASsuperimposes a synthetic

compu

ter-generated picture on the normal radar traces and acquisition
of up to 20 targets can be achieved either automatically or
manually by roller-ball manipulation.
Automatic tracking of targets acquired by either means is
Carried out while they are within 19 miles from ownship's
position which can be off-centred in the relative motion mode.
A guard zone can be set and target vectors presented relative
or true. Data concerning any target Selected by “Sing the
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roller-hall is shownin a three-line LEDreadout and sectors
of the display in which potentially hazardous situations ex
ist are automatically computed and are marked by arcs of
brightness round the circumference of the PPI.

Tha Krupp-Allan

Elahronil 0500
rnicloplocouor
conlrollad radar
ayuam. Tha is in
bright display unit:
cove! relative
motion. lruo
motionand
automatic collision
avoidanca.

Figure (64 )
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- In the U.K. Racal-Decca, have also opted for the stand
alone integrated radar / ARPAsystem. The radar uses the

clearscan clutter-suppression technique and operates in true
or relative

motion with 10 range scales from 1/4 to 96 n.m.

Up to 20 targets may be acquired either manually by joy

stick manipulation or semi-automatically on entering either
of two adjustable guard zones, target data being stored in
the true motion mode though the basic radar presentation
maybe in either true or relative. Vectors are drawn for
all targets
data can be
to which it
on large or

being tracked and an alpha-numeric display of
called up on the screen alongside the target
refers. Gain level is automatically reduced
close-to echoes so that all targets are opti

mised in viewing terms, and a feature of this ARPAis auto

matic stabilisation

of the display relative to progress ov

er the ground - a facility

useful in providing anchor watch

information on any movementof own ship or of other vessels.

Rural-Du 4u ARI‘.4
dupluy.

Figruer

( 65 )

- A joint design by Norcontrol of Norway and Kelvin Hughes in
the U.K., has resulted in the ARPAdesignated the DB7by the

Norwegianfirm and the Anticol by its British

manufacturers.

Based on the KHRadpak radar which is the commercial counter

part of the naval type 1006, this is a stand-alone single
acreen radar-cum-ARPAcapable of acquiring up to 20 targets
by manual joystick control, or up to 50 automatically for
tracking in true motion whitin a radius of 24 n.m. on a PPI

which for radar purposes can be switched to nine ranges bet
ween 3/4 and 96 n.m. No more than 20 vectors

are however dis

played at any one time, each having a time-length of up to 30

minutes of travel. Information on individual targets of choice
is shown alpha-numerically

in a panel above the PPI.

The display can be switched to relative or true motion and
the KBautomatic clutter control system employedadjusts the

amountof suppression to suit the general clutter level which
under wind influence may be higher on one bearing than on oth

ers. A separate system controls the clutter return around each
target by setting a threshold level based on the numberand
repetition rate of clutter echoes received. Adjustable safe
limits

for CPAand TCPAare incorporated

and alarms warn of

any intrusion on these. Warningof collision target loss is
Qiven by other alarms which also signal system or computer

failure.
whennavigating in restricted

waters a fairway ‘chart’ con
sisting of a set of parallel straight lines can be brought

up on the PPI. channel length, width, and location relative
to fixed objects being determined by the user. Groundstabili
sation of the channel ‘chart’ is by tracking ffam fixed 13"d
or seamarks or by DRderived from gyrocompass and speed 109 1"‘

puts.

Figure (66 )
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On the other hand, the alternative

systems can be divided in

to two main categories according to their method of data pre

sentation:
1- Time based automatic plotter systems presenting time related
vectors. These systems produce the same kind of plot as the ma
riner would manually generate. They display time related vec

torgﬂ§¥21terminated at the end of the selected time interval,
drawing tracks from the immediate target position up to the

point the target is supposed to reach in the time period.
The track may either indicate the apparent motion and hence
a means of evaluating the nearest approach, or the true mot
ion of target. The latter, in comparisonwith the vector whi

ch is necessarily attached to ownship, also allows the true

speed of the target ship to be evaluated.
As in the case of the history presentation the facility of
being able to switch from relative to true motion continously
is one of the greater advantages of the vector type of dis
play.
However, in using these systems it is always necessary to be
aware of the mode in which the system is operating before ta

king informations graphically from the display.
Errors arise when, for instance, observers attempt to establ
ish distance of nearest approach by reference to true vectors.
Due to the fact that most computations of relative track are
based on a number of positions

which have been smothed into a

best fit and the true motion is derived from this relative tr
ack by applying the immediate value of own ship's course and
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speed to it, the vectors portrayed during the period that own
ship is altering course or speed may be in error.
Tracks made while targets are manoeuvring may also be in err
or and some delay in taking up the new direction

may be appa

rent, particularly whenthe change in relative motion is small
or the apparent rate is low.
Computerbased vector systems offer a forecast role by a trial
manoeuvrefacility. The effect of different heading and speed
trails are displayed by the computer to assist the mariner in

arriving at a decision.
The ways of showing the forecast are, a simple presentation
of numerical data on an alpha-numeric display, and the move
ment of echoes on the synthetic display in accelerated motion.
Beyondthese trial facilities no effort is madeby the vector

displays to assist in the decision makingprocess.
2- Graphic situation

display system which is a product of spe

rry Marine companyusing the concept of collision

point and
dangerous area which previously mentioned in the first section.

In this system the solution is independent of the time. It ado
pts a unique display which portrays the Probable Area of Danger

(PAD)of each target entered into the computer and the total

situation is displayed continously to assist in the decision
making process.
The ‘perry system approach outputs information in a manner whi

ch combines the separate steps of hazzard determination and
safe manoeuvreidentification, steps which are conducted sepera
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tely using vector techniques.
If own ship headings at present speed, which results in a
pre-selected CPAdistance, (the target can pass either a
head or astern of own ship), are computed, and their points
of intersection with the target's track determined, the seg
ment of track between the intersection points becomesthe
longitudinal axis of a hexagonal PADsymbol, whose trans
verse axis is twice the selected CPAdistance. Both axis are

increased by a 300 yard allowance to represent a method of
error compensation (sensor and system error).
The target track line, which is an extension of its unit 6

minute vector, is terminated conveniently in the centre of
the PAD;

The PAD,therefore,

represents

an area into which own ship

must not intrude if the pre-selected C.P.A. distance is not
to be breached. This area is the only one in which own ship

is capable of approaching the target closely and, in the lim

it, colliding with it. This fact is indisputable and is based
on the realities of the relative motion of the encounter.
whendisplayed on the P.P.I.,

the PADhas a location relative

to ownship's present or planned direction and rate of pro
gress, (both the heading marker and the electronic bearing
cursor are subdivided into 6-minute elements of own ship mo

tion determined from the speed inputs).
The most critical

PADis the one which intersects

the head

ing marker and the relative motion on the P.P.I. of the echo
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of the target creating it will confirm the degree of hazard.
The PADapproach establishes

a simple but correct manoeuvre

convention for which time variable vector systems have no

equivalent:
‘Be prepared to take evasive action for PADson the heading

marker within the indicated time interval and in selecting
an evasive manoeuvre avoid close encroachment on any other
PAD“.The directness and simplicity of this convention has
a marked influence on familiarisation and training needs of
Sperry CAS.

The PADconvention remains consistent,

irrespective of targ
et category. A target alters its course and / or speed; its
vector will change in direction and / or length and the posi
tion of the PADon the display will change (about 15 seconds

for the corrected PADto be drawn). A target stopped in the

water will exhibit a zero vector when the speed input is wa
ter speed and will be enveloped by its PAD.A buoy, lights

vessel or ship at anchor will display a vector which is the
negative of the tidal disturbance, a short track line and a
PAD, (if own ship heads towards this PAD, the tide will carry

her downon the target). A target whose speed is equivalent
to ownship's will place its PADon the perpendicular bisec

tor of its line of sight, whichprovides the basis for a pat
tern for PADlocations in respect to speed ratios. Faster tar
gets exhibit more complex phenomena. with diminishing range. 3

faster target is likely to showa second PAD,reflecting the
ambiguity in the velocity triangle, but as the encounter pro
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grasses and the target clears away. the two PADsmerge and
disappear as the target commencesto recede from own ship.

In this latter situation, the faster target is declared non
hazardous and shows a 6-minute vector only, which is a unique
form and convenient economy in symbolism.

From this brief outline of the PADapproach, it will be ob

vious that the necessity for time-variable relative vectors
to identify targets with critical C.P.A. distance is elimi
nated. (The PADof the critical target appears inevitably
under the heading marker without any specific operator-initia
ated task). Likewise, it is unnecessary to provide any time
variation with the target's time tracks; they are terminated
already in the PADin exactly the same relative position on
the P.P.I. as wouldbe defined as a critical area if vari

able true vectors were cycled ahead in time until the close
approach of the target was observed. PADseliminate the nece

ssity for a trial heading interrogation but preserve the fac
ility for investigating the results of a trial speed change.
It is not considered necessary; however, to apply dynamic
time lags or manoeuvre delays.

The location of PADSprovides a continuous representation of
hazard which is obtained on an intermittent basis by vector

manipulation:
The certain own ship headings and speed, (whether present or

trial values), held for specific time intervals, result in
inadequate C.P.A. distances.

when two different

vessels produce PADswhich are over 1.9

ping, special caution should be exercised, as one of the ves
sels shall have to take action even after ownship has tak
en avoiding action. In such a case one should keep well clear.
However, the following should be taken into consideration to

avoid errors in interpretation:
1 The line

joining PADto target is not a real vector, there

foreit does not indicate speed. Short lines maybe attached

to fast targets and longer lines to slower targets.
The termination

of this line when a PADis drawn, is not the

P.P.C. nor is the PADsymmetrical about the P.P.C.

It must not be assumed that in cases where the heading marker

intersects the PAD,reduction of speed before the vessel
actually encounters the barrier will resolve the risk. Re
duction in speed changes the outline of the PADconsidera
bly and may in fact produce two PADSin cases where only

one existed previously.

If own heading marker cuts the PAD,

reduction of speed may infact cause the boundary to move
towards own ship.

The distance to the target is not necessarily the distance
which own ship must run before the situation is resolved
and own ship may resume course. For pass astern of targets

this may be far less, and for pass ahead far more, than the
time implied by the own ship heading marker.
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Prom this brief outline of both vector and PADtechniques,
we may say that the fundamantal difference between the two

approaches, is that PADsdisplay the hazards in a graphical
and complete manner which the humanoperator finds easy to

assimilate, where as the time-variable vector system will
generate hazard and manoeuvring information in manycircum

stances only if the navigator sees need to requice it.
The time-variable

vector systems nmusaue where and how fast

each of the tracked targets are going, while sperry system
indicates where own ship could not go. In other words, if
own ship manoeuvres in such away that she can keep clear of

the PADs,danger of collision

is avoided.

To provide an indication of the impact of the PADdisplay,
it is proposed to explore the PPI scenes in both vector and
PADformat as seen by a number of ships engaged in a random

ly selected multiple ship situation in a confluence region.
This is illustrated in the following figures.
The target density is representative of the level encounte
red normally in the Dover Straits.
progressing in a SW-W'lydirection,

Three vessels are showing
with two vessels on app

roximately reciprocal headings. Twovessels are heading in
a southerly direction, meeting three vessels comingin the
opposite direction. with one exception, the vessels are head

ing into confluence region, with reducing separations.
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Figure (7/pshows the situation observed on the PP1's of the
target numbers 5, 7 and 10, firstly in terms of l8-minute
'true'

vectors and secondly in the PADformat. The following

interpretations suggest themselves:
Target 5 - The vector presentation
of target

pairs

shows the close approach

1 and 9, 2 and 3 and 8 and lo and Ownship

proximity to targets 1 and 9. A suitable evasive heading
change would result from rotating Ownship 18-minute vector
37 degrees to starboard to clear all hazard.
The PADformat provides an immediate and positive

of the hazard distribution

indication

ahead. A heading alteration of

33 degrees to starboard is suggested. The cresent of PADS

across either bow at roughly 18 to 20 minutes time interval

indicates mutual hazard affecting these targets and high
lights their likelihood of manoeuvring.
Target 7 - In the vector format, allowing for the alteration
of target 5, this vessel select an alteration of 15 degrees
to starboard, bearing in mind that a broader alteration to
clear target 6 would create problems with target 4 later.
In the PADformat, the alterations of target 5 would change
its status to non-hazardous, leaving target 6 as the one of

greatest concern. An alteration of 15 degrees to starboard
is suggested, which avoids any problem with target 4. The

future threat of target 9 is seen clearly and enters into
the decision-making process.
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Target 10 - The vector evaluation would suggest a heading
alteration of 30 degrees to starboard; PADSshow that 23

degrees is quite adequate to preserve the required CPAdis
tance.
These examples are selected as an indication of the rapid and

direct assessment of the total hazard situation against a
single fixed time interval scale that is madepossible by
the PADconvention. In any given situation,

the Navigator is

presented with an unabiguius indication of the risks which
attach to continuing his present line of progress and is
made at a glance which is the optimummanoeuvre to alleviate

the situation.

3.2.2 Errors and limitations:
Three sources of errors could affect the computerized systems:

1 - Sensor errors.
2 - ARPA errors.

3 - Interpretation errors.
1- Sensor errors:
These are already itemized in the IMOARPApublications,

and

will be briefly mentioned again. Their errors and standard

deviations are relatively small.
(1) Bearing Errors:

(a) Target glint.

These are due to:

It is not always knownexactly which

part of a target yields the strongest reflection.
To a certain extent it depends on the aspect of the

object.
(b) Somebacklash in the aerial drive gear.

(c) Rolling and pitching. This gives rise to a quadran
tal error, maximumon relative bearings of 45°, 135°.
225° and 315° with the minima in between. It is due

to the angular tilting motion of the sanner. Super
imposedon this quadrantal variation is a sinusoidal
wave form caused by the lateral displacement of the
scanner position.
(d) Beamshape in the horizontal plane.
(e)

Quantification in azimuth.

(ii)

Range Haeasurement Errors: These result from:
(a) Target glint.
(b)

Rolling and pitching causing lateral displace
ment of the scanner position.
(c) Pulse-length echo-chape and strength (associ

ated with pre-set threshold levels).
(d)

(iii)

Quantification in range.

Course Input Errors: These are caused by gyro-compass

deviations and will affect tracking accuracy if their
time constants equal those of the tracker filters.
(iv)

Speed Input Errors: These are caused by log errors and
can become important. They affect course and speed cal

culations of the target and display true motion vector
errors and predicted relative motion vector errors wh
en using the "Trial Manoeuvre"facility. Range, bearing,
CPAand TCPAvalues are not affected.

2-

Errors generated
(1)

in the ARPA
“$9”?

SmoothingErrors: Especially, owing to rolling and

pitching errors (a combinedeffect of scanner move
ment and gyro-compass errors) slight changes in vec

tor quantities and digital read-outs are continous
ly taking place for all targets in rough weather.
It should, however, be rememberedthat a target’s

velocity vector, even under ideal conditions, is
always subject to slight changes, depending on tYPe
of steering facilities employed. weather and 5h1P’5
parameters 0
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when own ship or the target ship change their velo

city vectors,

smoothing will oppose the change and
true Velocity information of targets (vector and dig
ital

read-out) becomes unreliable.

some ARPAsstop

tracking during these periods. The reason for this is
that in most ARPAsscalculations are based on the rel
ative motion velocity vector. In one particular ARPA,
however, position and velocity of tracked targets are
stored in true motion format, so that true motion vec

tors of targets do not need to be re-established after
a change in relative

motion. In case of fast manoeuvre

the target may get out of the windowif it was small

and the tracker may lose the target.
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(ii)

Computercalculation errors:

These are nearly always due to course and speed in-put errors.

(a) The influences on vectors:

Relative vectors will not be affected (excect in case of
trial manoeuvre), but true vectors will be affected lea

ding to incorrect true course and speed of target.

incorrect speed

Figure

( 73 )
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(b) The influence on P.P.C.

In-correct speed
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Incorrect course
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The influence

on the PAD:

Incorrect speed

Figure

(
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In correct course input will produce similar effect.
CPAdata (distance and time) is independent of fixed errors

in own ship speed and course inputs to the data processor, is
always indicated correctly, but the result of specific manoeu
vre such as adopting a heading tangential

to the PADmay fall

short of or exceed the navigator‘s expectations.
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Note that, with ships on collision courses, speed input error

will shift the P.P.C.butit willremain on the heading marker.
On the assumption that the HMis correct1y angned,

course input

errors do not affect the P.P.C. positions with respect to the
HM.However, picture and heading marker will be disorientated

inside the tube, and correction has to be applied to obtain
the true course to avoid a PAD.

(iii)

Vector Jumping:
(a) This may occur when targets are close to each other
and their two echoes are in the same tracking win
dow. The two vectors may interchange and so will

the digital information (target information swop)

_or sometimes they combine or, when in manual acquisi

tion mode, one target may lose all its information wh

ile the other target mayyield data for the first time,
but they are the wrong data.
Target swop should be overcome by ‘rate-aiding‘

the

forecast of the target(s) predicted position ahead of
the echo during the next scan (so that the proper vec
tor can be drawn if the position is later confirmed)
and by making the tracking windowas small as possi

ble after the initial acquisition.
(b)

It can also take place that while in automatic acquisi
tion modefalse echoes are received due to side-lobe

effect or indirect reflection via superstuctures on
own ship. The remedy is to switch over the manual acq

uisition

modeor to put into action a minimumtracking

and / or acquisition range.
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(iv) -Spurious information owing to acquisitioning of rain
and sea clutter echoes and to tracking information
of land-based objects.
This can happen while using the automatic acquisition
mode. Not only does the observer get far too much un

wanted information, it will also make the radar pic
ture confusing to look at.

Lastly it maysaturate the tracking capacity of the
computer and some of the targets

may be dropped or

ignored even though they are important to the observer.
In these cases one should go back to the manual acquis

ition modeor apply acquisition restriction

for a min

imumdesired range and use the Area Rejection Boundar
ies or zones (ARBsor ARzs).

Use of a 10 cm. ARPAdisplay

can be recommended to pre

vent computer saturation due to rain echoes (but keep

on consulting a 3 cm. display if small targets can be

expected nearby), although risk of target swopis in

creased as ship's echoes are "fatter".
I?mu[“rk%rf
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Tru than

11:.ui-Jul 4/f
U1 ﬁuvgf

Figure ( 31 )

5‘//(cf .1 5,. c/‘If/‘V

- 219 

(v)

Interrupted tracking of targets, loss of targets or
even nondetection of targets.
This will happen with low-level thresholds having been
set too high. One may have to ask for technical ad
vice, and in this connection it is wise to remember
that with ARPAnavigation consultation of a raw radar
display should never be neglected.

3 - Errors in Interpretation:
(1)

Misinterpretation of Display Presentation and Vector
Mode.

The combination of different display and vector (plus
eventual history tracks) are so manythat mistakes are

easily made in interpretation. Sometimesspring-loaded
switches are provided for certain vector modesand this

can be helpful.
In the True Motion vector mode, using a Relative Motion

display, a vector will be attached to the point represen
ting own ship although the point remains stationary on
the radar screen. Note also that in somecases the past
track does not coincide with the afterglow (for example
THpast track on a RMdisplay).

(ii) Misinterpretation of the Trial Manoeuvre(Simulation)

- 220 

Here, also. the type of display presentation has to
be appreciated. with static simulation, showingthe
predicted situation immediately after the manoeuvre,
it seems best to use a Relative Motion Display with
Relative Motion vectors of moderate length. with dy
namic simulation,.showing the predicted developing
situation up to thirty minutes after the manoeuvre
has been carried out, it will be better to have a
True Motion Display, for good understanding, plus

Relative Motion vectors (if possible). Although ‘Sim
ulation’ will give guidance for a predicted safe man
oeuvre, the observer should keep the “Rule of the Road‘

in mind especially Rule 19, during poor visibility.
The former prediction,

which is based merely upon the

other vessel keeping her course and speed, may clash

with the latter requirement.
(111)

Misinterpretation of the Input speed (Velocity).
In open sea input speed to ARPAis generally manual

sea speed or one-axis "water-locked" speed. In calm
water-which is often the case during fog conditions

one can be reasonably certain from true motion vector

what the target's aspect will be. Near the coast or
in estuaries, it is often advisable to use ‘Auto-Track‘.
or ‘Echo-Reference"facility, if these are available
The true motion vectors will then show the ground vel
ocity giving a good idea where the ships are 90139 t0

(this arrangement,under restricted visibility condi

tions does not clash with Rule 19).
This facility

can be used with a True Motion or a Rel
ative Motion Display.

Hhatever the speed input,.one must make certain what
the type is- sea or ground speed- one-axis; sea or
ground speed dual axes (sea or ground velocity) - to
appreciate the meaning of and to understand the inter
pretation of the true motion vectors. Also during rou
9h weather, one should realise that somevessels will

have wind drift

(leeway) superimposed on their direc
ted motion and their real aspect maydiffer from the
one shownon the display or read out digitally. Error

in the speed or velocity input does not affect the acc
uracy of range, bearing and RMpast track.

(iv)

Misinterpretation

of Display Symbols.

Itis a pity that symbols (and.the same is true for dis
play controls) are not standardized, and that different
manufacturers use different symbols (circles,triang1es,
squares, diamonds etc.) for the same message. Putting
it in a different way: the same symbolon different
ARPAWoftenhas different meanings. For example, depend
ing on the ARPAmake, a square symbol may indicate

‘ac

quired' or ' Statkmary ‘Target’ or ‘Passing within the
set CPAdistance“.
(V)

Misinterpretation of Data in Display which are using
Points of Possible Collision (PPCs) and Predicted 31935
of Danger (PADS).

-Thisvms previously mentioned.

Hidden limits togggllision avoidance automation:
Equipment complexity

-

Ergonom1c3

Reliability

-

Non-equippedvessels

Equipment complexity:

Complexityis the prime contributor to reliability and ergo
nomiclimitations. Manycollision avoidance aids are still
rather complex. For instance, one has fifty-one switches and

other controls.
I8 it "0 wonder that a newmate, fresh out of the hiring hall,

is overhelmed to the point he is disinclined even to find out
how to turn the thing on if it is one of the systems f0rWid1hP
was not trained?

Further, he probably did not comeon board until almost sai

ling time and is kept quite busy with other aspects of his job,
so that even if he has the initiative, he is probably too busy
to devote the time required to learn to operate the aid even
if some—bodywas available

to teach him.

Therefore, simplicity of equipment is very important, it en
mes the mariner to be easly familier with the equipment and to

deal with it quickly, correctly and efficiently without fear
and hence reducing the probability

panies started

of humanerrors.

some com

to produce ARPAsets which only fulfill

requirements to be simple and cheap.

IMO

Ergonomics:

Ergonomics gmbraces the entire interaction between man and
machine. The ergonomic limits in the use of collision avoid
ance aids go much deeper than a lack of training in how to
push some switches and twist some knobs. The most serious

limitation is the ability to understand the different presen
tations and the graphic display, the meaning of each of the
different symbolsand to interpret the encounter situation as
presented. This is the samebasic limitation that generated
the phrase "radar assisted collisions", the failure to prop
erly use the equipmentand correctly interpret the display.

This limitation can only be ceased by offering an extensive
planned training course which should be repeated after cer

tain periods to provide sufficient training on the various
types of ARPAand the different technique used, to ensure
that the observer will be able to use each system properly

to gain all the benefits, considering the accuracy, under
stand the limitations and knowthe possible errors and their

effect.
Reliability:
Computer-basedcollision avoidance aids are sophisticated
electronic equipments. As such they do have failures.
Therefore, watchkeepingofficers must practice radar plotting
frequently because who become accustomed to having solutions

provided by automatic plotting aids may becomeless capable
of making effective use of radar on occasions when the ARPA

is defective.

Non-eguipned vessels:
Several years are still neededbefore most ships will be fitted with
ARPA,during which many ships will have to rely upon basic

radar plotting. Then, in congested areas not all ships en
gaged in the traffic

will be working with ~the sametechniqueun

der the Samet€ﬂ9"'9'3-Theperformance of the watchkeeping offi

cers will not be the same which could lead to inconsistent

avoiding actions.
It was found that the use of radar induced watchofficers to
operate a problem more deeply than they did with ARPA.Then,

with less time remaining in which to make a decision, many

watchofficers

using radar chose to make unexpected manoeuvres

which wi11 confuse the watchofficers

of nearby vessels and

there by increase the probability of collision.
Therefore, shipping companies should be encouraged to fit
their ships with ARPAeven before Iho schedule, by making

availabe simple, cheap sets easy to maintain and with longer
time between failure, particularly those ships under flag of
convenience.

3.2.3

Accuracy of ARPAglot:

1- Accuracy of CPA:

The standard deviation of the distance to the closest point
of approach

( cfzba) for ARPAplot will obey to the same

rules and praaahmesused for manual plot reflection plotter,
s.g. final equation will be the same.
Therefore


'

6 CpA= c7CTE- ( ( ?CPA / plot

interval

) + l )

. . For one minute plotting interval
6'E§A=

¢fE}E.

(TCPA

+

l )

and For three minute plotting interval
o'*CPA= 55.3.

(1/3

TCPA +

1)

Remembering that
all

cfE&E=

and

R68 (one plot)=

R68

1.1

(one plot

(

) /

(2/3(n)

)

( 12 distance of target)2
( 13 range in use )2 )0'5

+

Hence, the accuracy (M95) in the CPAcan be calculated.

A schedule which can be used for these calculations
next

is shown
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Fromthe forgoing it will be clear that the numberof vari
ables which govern the value of M95in the plotted Distance
to CPAis large.

In order to attain a simplified but justified comparison
between the accuracies of the various plotting methods on
the l2-and 6 Mile ranges the maxinunnvalues of N95 with re

spect to the Distance of Target are pictured in the below
graph.

Fromthis graph it is concluded that:
- Accuracy from a 1-minute ARPAplot at the 12 Mile-range

is the worst.
- Accuracies improve with a factor two when the l2-Mile

range is replaced by the 6 Mile-range.

—The belt accuracy is 1i?tained
'
.

from a 3-minute ARPAPlot

at the 6 Mile-range
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2-

Accuracy

of P.P.C.

and PAD:

In the figure below these parametres are depicted for a cer
tain close quarter situation, and in the following an analy
sis of the accuracy (R95) of the PADwill be given for cer

tain conditions

1

:7

Ddtaatc t C I

Figure

( 33

)

In the figure, the collision heading and the PPCare shown.
It is remarked here that there is a saxmd P.P.C. in this C359
which is not shown here.

The PPC is calculated by extending the speed vector of the
other ship (WA)with a distance

equal to Vother shipx TCPA.

where TCPintact in the time to collision and this time in
terval differs actually from the TCPAin case no change in
heading or speed is executed.
The R

of the PAD:

Wewill proceed as before when we dealt with manual plotting
to show improvement due to avoiding some human errors.

The factors which will affect the accurarcy of the PADare:
1- The accurarcy of own ship vector (W0)used in the velocity

triangle which will depend on the accuracy of its direc
tion and length.

at The direction of the (W0)will be influenced only by
wind drift and gyro alignement since the constructive

error of the observer will not exist.
Error in wind drift
ation used before
_

O

W

V

can be considered using same equ
V2

( AU / AL )

Sine<

By using here a moderate wind speed and ship‘s vel

ocity the variance ( (72 ) can be estimated to be
(1-5)2 instead of (l.75)2 used before.

Error in gyro alignement will be estimated as before
3t

_ loo 0
6.‘2 —1T

Then the direction error can be estimated at
2 =

(

.'.cF‘ ::

(1.5)2

+ (1/12)

) = 2.33°°

1.5° and the accuracy = 3°

-230
It follows that the variance of cross track error will
be

6-2

CT

-

V2.

(Plot interva1)2.

-—3422E

.

(57.3)?

b- The length of (N0) will also be influenced only by the

log error, e.g. by the accuracy of the water speed (V).
Assuming that the own ship‘s speed is greater than 10

knots, then the variance of the along-track error will
be
2

_

5-KT -

2

( 2 3 . V . Plot interval)

9

.'.

R68 of point

W =

2
R68 = 1'21

2
2 _ 1
2 (Plot interval)
‘G CT +6AT ’ ‘-7714 ' V " 50'»: 60*"
' miles

= _:<18529
744

1.1

(

¢rE%

+

(73% )‘ / sin 90°
2

'

2 _<L1r£__i_nt_er_«ﬁ
'

,.,et,e_.,

60 X 60

= 1.28 (V. plot interva1)2

metres

WhereV in knots and plot interval

in minutes.

2- The accuracy of the target relative vector (OA)used:
As already explained in plottingiuung the aids as reffection

plotter
2

2

VI
v

= 1.1 ( (12.target dist.)2+(13.range in use?)‘
-

.

2

2

.°.n§8 (one plot) = 1.21( (12.target dist.) +(13.ran9e in use’)
= 175 (Dist)2 + 205 (mn9e)2

mm(mpmm
2

1163of point (A) -(

231

2 1104

n (Dist in miles) T

2

(Rangeinmiles) )IIBt.res

‘--~1h+g“ﬁ‘£>

‘V

Figure
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2

R68 - plot

9

= ( :

1

(Dist in M)2 +

+ 1.28 (V. plot interva1)2)

1104

n

(Range in u)2

metres

Assumingthat plotting interval is 3 minutes, scanning per
iod 3 seconds the number of plots

by ARPAequal 60
II‘

.'.R68 PPC=(153(Dist of target)2+18.d(Range in use)2+11.5 V2)
X

Accuracy

R95 =

5 / 3 R68

(1/3 TCPA + 1)

metres

The conditions for the formula are resumed agalng

6 Drift - 1'5

o

V more than 10 knots
Log obeying IMOPerfonnance Specifications

Plot interval 3 minutes
Scanner period 3 seconds
TCPAin minutes

Range in use more than 2.5 miles

From the above formula some numerical values will be calcula
ted and presented in the following tables for 12 Mand 6 M

ranges.
Range

12

Range

M

R95/(1/3

6

M

R95/(l/3

TCPA+ 1)

TCPA+ 1)

ist

ist
12

10

8

_6~

Span

6

5

4

3

20

163

157 151 147

20

127

125 124

123

18

155

149 143 139

18

117

115 114

112

16

148

141 135 131

15

108

105 104

102

14

141

134 128 123

14

98

96

94

92

B9

67

84

E3

81

78

76

74

l2

135

128 121 116

12

10

128

122 116 110

10

Fttnlthe tables the graph whichis pictured belowis oostructed.
As the influence of the Distance of the target is of nunor inportanoe

to u1:tabuhu:values,tids aqnnent is1rxﬂecuaiin'UE:gmaph.
Further it is enphasized that the value given is R95of the PFCwhich
means that in order to acquire R99.7, the R95- values should be multi

pliai by 1.4.
Also attention is drawn to the fact that (TCPA)is different fItnITCPA
on a clearing Heading and that (TCPA)in fact is TCPAon a oollisio

heading.

This also explains that in ‘exact’ PAD's the PPCis not
the centere of the PADbecause (TCPA)differs from the
TCPA'| on the clearing

headings on both sides of the PAD,
the last two TCPA'salso differing from each other.
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Advantages and disadvantages

of ARPAsystem:

The potential advantages arising from these new developments,
both for timely decision making and in relieving the work

load of the navigator, are evident.
The system provides a fuller and more up-to-date and objective
presentation of the data on which the navigator must make his

decisions and a facility

for assessing the outcomeof any in

tended manoeuvre.

Enumerating the advantages:
1- Rawdata up-dated every scan (3 sec).

2- The selected echoes are vectored and displayed simultan
eously.
3- There will be no discontinuities from re-setting processes

or alterations

in course or speed of ownship or target.

4- Elimination of humanerror in the mechanical task or plott

ing.
.
5- Collision Risk alarm based on C.P.A. distance selected by

operator.
6- Information renewal rate about 15 secs.

7- Digital readout of target range and bearing, course and
speed, C.P.A. distance and time for selected echo instantly
on demand, i.e. continuous monitoring.
8- Trial manoeuvre presented dynamically and speeded up to
30 times.

9- Absence of discontinuities
permits plotting

or targets.

and renewal rate of 15 seconds

to continue during manoeuvring by own ship

The automatic systems, therefore,
continuous supply of intelligence

provide the mariner with a
in the form in which he ne

eds it and with a minimumof delay. It could enable the obse

rver to study the effect on the situation of a projected al
teration of course and/or speed, or several alternatives,
within a few second.

Hence. it can readily be seen that with such equipment, time

will be available to spend in studying up-to-date intelligence.
rather than in the laboriousproduction of muchless timely and
comprehensive information.

Although the system has all these advantages, it still has
some limitations and disadvantages such as:
l- A confusion of vectors or PADSis possible in dense traffic.
2- Specialised training is required to be familiar w1th the

correct use of the equipmentto gain all its benefits.
3- Over-reliance on a system could lead to a false sense of

security and hazardous encounters.
4- It's effectiveness remains closely dependent upon radar in
puts and setting; the radar should be tuned correctly.
5- Still expensive.
6- Tendency for ARPAusers to pay less attention to the visual
look-out and to neglect other requirements of the collision

regulations.
7- Mariners who became accustomed to having solutions provid

ed by automatic plotting aids may become less capable of
making effective use of basic radar on occasions when the
ARPAis defective.

Summary:

In this section a wide range of plotting devices has been dis
cussed. On the one side of the spectrum is the simple plotting

sheetfstill used by manyobservers,- and on the other side the
re is the ARPA.a sophisticated plotting aidh, which, gradually,
will be introduced on all ships of the mediumand large tonnage
C1883.

IMOhas already adopted a Resolution on the “MinimumRequire

ments for Training in the use of Automatic Radar Plotting Ai
ds (ARPA)”which starts with the paragraph:
Every master, chief mate and officer in charge of a naviga
tional’ whatchon a ship fitted with an automatic radar plotting

aid shall have completed an approved course of training in the

use of automatic radar plotting aids.
The contents of this course is published in IMOARPAPublica

tion. Recently the Merchant Navy Training Board (U.K) has is

sued a booklet, entitled

"Training in the Operational Use of

Automatic Radar Plotting Aids", which contains a course spe

cification

which is based on the IMOspecification.

It isworthwhile reading through the specification;
sections are quoted blow.

two short

l. The possible risks of exclusive reliance on ARPA.
Appreciation that ARPAis only a navigational aid and that

its limitations including those of its sensors, makeexclusive
reliance on ARPAdangerous, in particular

for keeping a look

out; the need to comply at all times with the basic princi
ples and operational guidance for officers in charge of a

navigation watch.

2. Manualand automatic acquisition of targets and their re

spective limitations.
Knowledgeof the limits imposed on both types of acquisition

1n multi-target scenarios, effects on acquisition of target
fading and target swop.
Reading through these it seems that raw radar displays, in
cluding a 10 cm. set will remain as desirable and valuable

aids.

Conclusion

Shipping has always been more or less a hazardous enterprise
and safety at sea has long been a preoccupation of the mari
time community.

Collision in particular, has always been a prominent problem
in maritime history and the rapid progress in allthe aspects
connected with the sea, specially in recent decades, led to

the continuity of its occurrence with alarming regularity.
This problem has resulted in the addition of a new and dif 

ferent dimension to safety equations and has led to changes
in both the scope and difficulty of maritime safety work.

The simple and relatively similarly designed ships of earlier
days have, to a large extent, been replaced by technically
very sophisticated specialized ships. Increased size, speed
of ships and cargo turnover, the growth in volume of traffic
and the advent of a large amount of several types of haz 
ardous cargoes transported by sea. Thus the situation became
more and more complicated and led to an increase in the prob

ability of collision risk with the seriousness of itsreants
which have pushed strongly to give a greater concern to the

safety at sea and the efficiency of shipping operations.
The increase in the numberof ships together with the trend

to spend less time in ports with more time at sea led to a
large increase in the volumeof traffic. As a result of the

geographical distribution of trade, the traffic flow haslxen
concentrated in certain areas creating high congested type
of traffic proceeding in several different directions. some
of these waterways are restricted

in width and hence reduce

the latitude

for manoeuvring decisions and the margin for

errors.
Larger ships are less manoeuvrable and more difficult

stop, and they are also restricted

to

in where they can go in

safely, thus increasing the encounter rate in some areas,
and constitute a considerable collision hazard.
The sophisticated specialized ships have complicated oper
ating conditions and demandhigher organizational and op 
erational qualities in the interaction between manand ma

terials.
The commercial world demands that the sea voyagesshmud be

completedas efficiently

as possible, usually with respect

of time. Therefore, modern ships are of high speed and mag

ters of these ships normally proceed with full speed incng

gested areas even in restricted visibility
collision risk tremendously.

which increase

Several shipowners have been using the so-called flags

convenience to keep their ships at a lower standard
(sub-standard ships).

Someof these shipowners have norms;

tation in sending old,ill-equipped
ly qualified

of

level

and trained officers

ships to sea with poor
in charge.Tn6SB Ships m3Y

cause disastrous consequences and often not only to

them

selves.
This situation has led to an increase in the numberof col
lisions involving the probable loss of property, life and
or pollution. If the hazardous nature of cargoes is taken
into consideration, such casualties will need a huge ammmt
of money, considerable period of time and concerted effort
to removeits effect.

The importance of reducing the shipping losses, environmental
damageand loss of lives that are often associated with mar 

ine collisions

is well recognized and has tended to persuade

the maritime community to explore ways to enhance and promote

the safety, accuracy and increased effectiveness of collision
avoidance and navigation practices on board ships to

improve

the situation.
In response to the persistent need of active preventive
measures, strenuous efforts

conducted, and are still

and comprehensive work have been

going on, by the international organ

izations, national administrations, classification societies,
firms, research centres and various institutions to eliminate
this risk and put it under control.
As a result of extensive studies, investigations, research
work and experiments,

several measures have been taken and dg
veloped, the major of which are:
- The Rules of the Nautical Roads, to direct the actions ummm

by mariners so that a safe conduct results.
Ship-to-ship communication, to make clear the intentions.mﬁ

exchangeanti-collision

advice.

Optimal bridge design and arrangement, seeking for the most

efficient navigational operations.
Suitable well defined bridge routines and procedures, to en
sure that the necessary tasks are carried out correctly at
the right time.

- Vessel traffic services, to regulate the traffic in the con
gested areas and provide invaluable advice to prevent acci
dents within those areas.

Reliable ship's control systems, for better ship handling

and more effective

manoeuvres.

Organized education and training systems, for upgrading

mariner's qualifications, promotingtheir practical ex
perience and improving the navigators skills to handle

effectively their ships and avoid collision risks.
Marine casualty investigation techniques, to check the
effectiveness of the preventive measures and explorenew
adequate ideas for successful safety work.
Developed bridge equipment to improve both navigation

accuracy reducing the work load, and threat assessment

avoiding ambiguity.

someadjustment is still

needed to gain the full

benefit

of these measures to improve the situation and increase

the safety level.
The Rules of the Nautical Roads, as one of the principal
means for preventing collisions, must be well arranged ,

very clear and simple.
The verbiage of the rules should be in a better form to

give the correct meaning; more restrictions

on the behav
iour of ships in collision avoidance situations in poor
visibility are required, the cooperation betweenthe give
wayvessel and the stand-on vessel still need better ar
rangement and more effort is still

needed to makethe rules

simpler to be used easily and correctly without tesitaticn.
Communicationsare very important for the safe conduct of

shipping and therefore additional steps should betaken to

ensure its effectiveness.

Morestrict regulations are needed to ensure greater circuit
discipline. Communicationfacilities should be more recog 
nized in the 1972 International Rules which shouldspanfiauly
acknowledge the existence of the V.H.F. equipment. An ‘anti

collision message‘ section has to be included in the Interna
tional Code (INTERCO)and its content should be closely

aligned with the International Regulations. The adoption of
a separate worldwide V.H.F. channel is necessary to be used
during ship encounters in international waters to ensurethat

the passing of vital navigational and anti-collision infor 
mations are not prejudiced.
Shore-to-ship communicationstill needs to be promotedtarset
ting a better arrangement of procedures and adequate equip
ments to increase its range, so ships can ask for an advice
when needed and can be continuously

ary intelligence

of the traffic

informed with the naumg

and local environment uuouwm

which they pass. This will be quite useful in areas ofltavy

shipping traffic,

particularly whenbad visibility is luely

to occur.
Bridge design and arrangement has been recognized as an im.
portant measure. A concern for ergonomics has become axrxesg

ity in today‘s maritime industry.
Morecareful work is still needed to ensure the most effi 

cient navigational operations.
A serious continuous contact between ship designers, owners
and operators is essential to have a wheelhousewhich suits

the ship's function and route and enables the officerstotﬁg
charge their duties correctly and in time. Classification sg
cieties should contribute to help in finding out the best

suitable design and arrangement taking into account theforrJ_a

cominginternational regulations. The societies should also
advice the owners of existing vessels for the necessary, not
muchcostly,

modifications

needed to improve the working con

ditions on the bridge by having a sensible layout of instru
ments and equipment, enough area of visibility, etc.
Well defined bridge routines and procedures are very import
ant and can be considered as a necessary measure needed to
increase the safety at sea. The reason for the existing higher

safety standards in air navigation is actually due to the
successful extensive routines and procedures.
Moreeffort is still needed to formalize adequate bridge rog
tines and practices on board ships and not leaving it up to
the individual navigator. The traditional attitudes should
be changed and the work on the bridge must be regulated

and

organized to stop the widespread improvisation which often

leads to accidents.
Bridge teamwork training

should also.be included in thexvnmi

cal colleges curriculum.
Vessel Traffic Services (V.T.S.) can provide a higher level

of safety and efficiency when tailored to meet the needs of

the specific areas serviced.
Traffic Separation Schemeshave been found very effective in
reducing the incidence of collisions especially meeting and

fine crossing collisions in poor visibility.
More IMOapproved T.S.S. are still needed in some congested
areas such as some coastal regions off Japan and Korea.

Extension of shore based radar surveillance

and improving

identification methodsmight be necessary, perhapsouulxny
fitting of transponders is a good idea. Better arrangement
techniques and equipment are also needed for successful ac
curate communication and reporting procedures.
The sudden failure

of some ship;s systems could lead to

an

accident particularly in close quarter situations.Therefore
careful structures, maintenance and repair under the class;
fication societies supervision is always necessary.
Moreattention

is required to ensure a good rudder effective

ness, an active back up or parallel system is necessary to

increase the reliability of the steering gear. Anextensive
well established engine room routine is essential, and more
serious check by the chief engineer is needed to

always
a

have a well maintained machinery. There is a need for

greater use of fault—diagnosis and control systems, amisudct

state of readiness procedures.
It has been found from marine casualties analysis that

the

factor of humanerror predominates. In a lion's share of
cases, humanfactors were cited as causes of collision. Ac

cordingly, upgrading the education and training of ship per
sonnel can be considered as a direct preventive measure.Edg
cation and training must be sufficient and efficient to ful

fil the needs.
There is a need to agree internationally on entrance quali
fications for maritime colleges which have to be high axzgh.
‘Hose pipe‘ systems must be stopped and I personally belne
that officers following that system never receive sufficient
amountof education and training.

Naval officers

who like to join merchant ships must attend

a certain course of education and training to adapt their
knowledgeand skills to suit the working conditions on hind
merchant ships and not considering them automatically
holding a master certificate of competencyon reaching a
certain rank which is the case in manycountries.
There is still a need for more serious training on pro 
cedures aimed at the avoidance of collisions, and how to
deal correctly with the emergencycases. Radar simulators
are quite useful for such courses which should be compul
sory. Somecountries such as Panamaand Liberia still be 

lieve that it is not necessary. Within this courses marine
casualty statistics should be analyzed and the navigators
have to study special cases with the aim of finding causes
and recommend measures. Such courses ought to be made maul

able in the education program of the navigational colleges
as many lives and ships are lost each year simply because
the lessons learned from accident investigations do not
reach those who are most concerned: the mariners.

Cooperation between maritime colleges is essential to ex
change knowledge and experience to reach a high

interna 

tional standard of education and training.
Investigation of marine casualties is necessary to improve
the existing measures to suit the modernsituation and to
initiate extra adequate preventive actions to avoid the rg
currence of similar accidents. Reduction of collision prob

ability can not be achieved to any significant extent un
less a serious investigation of collision cases is carried
out. The investigation should be based on correct informa

tions, therefore recording devices should be installed on
board ships to be as the black box on the airplanes in or

der to preserve the vital information prior
dent and at the instant of its occurrence.

to the acci

Developmentof an international system for collecting, ang
lyzing and presenting marine casualty data (data bank) is
required to recognize where and how they occurred uoarrive
at a quantitative and qualitative description of the ammal
factors to determine the correct recommendations for in

creasing the safety at sea.
The role of IMOshould be increased;

efforts

made by the

various maritime countries and their achievements in im

proving safety as a result of casualty investigations are
still, with very few exceptions, not communicatedto other
countries.
In the past 50 years there has been a vast development in

bridge equipment to increase the safety

and improve the
efficiency of ship’s operation. The advanced electronic ng
vigation aids have improved the situation to a considerable
degree. The equipment used to determine the ship's posi
tion are nowproviding accurate enough position fixes. The
accuracy will further improve -with the introduction of
Navstar (GPS) which is

expected

to have

reaching effects not only on position fixing
the whole spectrum of navigation.

extremely far

but also on

This type of equipmentplays a principle role in reducing
the work load of watchkeeping officers, leaving more time

for them to evaluate the traffic situation and taking the

correct action in time. Any navigator, in confined and con

gested waters, will have his attention divided between pure
navigation and collision avoidance. Therefore, any step done
to simplify the navigation will leave him with more freedom

to attend shipping in the vicinity and hence safety of navi
gation will increase.
There is still

a need to recognize a good enough training

course for the proper use of these equipment to analyzecor

rectly the informations available taking into account their
limitations. This course should be repeated at certain
periods to clear any ambiguity and ensure that the navi 
gator is capable to deal with them perfectly, particularly
with the new generation.
Radar and ARPAare, perhaps, the most useful aids that Mme

been given to the navigator. They have a direct contribu 
tion to collision avoidance procedure. Collision avoidance
is an important task facing the navigator and anylmxmannuﬂ

assistance which improves the information flow, accelerates
decision making, and reduces stress and indecision, is per
forming a worthwhile service to the mariner.
The introduction of radar to merchant ships has broughtbeqg
fit in terms of collision avoidance. whenused properly, it

can greatly benefit the navigator in determining the riskof
collision, but if it is not used and interpreted correctly
it can do more harm than good.

Probably the most famous case of misuse of radar was on
26th. July 1956, when the Andrea Doria and Stockholm amlnkd

off Nantucket lightvessel. Although the radar pips of the
other vessel were detected by the Andrea Doria atlJ miles
and the Stockholm at 12 miles, neither vessel made proper

use of the available information.
So, there can be no doubt that almost every collision has
been caused by a human aberration

of some kind

which led

to failure to recognize early enough that action was gmng
to be called for, the time left to get clear has been too
short to permit coherent planning with the means avail 
able plus the actual manoeuvreperforming. Possibly

the

knowledgeof this constraint promptedthe irrational
ior which followed.

behay

The object of any kind of marine plot is to give an explg

nation for the radar picture, producing a plan oftie area
around own ship with the vessels moving on it. The plot

will be expected to showthe current position of each tar
get vessel,

the expected forward movementof each and the

risk of collision, if any, then guide the observer to de
termine the manoeuvre required to avoid that collision tak
ing into consideration other vessels in the area.
some excuse may be offered for the manual plotting defi 
ciency since the work load of manual data extraction, and

the difficulties

of situation analysis on a conventional

radar display are considerable. They are both time consug

ing and tedious. It is not surprising that in high tnniic
densities formal attempt to extract data is often aban 
doned.

The principal deficiencies of the manualtransferred plot

lie within the observer/PPI combination; they are of poor
accuracy, slow delivery, they have low maximumcapacity ,
and produce fatigue. The PPI is a poor discriminator of

small changes of bearing and the observer can only deal
with one problem at a time concerning one echo at a time.

If there is more than one target to study, the delay in
providing the required intelligence accummulatesin pro

portion.
However,the only effective and reliable method ofgettug
the necessary information from radar observations is to

computethem. It is quite feasible for this to be done
or to have some of the process automated

automatically,

A very great deal has been done in efforts to make the
work of computation easier, faster, accurate enough, and

accommodateseveral targets simultaneously.
A variety of manual plotting aids has been produced, per
haps the most generally useful device is the reflection

plotter,

somesemi-automatic plots-are introduced,butrtme

of them have come into major use; also some attempts have

been made to produce electronic

computation on theface of
the PPI, but to obtain a complete computeddata it is stnl
necessary to do a certain amount of manual plotting. Al 
though it is reasonable to suppose that the use ofnechmrv
electronic devices reduce the work load and the possuﬁlity
of humanerror to some extent, each system has a limited

capacity in terms of the number of targets which can be

dealt with and the quantity and quality of intelligence
which can be provided.

The introduction of collision avoidance systems has improved
and sustained.the performance by eliminating manyof thelunun

limitations of radar plotting. It is a considerable step for
ward in the constant battle against collision.
The system provides the mariner with a continuous supply of
updated information in the form he needs it with a minimum

delay. It also enables the observer to study the effectontie
situation of a projected alteration of course and/or speed,
or several alternatives, within a few seconds, to recognize
the effective manoeuvre.
Do the ARPAsystems really make the navigation safer and re

duce the probability of collision?
A series of experiments have been run on the simulator
CAORF(USA) from early

at

1976 to the spring of 1979 to analyze

the performanceof navigators utilizing visual techniques
compared to radar and a collision

avoidance system.
The collision avoidance program had initiany ascertained that
the overall watch officer performance while using a collisnam
threat assessment system was superior to his radar aided per

formance or his performance using only visual clues. These
results were then extended and it was found that the super

iority of a threat assessment system over radar was also evi
denced whenmore than one ship in a potential close quarters
situation had collision threat assessment aiding cmqnradudth

radar aiding. This supports the argument that fitting
ships with ARPAsystems would result

in safer vessel

more
oper 

ation.
In an attempt to verify the results

of the CAORF
study

and

overcome some criticisms of an earlier study (1974-1975). the
Liverpool Polytechnic Maritime operations Research Unit con

ducted further research and the overall conclusion indicates
that the results align closely with CAORP.
Then an attempt was made to locate comparisons with the

ef 

fectiveness of the stored history devices. The following ude
summarizes the results which are drawn from the analysis
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Computerized CAS

Casualty

Storgg_history

cases helped

Collisions

of

cases helped

14

9

4

0

18

9

(17)
Rammings

(6)

Collisions and
Rammings

Table (9)

Later CAORF
had the following results

Measurevisualradar

from a further study :

S.H.wit.h - S.l:l..with

PADvector

CPA (n.m.)

0.57

0.61

TCPA(min.)

8.7

7.4

11.4

10.8

24

24

38

39

35

47

l3

l0

9

7

2

2

0

l

l

l

0

0

Manoeuvre

(deg.)
Narunans

0.96

0.77

0.8

10.8

1.14

12.7

5 0 . 3n.m.

Collision

Table (10)

CPAI closest point of approach
TCPA-time of closest point of approach

In a field visit,

I have done three voyages on three ferries
type ofcollisnzm

each of which is equipped with a different
avoidance system.

1. 14th. of July 1980, Sea-Link Ferries —Vortigers Ferry ,
from Folkestone to Boulogne and back (1410 to 1900). The

ferry was equipped with Digiplot of Iotron.
2. 15th. of July. Sea-Link, Hengist Ferry, from Dover to
Calais and back to Folkestone. The ferry was equipped
with CASII, Sperry.
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3. 23th. of July, P 5 0 Ferries,

N.F. Panther, from Dover to

Boulogne and back. The ferry was equipped with
Raytheon.

The captain and officers

satisfied

Raycas

on each ferry were quite happy and

with the equipment they had got on board sayhxgit

makes life easier, reducing the load quite a lot and incnagg
ing their confidence in complexsituations, whichltdpsiiem
to act quickly and correctly. Most of the officers wherenot
familiar with the other types of ARPAso believing that the
one they had got on board is one of the best, always pre 
ferring to deal with the same type. Maybethey gave this
from the companywas with

answer because a representative

me each time, but I think that the point is that they suc

ceed to be familiar with the equipment they have on board and

are able to use most of its benefits, if not all,which helped
them to successfully avoid dangerous situations, so trey prefer
to keep going with the same type. The reason for thiﬂﬁﬁ amuse
is due to the lack of training courses which should soon be
covered.

The visit indicated that the navigator really needs such
equipment to be on the bridge and an adequate training

should
be available for the different types and to be compulsory.
An ARPAshould, in order to improve the standard of collision
avoidance at sea, reduce the work load of the observer.

Therefore, simplicity of equipment is very important; the com
panies should produce ARPAsets which fulfil

IMOrequirements

with an emphasis on compactness, simplicity and reliability .
This will also be beneficial in avoiding an excessive tnauung
requirement and expensive sets.
Controls should be arranged in a way that their functions can
be recognized from the first

glance and that can be achieved

by appointing only one function to each control,
functions to the same one.

not difﬂammt

The meaning of the symbols used in the different types should
be standardized to avoid ambiguity and its number should be

reduced to avoid the possibility of masking small targets.
Positive steps should be taken on board ships to avoid over
relience of navigators on an ARPAset, perhaps by not using it
in areas where few traffic of ships is expected,kaqnng it on
stand-by and insisting in carrying out a manual plotting in
case of meeting any. The tendency of ARPAusers to give

less

attention to the visual look-out, neglect other collision

avoidance requirements and be less capable of making effect1ve
use of basic radar could lead to a false sense of security and
thus to hazardous encounters causing an ‘AREAassisted colli

sion'.

Recommendations

1. Strengthening the training and examination methods re

lated to International Regulations for Preventing Col
lisions at Sea to ensure that all officers are well
prepared to abide by them intelligently and correctly
in time without hesitation. International unification
of these methodswill give better results.
2. Testing and analyzing the application of the rules ex
perimentaly and adjusting them when necessary to

keep

them abreast of development in marine technology . The

rules should always be suitable for the infinite var 
iety of maritime circumstances;

any amendmentmnstcome

into force as quickly as possible for faster hqnowmnnt

of the situation.
Greater emphasis on the use of communication, ship-to

hi

ship communication should be promoted and regulated in

a better wayto increase its effectiveness,cooperation
between ships is very important particularly in heavy

traffic portions.
4. The bridge design should be evaluated in relation to
the requirements of functional analysis and foruxxmung
international regulations. It should allow the housing
of new technology without affecting negatively exnndng

functions and routines.
U1

0

Ergonomical approach to bridge arrangement. It is bmner
to group equipment according to function, which means

having regard to inter alia usage, circumstances, preg
entation and back-up facilities.
Only equipment which
is actually required for the navigation of the ship

should be placed in front of the navigator, and all other
equipment relegated to the back of the bridge.
Continuous contact between ship designers, buildersrxmers
and operators is necessary to ensure that the bridge will

suit the user providing all the needs for most efficient
operation of the particular ship and trade.
\l I

Well defined job requirements on board ships is very im 

portant, extensive bridge routine and procedures are es 
sential and strict watch rules and orders are necessary,
followed by consecutive checks and serious control by the
master to ensure adequate coverage of the watch,executing

properly the vital tasks.
Regular and frequent check of the performance of bridge
equipment by officers and never allow them to completely

rely upon a single device, therefore certain

back —up
systems are necessary to increase the safety of operation
Owners who fit

their

ships with an ARPAsystem have a duty

to ensure that their staff are clearly aware of both the
virtues and the vices of the system chosen, as wellas
their ownfallibility. It could be better to standardize
on one system as that staff could be confused by thesmmie
differences between marks when they have to be transferred

to another ship.
10. It is better not to use ARPAwhen few traffic

is expected

(to be on stand-by) to keep the officers aware of the im
portance of the visual look-out, practicing manualphnxing

and developing their manoeuvring skills, and not toheame
accustomed to have all the solutions provided by ARPA.It
must be completely understood at all times that ARPA is
just an aid rather than an automatic control.

11. The safety advantage of ARPAactually

increases substag
tially whenthe two interacting ships are both equipped
with threat assessment systems. Therefore, shipping com
panies should be encouraged to fit their ships wiuaaﬂﬂh

even before IMOschedule by making available

simple and

cheap sets, easy to maintain and with longer times be

tween failure.
12. Improvement of performance of aids interfaced

withhﬂwm

such as radar, gyro and log.
Development of two-component logs measuring speed thnxgh

the water in two directions

( X and Y axis of the Sup L

Development of ARPAin combination of radar picture

and

navigation maps (electronic maps). In addition, it is
necessary to have a rate of turn measuring device which
can be connected to the ARPAcomputer.
13. Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)is a very effective

pre 
ventive measure in congested areas, and an international

survey is needed to determine the location of the necesg
ary ones where the risk of collision is greatest and
where collision effects are the most serious.
14

Extension of the areas which require a compulsory pi 

lotage in heavy traffic portions.
in connection with the li
censing and certification programs, the general emerg

15. There is a need to identify,

ency ship handling procedures expected to be followed

that will reduce ship collisions caused by vital con 
trol system failure. A model simulator training program
related to this matter should be developed.
16. Well established

engine room procedures and maintenance
programs are important; main engine and steering gear

must always be kept in good order and seriously checked
an approaching congested areas.
17. Using standardized formats for presenting clear concise

ship manoeuvring data such as the rate of turn, the ad
Vance distance and the stopping distance under different

ship conditions.

'

18' Marinecollege courses, educational tools,training

tech

niques and test materials must be well arranged and dg
veloped so as to be always suitable for the ramnxeuyms
and cope with the developments that so frequently occur

in the maritime field.
19. Renewalof certificates

and training at certain periods

is very important and should be done according to

STCW

requirements.
20. The appreciation of collision avoidance problems by
seafarers,

must be widened beyond knowledge of the

col

lision regulations and the recognition of risk, to en
compass a knowledge of the limitations

imposed by self

and other ships manoeuvrabi1ity‘and equipment.
21

Further objective study should be undertaken to under
stand better howofficers use the data presented to them

and howthey percieve the overall collision

avoidance

problem to find out why human factors have a large con

tribution in marinecasualties. It is not sufficient to
just indicate that the cause of the accident is due to
humanerror, it is necessary to find out why the offuxx
acted in such a way which led to the accident.
22. Ship owners must not fit their ships with any new piece

of equipmentbefore they are sure that the staff isatﬂe
to use it properly and effectively, as the incorrect
use of equipment could cause more harm than good.

23. Reducing the officer's work load to an adequate levelgthis
could be achieved by changing the framework condition gov
erning the running of the ship, the manning arrangement ,
hours of work and watchkeeping plan.

Ship manning must never be reduced before adjusting the

ship to suit the limited numberof personnel, otherwise a
gap will exist in the bridge organization.
24. The social climate on board ships should be improved to

get the officers best effort.
25. No pressure should exist to complete the voyage in

a cer
tain period of time. Masters of ships must consider safety

as the major goal and not proceed with a speed more than

that permitted by the circumstances; the higher the speed

the faster the situation will develop and the lesstie time
available for decision making.
26. Passage planning must be well prepared and discussed in ad

Vance taking into account the needs of each phase of
voyage for safe passage.
27. Introduction of automatic registry of operational data

the

on

board ships for the purpose of obtaining more relevant and

correct data for casualty investigation.
28. Morecontribution by IMOto regulate investigation

of casg
alties and establishment of a well structured and active

international system for investigating, analyzing and re
porting marine accidents as that organized by ICAO.
A modest start

has been made by the Maritime Safety
Committee of IMO,which has begun to issue statistics

of

serious accidents, but the reports are not complete and
detailed enough to be of muchpractical value.
29. Fairways must be adjusted to suit the development occurred

in marine industry, the increase in ship‘s size and draft
and the increase in the amount and types of hazardous ma

terials.
3°C

The overall responsibility for the control of maritime
safety must be held by the national administrations. In
the light of this,

a system must be developed that emnﬂes

work on safety to be arranged in such a way that the over

all responsibility held by the national administration is
effective in practice, at the sametime as servicescﬁ the

classification societies are utilized to the extent con
sidered justifiable and appropiate. The national adminis
tration must keep abreast of developments in the field of
maritime safety in all aspects as regards shipping in gen

eral. It is necessary to examineits future abilityto per

31

form both current and future duties taking into account
all convention requirements.
The national administration must play a central role in
cooperation with education and training centres, owners
and ship masters to ensure that ships staff have an ad 
equate competency. The administration

should make a record

for each officer containing a detailed information about
him, particularly his acts on board ships according to
which the officer mayhave to repeat a certain training
course or to sail as an extra officer or officer of lower
rank for a certain period of time.
The administration must take over the entire responsibi 
lity for reformedsigning-on activities for this purpose.
32. Increase the cooperation betweennational adinistrations
and the classification societies to ensure that a ship ,
when it is being operated, is actually seaworthy,adequately

crowed, equiped and maintained in such a way that it pro
vides adequate safety in order to prevent marine casu
alties, with regard to the ship's operation and the trade
in which it is operated. To-day's technically advanced
shipping requires the coordination of the technical,

structural and operational aspects.
societies must, in spite of the com
petition between them, collaborate in the work of inter

33. The classification

national maritime safety, exchange experience and de 
tailed information, carry out research work and objective
studies to explore ideas which could improve the oper 
ational safety. They must cooperate on a mutual basis to

be able to offer relevant professional assistance
guidance in this field.

and

Det Norske Veritas Research Di 

vision has carried out a project in the period 1977 - 80
on cause relationships of collisions and groundings to

evaluate its classification rules for ships and proposed
a voluntary class for nautical safety. The data used was
based upon the collisions
norwegian ships.

and groundings involving

If same work could be done in ouqxuatnm1

with the other classification

societies, the data would

be wider, the experience greater and the work more exten
sive, which surely would lead to more comprehensive and

accurate results for greater benefit.
34

Cooperation between the national administrations of vari
ous countries must be extended for better control of
ship‘s standards, to prevent owners of sub—standard shun
to continue and keep them operating in this condition.
Ships not complyingwith internationally agreed staniuds
must be stopped.

It is of greatest importance to ensure that IMOoper 
ational and technical standards are maintainedcmdupe.
In the North Sea area, the national administrations of
the North Sea states, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, France ,
West Germany, The Netherlands,

Norway, England and

Sweden, as well as Greece, cooperate in port inspection

of all ships to ensure the maintenance of certain stag
dards. This cooperation is based on the so-called
Memorandumof Understanding between certain

maritime

authorities.
Similar cooperation should be organized in other re 
gions.
35. The assistance provided by the International
Maritime
Organization (IMO)for maritime countries,particularly
the developing ones, should continue andto be increased
whennecessary to develop their maritime industry and
to be able to implement the requirements of

the

STCW

convention as quickly as possible in the near future .
The establishment

of the world Maritime University(wMU)

under the auspices of IMOis a magnificent work and

correct positive step towards a better future.
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INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVESThe investigation is related to collisions which
have occurred outside port areas, in coastal waters or in the
open sea. Statistics of all knowncollisions have been used
to determine trends according to regions and to investigate

the effects of other factors such as darkness and visibility.
From the data bank of knowncollisions it has been possible
to seek out further details of the circumstances of the
accidents from various sources for the purpose of analysis of
the causes of collisions.
SCOPEOF THE lNVESTIGATION'The survey has been restricted

to collisions between vessels of over 100 tons gross under way
and proceeding on passage and not engaged in special

activities such as fishing, replenishment or naval exercises.
It tapplies
occurring
waters
or
e opentoseacollisions
but does not
apply world-wide
to accidentsin incoastal
harbours,
rivers, canals or inland waters. Narrowstraits such as the
Sound, the Bosporus and the Straits of Messina have been
excluded from consideration but collisions in the Straits of
Gibraltar and Singapore have been included. Data has been
obtained for collisions which have occurred since the lst
January 1956. The data bank will continue to be up-dated in
the immediate future.
SOURCES
OF DATA The initial

data relating

and location of collisions for statistical

to the incidence

purposes has been

obtained from Lloyd's Weekly Casualty Reports published by the
Corporation of Lloyds. Data on collisions in the Dover Strait
area has been checked by comparison with the reports of the
National Maritime Institute of the United Kingdomand
supplemented by information received from the Channel Navigation

Information Service.
Moredetailed information about the circumstances of collisions
has been received from various national administrations and from
other sources. Data based on Japanese investigations has been
pioxidid
s er es.by Professor Kandori of the Shimonoseki University of
BACKGROUND

NUMBER
OF SHIPS IN SERVICE This report

is concerned

with

collisions Between ships proceeding on passage, which are almost
invariably merchant ships engaged on commercial voyages. when
considering trends in the incidence of collisions accout must
be taken of the number of trading ships in service, which has
increased considerably over the period covered by the investi
gation. Estimates of the numberof trading ships in service at

ten yearly intervals are shownin Table l for different size
(2 >
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categories.

The figures are based on the Statistical

Tables

of L oyd's
Register
of Shipping
and on data published by the
General
Counc
1 of British
Shipping.

Table 1 Numbersof trading ships in service according

to/size category (g.r.t.)
,/
Year

l

100-999 1000-9999 l0000over latal

1950

5100

11200

1100

17400

1960

7400

12300

3000

22700

1970

11400

13000

6200

30600

1980

11800

13600

9500

34900

REGIONAL
TRAFFICDENSITIES During the first

part of the period

covered by the survey the densit
arine traffic was highest
in the
coastal
region off
the
route
from Ushant
to t q9ILh_H£Sﬁ?§g;ggg;)particularly
e Elbe.
raffic surveys made inon
1972 and 1977 indicated that the volume of through traffic was
of the order of 300-400 ships per day in the Dover Strait,‘
with 150-200 crossing ships per day in the peak summermonths)

Traffic off N.W.Europe mayhave been slightly higher in earlier
years when there was a larger number of small coastal ships
operating in the area. In 1962 the number of through ships on
the Borkum-Terschelling swept route was estimated to be about
350 per day.

The
volume of during
traffic thein,ggp§%g§g_5g§%t;§:E§EEE§)hasincreased
considerably
perio covere
' investigation

and traffic density off somesections of the coast is now
higher than in the DoverStrait and all other coastal regions.
The high traffic density is due to the large number of small
coastal ships trading in this region, apart from the considerable
numberof fishing vessels.
Other coastal regions with a high traffic density are the
Malaccaand Singapore Straits, the southern part of the Baltic
Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1978 the flow of traffic
through the Strait of Gibraltar was found to be of the order
of 100-150 ships per day.)

(3)
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RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATIQE

1.

STATISTICS OF WORLD-HIDE COLLISIONS

It is difficult to obtain completestatistics of world-wide
casualties,
especially
accidents vhic
occur inwith
portrespect
areas. to Athe
verynumerousminor
high proportion of

collisions which occur in coastal regions or the open sea will
be re orted by Lloyd's as at least one of the ships involved
is licely to suffer appreciable damage. However, it has been
found that some collisions between small ships in Japanese
coastal waters have not been included in Lloyd's Lasualty
Reports and the data bank has been supplemented by additional
information received from Japan.
INCIDENCEOF COLLISIONS The annual

incidence

of world-wide

collisions is shown in Table 2. Despite the considerable
increase in the number of ships in service the incidence
of sea collisions, as reported by Lloyd's, has remained

relatively constant.

Table 2 Annual Incidence of Reported Collisions
I/

Both ships
over 1000 tons

Totals
Both ships
over 100 tons

Totals

1956-60

1961-65

1966-70

1971-75

1976-80 1956-80

46
46

51
41

48
36

41
45

34
36

41
45
50

48
51
41

45
S5
52

34
40
57

46
43
35

228

232

236

217

194
79
81

80
68

77
S7

87
73

105
85

65

87

87

77

79

76
70

83
94

105
100

93
94

76
66

359

398

452

454

381

U1)

1107

2044

Iwvzqﬁyu

Allll
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RATIOT0 NUMBER
AT RISK The total

s ze categor as H c

number of ships

of different

are known to have been involved in a sea

collision
are t given
each rate
five year
in ofTable
The
ratio of
e neanforannual
to theperiod
number
ships3. in

service is also shown. The ratio of ships in collision to ships

at risk was appreciably higher for larger ships before 1970,
but has decreased in recent years to be about the same as for

small ships.

Table 3 Numbersof ships involved in collision

and rnnual

ratios to the numbersin service, for different
size categories

Period

Size Category in g.r.t.
100-999

1000-9999

10000 I over

141

450

110

.0043

.0074

.0088

1961-95
Ships
~'
Ratio in collision

171
.0041

435
.0070

140
.0081

1966-70 Ships in collision
Ratio

261
.0049

384
.0060

212
.0081

1971-75 Ships in collision
Ratio

298
.0051

347
.0053

239
.0069

1976-80 Ships in collision
Ratio

220
.0039

319
.0047

189
.0045

1956-60

No of ships

in
Ratio to number

collision

in service

REGIONAL
INCIDENCEThe regional

year perio

totals

are s own in Table 4.

of collisions

for five

The figures for Japan and

Korea are likely to be incomplete, especially for the earlier
years. Collisions in the bays of Japan and in restricted waters
of the Inland Sea have not been included.

(5)
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Table 4 Regional totals of collisions for five year periods,
1956 to 1980

legion

1958-60

Baltic

1961-65

1966-70

{><

1971-75 1976-80 TOTALS

Sea

37

42

39

33

21

172

Southern North Sea

82

80

71

32

22

287

Dover Strait

60

69

45

19

16

209

English

Channel

25

29

23

22

15

113

E Coast

UK

34

19

17

12

10

92

I Coast Spain-Portugal

13

29

17

15

12

86

Gibraltar

10

13

13

3

17

56

Mediterranean

22

19

15

29

31

116

E Coast N America

27

22

20

18

ll

98

5

13

26

20

66
436

Strait

Malacca 8 Singapore
Straits

Coasts of Japan and
Korea

5

29

114

163

125

s.v. Pacific

2

6

11

24

17

so

Other regions

40

34

55

58

52

239

7

There has been a considerable decrease in the number of collisions
occurring off north west Europe in recent years which cannot be
accounted’for by the possible slight decrease in traffic density.
The coastal region from Ushant to the Elbe will be considered

in moredetail in the next section of this report.
The increase of collisions occurring off Japan during the period
of the survey can be attributed to the growth of international
and coastal trade and the considerable increase in the number
of Japanese ships. There are no IMCOapproved traffic
separation schemes in the coastal regions off Japan and Korea.
EFFECTOF RESTRlCT§QVISIBILITY It is not possible

to determine

{Fe exact proportion of collisions occurring in restricted
visibility
all regions
as theCasualty
extent of
the visibility
is
not
always for
indicated
n Lloyd's
Reports.
Restricted
visibility (less than 2 miles) was reported in 505 of the 742
collisions (68!) for which details have been received.
(6!
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During the 10 year period 1956-1965 over 80%of collisions

in

the DoverStrait area occurred in restricted visibility, but
less than/50|
The roportion of collisions in restricted visibility has been
during the last 10 years this proportion has been reduced to

of t e order of 60%or more in the coastal regions of N.H. Europe,
Japan, N.B. America and in the Gibraltar Strait.
Less than 301
of collisions in the Malacca and Singapore Straits have occurred

in restricted visibility,

due mainly to heavy rainfall.

EFFECTOF DARKNESSThe effect

of darkness

on the incidence

of

collisions, for which information relating to time and
visibilit
was available, is shownin Table 5. For collisions
knownto ave occurred in clear visibility the number of
collisions occurring in darkness is approximately three times
the numberoccurring in daylight. In restricted visibility
collisions occur as frequently in daylight as in darkness.

‘Table 5 Effect of darkness on the incidence of collisions

Collisions in clear visi
bility

Collisions in restricted
visibility

In conditions of clear visibility

Daylight

Darkness

60

184

427

405

the higher incidence of

collisions was found to apply evenly throughout the period
of darkness. The incidence during the period of twilight
goeinnot
ar ess. appear to be greater than during the period of
2.

COLLISIONS on:

NORTHWEST euaope

The coastal region of north west Europe ‘etween Ushant and the
Elbe merits special consideration. During the period 1956-65
over 40%of reported world-wide collisions occurred in this
region but during the last 10 years the proportion has reduced

to less than 201 of the world total. Traffic separation
schemeswere first established in this_region in 1967-68, and
have subsequently been revised and extended.

The effect of

traffic separation in this area will be investigated.

The coastal region can conveniently be divided into three
sections: the English Channel west of the Greenwich Meridian,
the Dover Strait and the southern part of_the North Sea.
Thethree sections will be considered separately.
L7’
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THEDOVER
STRAIT For the purpose of this

over tra
a ea is considered to extend investigation
from latitude ths
S0 1S'N
to latitudeosl
l5'N A
and
from the
Greenwich
meridian
to
lon
itude 2 00'E.
traffic
separation
scheme
now extends
ent rely through the area so that all navigable water lies
within the scheme or the adjacent inshore zones.

Traffic separation was first introduced on a voluntary basis
in September 1967. A radar surveillance

scheme was brought

into operation in July 1972 and has since been extended to cover
the full width of the Strait in the narrow section. Compliance
with the principles of traffic separation was mad. compulsory
for some ships during the period 1972 to 1977. In July 1977
the new Collision Regulations came into force requiring all
ships to complywith the principles of traffic separation.
Voyagedata has been obtained for almost all ships involved in
collision,in this area and in manycases information about
coursesgsteered has also been received. Table 6 shows the
numberof collisions according to the category of encounter
situation for five year periods between 1st July 1956 and
30th June 1981. The number of collisions in clear and

restricted visibility are also given for each period.

Table 6 Numbersof collisions

in the Dover Strait according

to encounter situation and visibility,
periods.

Encounter Situation

Opposite directions
Broad crossing

for five year

1956-61 1961-66 1966-71 1971-76 1976-81

43

52

25

7

4

0

0

O

0

1

Same direction

7

7

8

6

6

Not known

1

2

l

l

0

Totals

51

62

34

14

Restricted visibility
Clear visibility

49
2

52
9

26
8

10
4

ll

7
4

In recent years the numberof collisions between vessels
proceeding in opposite directions has been reduced to approximately
10%of the incidence before traffic separation was introduced.
There have been no collisions between vessels proceeding in
opposite directions within the traffic lanes of this area since
1972. The last 10 collisions between vessels proceeding in
opposite directions have occurred within the inshore zones.

uv 26/4/i
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Since traffic separation was introduced in l967 there have been
20 collisions between vessels proceeding in the opposite
directions in the inshore zones of the Dover Strait and 18 of
these have involved at least one ship which was neither calling
at a port or pilot station within the zone nor proceeding
to or from a nearby port on the adjacent coast.
Despite the considerable volume of both through and crossing
traffic and the relatively high incidence of fog there is no
record of any collision involving ships crossing at a broad
angle during the 21 years before the 1972 Collision R-gulations
came into force.
The number of collisions

between vessels proceeding in the same
direction has remained relatively constant throughout the 25
year period of the survey. The majority of collisions between
vessels going in the same direction (22 out of a total of 34)

occurredin restricted visibility.

The incidence of collisions in clear visibility in the Dover
Strait has also remained relatively constant. The introduction
of traffic separation does not appear to have affected the low
incidence of collisions between vessels proceeding in opposite

directions in conditions of clear visibility.
SOUTHERN
NORTHSEA This area is considered

to extend

from the

eastern Boundaryof the Dover Strait area to the Elbe estuary,
and to include the traffic separation schemes and deep water
route off the European coast. The region off the east coast
of England has been considered separately.
During the first half of the 25 year period of this survey
channels swept clear of mines were established

routes.

as NEMEDRI

Centre line buoys provided a form of traffic

separation but in periods of restricted visibility vessels

tended to move into the wrong side of the channel and there
were numerous collisions.
The swept channels were relatively

narrow causing vessels to overtake at close distances.
Traffic separation schemeswere introduced in parts of this
coastal region in 1968. There is no radar surveillance of the
schemes and no procedure for identifying ships which are
contravening Rule 10 of the Collision Regulations.
Table 2 shows the numbers of collisions related to encounter
situations for five year periods between mid 1956 and mid 1981.
The numberof collisions between vessels proceeding in opposite
directions has decreased to less than 20%of the incidence
before traffic separation was introduced. During the last 5
years there have been 10 collisions between vessels proceeding
in opposite directions within the region, but 5 of these occurred

in areas well clear of the traffic separation schemes.

(7:
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Table 7 Nuabers of collisions

in the southern North Sea

according to encounter situation

1956-61

Opposite directions

1961-66

1966-71

1971-76

1976-81

56

60

47

12

10

Broad crossing

7

6

6

9

4

Same direction

10

10

6

6

4

Not known

10

10

7

3

2

Totals

83

84

66

30

20

The numberof collisions resulting from broad crossing situations
has remained relatively constant. The majority of broad

crossing collisions occurred in restricted visibility and

involved a small ship.
There has been a decrease in the incidence of collisions between
vessels proceeding in the same direction.
This was to be
expected as the traffic lanes are wider than the swept channels
of the NEMEDRIroutes.
ENGLISHCHANNELThis area is considered

to extend from the

wsstern Boundaryof the Dover Strait area to longitude
7 N and to include the southern approaches to the traffic
separation scheme off Ushant.

Traffic separation schemes were established off Ushant and
Casquets, and off south west England in 1968 but most of the
area is not covered by separation schemes. Extensive changes
to the separation schemes off Ushant and Casquets came into
force in January 1979.
Table 8 shows the number of collisions according to type of
encounter situations for 5 year periods since 1st July 1956.
The decrease in the number of col1is;ons between vessels
proceeding in opposite directions is less pronounced than in the

other coastal regions of north west Europe but in the vicinity
of the traffic separation schemesestablished in 1968 the

number decreased from 18 in the period 1956-66 to 6 in the
period 1971-81.
‘

There have been very few collisions between vessels in broad
crossing situations in this region. The incidence of collisions
between vessels proceeding in the same direction is relatively
low and there is no apparent trend.

(/0)
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Table 8 Numbersof collisions

in the English Channel

according to encounter situation
1956-61

Opposite directions
Broad crossing

1961-66

19
0

27
1

Same direction

2

Not known

1

22

Totals

SUMARYTable 9 shows the totals

1966-71

1971-76

1976-81

17
1

16
0

11
1

Z

4

3

1

0

1

0

31

22

20

14

for 5 year periods for the

entire coastal region, and the totals of collisions which have
occurred in areas where traffic separation schemes have been
established. There has been a considerable reduction in the
incidence of collisions between vessels proceeding in opposite
directions in restricted visibility through areas wheretraffic
separation schemes have been established.
The incidence of
collisions involving vessels crossing or proceeding in the
samedirection within those areas, and of all types of collisions
outside those areas has remained relatively constant.
Table 9 Numbersof collisions in the coastal region
off North West Europe for five year periods
Area

1956-61

1961-66

1966-71

1971-76

1976-31

Dover Strait

51

62

34

14

11

Southern North Sea

83

84

66

30

20

English Channel

22

31

22

20

14

122

(54

45

39

34

24

29

30

21

Totals

Vicinity

of rss

Away from T85

155

176

123

140

28

36

l//)

'
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or COLLISIONCASES

Inforlafion about the circumstances preceding collisions in the
e an sea or coastal waters has been received for approximately
7gOcases.

For the years 1968 to 1977 inclusive

it has been

possible to obtain data relating to at least one ship in 50%
or more of knownsea collisions.
Someinitial results of the
analysis will be summarisedin this section of the report.
Table l0 shows a breakdown of reported collisions with respect

to category of encounter situation and condition of visibility.
The categories of encounter referred to in the table are defined
as follows:
Meeting end-on Esch vessel initially

subtending less than

Fine crossing

Bash vessel initially

subtending less than

Broad crossing Each°vessel_initially

subtending less than

S on the bow of the other ship.

30 on the bow from the other ahip.
or both subtending more than 5 .

One

1121 on the bow from the other shi .
One or both subtending more than 30 .

Overtaking

One vessel subtending more than 11210 on
the bow from the other ship.

The figures should only be regarded as close approximations,
owing to the imprecise nature of the evidence available.
Table 10 Numbersof collisions according to encounter

situation and visibility for different regions
Meeting
end-on

Fine
Crossing

Broad
Crossing

Overtaking

Clear visibility
N-W. Europe

8

18

23

23

Japan
Other areas

3
7

24
26

40
21

24
14

13

68

84

61

Totals

Restricted Visibility

in 26/41
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Fig! 12
COLLISIONS IN CLEAR VISIBILITY

MEETINGEND-ON Only 18 cases have been considered

to be in this

Ei?3i3?§T'l3?? than 3%of the total for which information about
the circumstances has been received. For post o these cases
the angle on the bow was of the order of 3 to S on the bow
for one or both ships so that the Crossing Rule would probably
have been applicable.
Someof the collisions in this group could be attributed mainly
to poor look-out on one or both ships - usually in cases
involving small vessels.
In a few cases the close p esence
of a third vessel was a contributory factor. A third cause,

in several collisions of this type, was a late starboard turn
by one ship in what was initially a starboard to starboard

passing situation.

CROSSINGSITUATIONS The Crossing

Rule would have been

applicable In approximately 701 of the collisions which occurred
in clear visibility.
The predominant cause in almost every
case was poor look-out by the watch officer of the give-way
ship. In a very high proportion of collisions of this type
action was not taken by either ship until very close range.
The Stand-on Rule of the 1972 Regulations,

which came into

force in July 1977, permits the stand-on vessel to take action
at an earlier stage than was permitted under previous
regulations.
'

Information/has not been received for sufficient casualties

which have occurred since July 1977 to assess the effectiveness
at athelater
ate.
of
change
but it will be possible to make a comparison
Somecollisions have occurred as a result of a crossing
situation in which a change of course was made on rounding a
headland. Traffic separation is believed to have been
effective in reducing the incidence of collision of this type.

Although the majority of collisions which occurred in clear
visibility have been classed as broad crossings only about
lS% (27 collisions) involveg vessels crossing with an initial
course difference within 30 of a right angle. Collisions
between vessels crossing at a very broad angle tend to occur
in areas of low traffic density where less vigilance is
maintained. Several accidents of this type have occurred in
the central Mediterranean and the open rceans. Broad crossing
collisions are relatively frequent in Japanese waters, where
small vessels are usually involved.
OVERTAKING
CASES As in the case of crossing

situations

the

principal cause of collisions between vessels involved in
overtaking in clear visibility is poor'look-out on one or
both ships. At least 8 collisions have resulted from a sudden
change of heading by one vessel due to failure of the steering
system whenovertaking at close distance. Several others
involved
the close presence of a third vessel or other special
circumstances.

(I3)
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COLLISIONS IN RESTRICTEDvxsxnxurv

MEETINGOR FINE CROSSINGSITUATIONS Before

the

introduction

5T—T7FTTIE'7?B3?3TT3ﬁ_E3TTi?i3ﬁ?'EEtweenvesse s on nearly

opposite courses, each subtending less than 30 on the bow
of the other shi , represented over 90%of collision in

restricted visibility.

Traffic separation is reducing the

incidence of this type of collision but there have been
numerous instances in recent years, some involving very

large ships.
The frequency of meeting or fine crossing collisloas in
restricted visibility is mainly due to improper use of radar

and faulty interpretation of radar data, associated with a
relatively high speed of approach. Manycollisions of this
type featured starboard helm action by one ship and port helm
action by the other, usually at a late stage.

The 1972 Regulations have placed more emphasis on starboard

helm action but it is too soon to assess the effectiveness
of this change. Several meeting/fine crossing collisions
in restricted visibility have resulted fromstarboard
helm action by one ship in a starboard to starboard passing
situation.
_
It should be possible to reduce the incidence of this type of
collision by introducing further traffic separation schemes,
especially off the coast of Japan, and by additional routeing
measures - such as those agreed for the English Channel.
Someof the existing traffic separation schemesare relatively

ineffective.

BROADCROSSINGSThere are relatively

few collisions

between

vessels crossing at a broad angle in restricted visibility.

This type of situation can be more readily interpreted from
the radar display and the rate of approach is less than for
fine crossings.
Host of the reported cases have involved a small vessel and/or
a ship without operational radar so that detection was made
at a late stage.
n each of the 27 cases involving vessels
crossing within 30 of a right angle detection was made by one
or both vessels at a range of less than 5 miles, and in 25
of the 27 cases one vessel was less than 3000 tons gross.
OVERTAKING
CASES Overtaking collisions

account for less than

0
e to a occurring in restricted visibility.
The annual
incidence of this type of collision is less in restricted

visibility than in clear visibility.

As in the case of broad crossing situations the majority of
cases are associated with a low detection range. Several
collisions of this type have occurred as a result of action to

avoid a third ship, particularly in the traffic lanes of
traffic separation schems.
(/4!)
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CONCLUSIONS

1) The incidence of world-wide collisions in the open sea
and coastal waters has remained relatively constant over
the last 25 years despite the considerable increase in
the nunber of ships in service.
1) There has been a decrease of over 50%in the incidence
of collisions off north west Europe during the second
half of the 25 year period whereas the incidence of

collisions in the coastal regions of eastern Asia has
greatly increased.
Before the introduction of traffic separation schemes

the proportion of collisions in restricted visibility

was about 70! of the total.
This roportion is now
decreasing. In the Dover Strait t e proportion

occurring in restricted visibility was over 80%before
traffic separation was introduced, it is nowless than
50%.

In conditions of clear visibility the incidence of
collisions in darkness is three times greater than
the incidence in daylight.

4)

the coast of north west Europe collisions between
C9 Off
vessels proceeding in opposite, or nearly opposite,

directions constituted approximately 80$ of the
total before traffic separation was introduced. The
incidence of this type of collision has been very much
reduced in this region and is now almost negligible
within the limits of the separation schemes.
5) Traffic separation has not appreciably affected the
incidence of collisions between vessels proceeding in
the samedirection, or crossing at a broad angle, off
the coast of north west Europe.
7) The incidence of collisions in clear visibility has not
been appreciably affected by the introduction of traffic
separation schemes.
3) Almost all collisions which have occurred within the
inshore zones of the DoverStrait since traffic separation
was introduced have involved at least one ship which was
not calling at a port or pilot station within the zone,
.nor proceeding to or from a nearby port on the adjacent
COISC.

9)
10

\-4

In clear visibility the Crossing Rule would have been
applicable in approximately 70$ of collisions.
e
predominant cause of this type of collision is poor look out.
Collisions between vessels crossing at a broad angle in
clear visibility tend to occur in areas of low traffic
density or to involve small vessels.
U5)

m

Allﬂ26/4'.’/1
Paco 15

ll) In clear visibility overtaking collisions are usually

attributable to poor look out and/or a sudden change of
heading whenpassing at a close distance.

In restricted visibility

approximately90%of collisions

involve vessels proceeding in opposite or nearly
opposite directions.
The predominant cause is improper
use of radar and faulty interpretation of radar data,
associated with a high speed of approach.
l3) There are relatively few collisions between vessels
crossing at a broad angle in restricted vis.bility.
Such cases usually involve a small vessel and/or vessels

without operational radar.
14) overtaking collisions account for less than 5%of the
total occurring in restricted visibilit . Collisions
of this type are usually associated wit low detection
range or action to avoid a third ship.
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COURSES
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iastzasﬁisn
1

‘Io develop frameworks of model courses in response to recommendations made

U! the Joint BC.iP[D!0 Regional Meeting of hperte in Hariti.me '1‘:-ainingand
Certification ‘Bangkok,April/Hay 1980), the D19Secretariat prepared terma of

reference for the guidanceof connﬁte

:eg

contributing to the project.

of Reference

2
be main points of these terms of reference are set out in the Anne: and
aubject to the advice and cements of the £mb—Counittee.will he need as
guidance for any further model coureee prepared under or aeeociated with D10

technical oo-operation projects.
Material developed to date

5

llodel oouree material for the following has been developed to date:

.1 certificate

an Officer in Charge of a lavigational Hatch on ehipe

of 200 G1‘or more;

.2 certificate an Engineer Officer in Chargeof a Watchin a traditionally
manned engine room as a sea-going ehip powered by propulsion machinery

of 150 W propulsion power or more;

.5 lodel rrunovoxxi and teaching ayllabuaea for aafety training for
hetero. offioere and rating: of oil tankera, ehenioal tankera and

liquefied gu tankere.
¥ frelininaq drafte of other material have been prepared by 130 consultant:
I: n ad hoe haaia in reaponee to project demamla.

/

\ 1/
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Terms of Reference

on the Development of Detailed Teaching Byllabuees, lrameworke
of Iodel courses and SpecimenIramination Papers based on
the l97B STCHconvention and associated

1910sw Conferencesuoiutiony

£3 1 - project Development and Co-ordination

l Darts 2 and 5 of the project dealing with basic courses shall be co-ordinated
three project co-crdinators. one for deck department, one for engine
partment and one for radio department matters.2
2 !he work is to be distributed by the co-ordinators in such a manner that

s institution will take full responsibility for the production of the detailed
aching eyllabuses, the frameworks of courses and the specimen examinations for

complete subject at all basic course levels. and so that the resultant work
presents the combinedefforts of as manycountries as practicable.
3 Drafts of the detailed teaching syllabuses. frameworks of model courses
d specimen examinations shall be validated by a small group of experts and
O consultants.

rt 2 - Be uirements for "Unrestricted Certificates"
(Basic Courses;
1 General

l.l The general objective is to develop detailed syllabuses, frameworksof
del courses and specimen examination papers in the English languag

imarily reflecting:

Only the Parties to the 1978 STCHConvention may authoritatively

pronouce on its meaningand application.

The detailed syllabuses,

frameworks of model courses and specimen examination questions

developedunder this technical co-operation project are only to
be regarded as an effort to provide and harmonize technical assistance
in maritime training.
To be developed in cosultation with ITU.
Subsequentto validation of the English versions, all material will
be translated into appropriate languages.

(/3)
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.1

the mandatory minimumrequirements

for the 1978 STCVConvention ‘Esdes

or classes of certificates and authorizations whichare valid for

vsyuges which are more extensive than near-coastal voyages and those

certificates

issued under the Radio Regulations that are required to

he held under the provisions of the 1978 STCHConvention or
recommwndedas a minimum requirement

Resolution 7;
.2

by the 1978 BTUConference

and’

the minimumrequirements for ratings made mandatory by the STCH
convention or recommended by the 1978 STUConference Resolution 9:
and

.5 the mandatoryminimumrequirements for certificates

of proficiency

in survival craft.

m

- 2.1.2 The completelist of certificates
follows:

and qualifications concerned is as

Chapter II - Master - Deck Department

Master of ships of 1600 GTor more (unrestricted).

Chief late of ships of 1600 GTor more (unrestricted).
Master of ships of 200 - 1600 GT(unrestricted).
Chief Mate c ships of 200 - l6OOGT(unrestricted).
Officer in Charge of a Navigational Hatch on ships of 200 GTor more

(unrestricted).
Mandatory MinimumRequirements for a Rating forming part of a
Navigational Hatch.

Cha ter III -

ine De artment

Chief Engineer Officer of ships powered by main propulsion machinery

of 3000E! or more (urestricted).

U9)

.

Beoond igineer

Officer of ships powered by I111! P1'°P'-|1|1°3 333511131‘!°‘

30!!)W or more (unrestricted).
Engineer Oftiosr in Charge of s Hatch on ships poweredby min propulsion
IIQLLBOI1of 750 W 01‘3°"

Chief hgineer Otticer of nhips poweredby main propulsion machinery
between 750 end 3000 W (unrestricted).
Second hgineer Officer of ships powered by main propulsion machinery
between 150 and 3000 kw (unrestricted).
Mandatory MinimumRequirements for a rating forming part of an Engine
RoomHatch.

MinimumRequirements for a Rating nominated as the Assistant
Engineer Officer in Charge of the Hatch.

to the

Chapter IV - Radio Department

Radiocoununication Operator's General Certificate for the Maritime Mobile
Service including the additional lcnowledgerequired by the 1978
STCHConvention

First Class Radio Telgraph Operator's Certificate including the
additional

knowledge required by the 1978 STCUConvention.

SecondClas-. Radiotelegraph Operator's Certificate including the additional

/

knowledge required

by the 1978 STCUConvention.

RadiotelephoneOperator's General Certificate including the additional
knowledge required

by the 1978 STCHConvention.

Restricted RadiotelephoneOperator's Certificate including the additional
knowledge required by the 1978 SNU Convention.

T

Radiotelegraph Operator's Special Certificate including the additional
knowledge recommendedby the SW Conference Resolution 7.2

1/

K’

Ln authorisation to serve as Chief Engineer Officer of ships powered
5! III-inpropulsion machinery of less than 3000 W (unrestricted)
lily be endorsed on the Second Engineer Officer Certificate but no
separate course for this is necessary.
Chapter 7 requirements are being dealt with as specialized courses.

(20)

Cha erV'1

Certificate of zgofigiency in Survival Craft

LL,

5. ¢.u11ed teaching eyllabuses, frameworksof basic modelcourses

and specimen examination papers are intended to provide information on minimum

levels for use by technical advisers, consultants and experts i.Iplemsntin.g
technical assistance projects for developing countries in the field of the
ﬁﬁgyg and certification of seafarers so that their approach and the minimum
gundu,-as implemented may be as uniform as possible.

The work must not be

gggaggedas an official interpretation of the Convention. The following note
is therefore to be inserted immediatelybelow the title of each detailed
syllabus, model course framework and specimen examination paper:

"NJ. mly Parties to the 1978 STCHConvention may authoritatively
pronounce on the meaning and application of the Convention and the
information contained in this documentmust be regarded as reflecting

only the consensus of opinion of the contributing consultants."
2.1.4 Since levels of development vary from country to country and
progressively improve, the entry requirements identified with the course

i‘rameworksfor 'first'

certificates

mayin somecountries necessitate

augmentation of the academic knowledge of students who possess the most

suitable general education qualifications, by preparatory upgrading courses
or by academicenrichment of the technical courses at entry levels.
2.1.5 In other countries the level of development maypermit ‘the implementation
of a more ambitious training prey-ammewhich exceeds the basic requirements of
the 1978 STCUConvention.

In such cases

the CCHMON
CORECUERICUIJreflected

in the model courses would be enriched to‘ the extent appropriate by the

consultant or expert concerned as part of the technical assistance being provided.
2.2 Etailed

'1‘each_i_.ng
ﬁllabuses

2.2.1 A detailed teaching syllabus shall be drawn up for each master - deck

II-bu-taunt and engine departmentcertificate and qualification listed in
DI!-'lF~'|Ph2.1/.2. based on the general objectives

listed

in the 1978 S‘1Y.‘H

cmventien regulation concerned and its appendix. if am. taking into account

s.

inthelevelofhiowledge,
therelevant
resolutions

“WW5 57 the 1978 STVconference and relevant—ﬁ1Orecomsndationa.

(2/)
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2.2.2 A detailed teaching syllabus shall be drawn up for each radio department
oertifioate listed in paragraph 2.1.2. based on the provisions of the Radio
'.‘u;.g3¢.., :3. general objectives listed in the 1978STCHConventionregulation
concerned and its appendix, the provisions of the 1974 5°L‘3 c°"V°ﬂ‘1°n.
chgpggg IV, the relevant resolutions adopted by the 1978 STUConference and
relevant IMOrecommendations. It shall be assumed that the additional
:nsu1edge specified in the 1978 STCHConvention and STUConference Resolution 1

is included in the examinationfor the Radio Regulations certificate.
2.2.} A detailed teaching syllabus shall be drawnup for the certificate of
proficiency in survival craft based on the provisions of the 1978 STCH
Convention, V/1. the provisions of the 1914 sous Convention. Chapter III, the
1978 STUConference. Resolution 19 and relevant

IMOrecommendations.

2.2.4 Eachdetailed teaching syllabus shall:
.1 be drawn up in an appropriate subject order:

.2 primarily reflect the basic minimumrequirements but incorporate where
appropriate any supplementary provisions recommendedin the related
documentsas identified above, indicating their recommendatorynature;

.3 clearly identify the source of each subject element incorporated in
the sy111busby paranthetic inclusion or marginal notation of
appropri .e cross references to the paragraph or sub-paragraph of the
convention. resolution or recommendationconcerned.
2.}

Post-Sea Service Course Frameworks

2.3.1 Each course frameworkshall be specific to the certificate
concerned and shall:

or :.quirement

.1 not assume that any maritime training has been undergone by the course

T
}/

participants other than the minimumtraining specified for the
certificate or qualification concerned;1_

Whereoptions are provided, the option requiring the least formal
training is to be assumed.

(.22.)

2 gqggtlty the minimumentry requirements appropriate to the
qualification and knowledgerequirements of the appropriate regulations
and the academic biowledge presupposed in designing the course framework
in each subject;

_3 ,r;ng:11y reflect in appropriate subject order and sequence only the
basic or mandatory requirements;
,4 incorporate where appropriate any supplementary provisions recommended

13 the relevant documentsidentified in paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 in
an appropriate sequence but clearly indicate their recommsndatory
nature;

.5 clearly identify the source of each subject element incorporated in
the course by parenthetic inclusion or marginal notation of appropriate
cross-references to the paragraph or sub-paragraph of the Convention.
its annex or resolution

adopted by the 1978 STUConference or by IMO;

.6 indicate the amountof lecture and laboratory time allotted each
main subject element;
.7 identify the personnel, accommodation,laboratory. teaching aid.
equipment, consumables and other resource inputs that are:

- essential, and

- desirab1e;2/
.8 indicate the order of priority of those resource inputs identified as
being desirable;

Since no uniform academic structure exists, the presupposed academic
knowledgemust be specifically identified.
This involves Judgementof the minimal reasonable interpretation of the
convention requirements bearing in mind the needs and difficulties
experienced by developing countries as well as the needs of safety.
Wherepossible the course outline should be provided in learning
objective format. Appropriate explanatory material drawn from a
umber of sources can be madeavailable.
'

an intake of 20-25 students is to be assumedfor resource input
estimates. Appropriate guidance should be provided re: scaling u.

(23)

-you-',l
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9 ho suported by appropriate performancespecifications;/and
spprolimste costs in 03 dollars for the Ip°¢191° t0l¢h1D6 3143 '04
gqnipmsmtand indicating the estimate year:
_1o 5. gupportod by layout plans or diagrams where necessary;

.11 indicate any applicable course loading or teacher/student ratio
limitation;

.12 indicate siting or location requirements, limitations or considerations
where requisite and any support or outside services necessary;
.15 indicate the numberof teaching staff required and their minimum

academicand professional qualifications,

industrial experience and

pedagogical training which are appropriate to the level of the course;
.14 utilize whenpossible course modules that are commonto more than
one department and level of certificate,
the commonalityof such

modulesbeing identified.
2.4

2.4.1

Specimen Examination Questions

Twoseparate sets of specimen examination questions shall be drawn up

in the selected subject order (see paragraph 2.3.1.3) for each subject for
whicha written examination is appropriate, one illustrating the use of
traditional (subj rive) type questions and the other illustrating the use
of objective (preferably multiple choice) type questions.
2.4.2 The advantages and disadvantages of the two examination techniques and
the effect this mayhave on training are to be briefly summarizedto assist

officials in maritime training administrations to choose whichever exarination
system or mix of systems is best suited to their needs
Part 3 - Detailed s llabuses and frameworks of courses re arded as

eauivalent to sea-Eoiig service Ispiroved education and training,

pre—seaor sandwich type courses. etc.

3.1 In addition to the basic material specified in Part 2, detailed
syllabusee. model course frameworks and specimen examination questions shall
be drawnup for the deck, marine engineering and radio disciplines so as to
1/

Reference should be made to applicable IMOoperating requirements
and performance specifications.

(n29)

W 17/9

In

wide a broader based career oriented maritime education primarily for new
wants to the ind\Il¢-l'¥

In the ease of officer trainees,

the above material shall be drawn mm

the basis of a career pattern that allows the trainees to obtain the highest
ropriate certificate in their discipline in the shortest penaitted time
1.3‘ mm sdvantage of examination exemption and similar provisions.

The
io provision shall be enriched to the extent necessary to provide a sound

cational basis for easy assimilation of all specialized training identified
the 1978 BMWConvention. the associated Conference resolutions

and D10

osnendations (see Part 4 for a sample list of specialized courses).

In the case of rating trainees the detailed syllabuses, modelcourse
networksand specimen examination questions should be sufficiently comprehensive
to provide a sound basis for both safety and career purposes and for such

sequent training as maybe required to fill key rating positions.
hoept as provided in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3, the frameworksof these
sl courses shall take full account of the provisions of Part 2.

n‘P°r1°‘°°d 3.“-73-1-‘°1‘3
I33 in some circumstances enter such courses.

(2 5)
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zart 5 - List of Model Sgecislized Courses

[or Selective Offering

Participants

Course Level

Dangerous and
lnsnrdous cargoes
(Other than

ﬂbjoct

Officers
and
Key

Advanced

unto
Special oRgquirw

Ratings

Remarks
STUConference
Resolution 13

reso utions
Assembly

chemical .£a
tankers
liquefigd as

A.537El3;(and

1.437 XI )

Bridge Tun
Draining and

Ptlllgl Planning
‘

Masters and
Senior Deck

Officers

Advanced

STCURegulation
II/1. 6(a)
(S'IVConference

Fesolutions

I,

17. 18 and 20)

Spocializedbil,

Officers

chemical and
15-Q30-T105
633

and
33“-D85

“nk.r courgea

Masters
senior
Officers

Specialized
Training
Programme

11 and 12
éllesolution l6)
reso
u ions
‘aging?’

ﬁﬂgsﬁﬁzel

(‘dV“"°°d)

A.457 x1)) and
A.286EVIII)

Supervisor
Personnel

Ad

Vance

Resolution 22

3”“
3'1‘t1°°|h-1-P3

Pamiliarization

STCHConvention
Chapter V
Resolutions

d

Masters
a-nd

l0.

STUConference

SWconference

Simulator

Senior Deck

Advanced

Resolution 17

Radar Simulator
77313138

Masters and
Deck Officers

‘dvanced

51g C n;
Resolﬁtigﬁﬁnfe

Officer:

and 18
(Assembly

1.433
XII)
reso11(1tion
Autuntic

Rndar

noﬁms uh
up‘)

Ms t

us 19;;

and

P1

U actigal

or f1CO1'Bin

L1ﬂit8t10!1B

39 3-“ _

Shipsfitted

(‘dnnceﬁ

STUConference

Resolution
20
(tggembly

ruohtion
Use of simulator
included

C26‘)

subJQct

hdb/Eleotrmie

Participants

Course Level

Bquipnent

354.10

Primarily

Supplementary

Hnintennnoe

Officers

Updating

or

Priority

2

Persons in
charge of

Advanced

SW Conference

Resolution

1.4.

gal-rt
urseIIany

advanced)
Medical Care

Remarks

include use of
simulator

2

Hed.ics.l cm

1010resolution

A.4}8(XI)

Aboard Ships

on Certain

Voyages

Electronics

Engineer
Officers and

“""‘“°°“

‘d

Electrical
Officers
Control

Senior

Bzgineering
end
Autoaauon

Engineer
Officers

lxtellptllioittruetion

Senior”

Efficiency

Officers

Planned

Senior

Maintenance for
Machinery

Engineer
Officers

Installations

Engineering

Senior

Department

Engineer

Financial,

Technical and

Officers

d

""‘°°

1

1

use of

Advanced

2

Advanced

2

Advanced

2

Personnelt /

(27)
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Use of an ARPX

In this paper I will try to give an impression of the practical use of an
AIPAas it is usually applied on board snipe and hydrofoils (jetfoils)
today.
ﬂy experience of the practical use of ARPA'sdates from the early
‘iisties,
when the first prototype of ARPA.thﬂ "Ph111P| 51-9105" VII
esperisentally installed on board someDutch ships.
.
This experience was amongother things gained on board ships and
hydrofoils from constantly observing the proceedings on different sakes
of AIPA's. Further I may add sy experience gained in the use of a
lsytheon LRPA"Raycss" linked up with the radar simulator of the
AmsterdamNautical College. Further I sailed on the training vessel
'Prinses ﬂsrgriet" equipped with the Racal-Decca ARPA.

/

Particular attention was paid to utilizing and testing what was possible
and impossible

on ARPA:

1. The interpretation

acquirid.

of the vectors of targets which were only recently

2. The interpretation of the "Target Hindow".
3. The use of the "Trial Hanoauvre".
4. The false safety feeling when using "Guard Zones" for automatic

acquisition.

5. Judging "Target Trails" (equally tine—spacedhistory spots).
6. Realising what log the ARPAis linked to.
7. Using the various "Navigation Lines" and "Navigation Marks".

8. The false safety feeling whenusing the "Potential Collision Points
(PCP's)" of the Raytheon Raycas.
9. Using the "Syten Clear" on the Raytheon Raycas.

10. Having a reflex plotter at one's disposal on the ARPA-display.

11. The incompleteness of ARPAaanuals.

sub 1. The inter retation of the vectors of tar ets which were onl
recently acquired.
There are ARPA'swhich after the acquisition of a target only show the
relevant vector whenit has been found to be reliable by the
scroprocessor. Or in any case showa figure round the target to show the
more or less reliability of the vector shown.
In the Iaytheon Raycas the calculation of the ARPAis as it were shown by
the development of the vector from zero to a reliable vector. By
expressing the vector into readable digits it can be checked whether the
vector has becomestable.
Uith this method the user should be careful not to draw premature
conclusions on the basis of too early shown Vector3_
sub 2. The interpretation
Lfter the acquisition

of the "Target Window",

some systems do not show the "Target Uindow" or

Inly showit after typing-in the relative code figure.

(2 9)

I am convinced that this search windowshould ae visible at all times.
for only then does the user know tnat the

_ i

by the

microprocessor. If in the case of Raycas the arorementioned code figure
is not used and consequently the windowis not shown. than after the
acquisition of targets of. say a fishing fleet whenthe windows.if
o' y1.1b1., would overlap each other. these targets are not accepted by the
microprocessor and therefore never get a vector either! They would not

even activate the signal of a lost target!

lloreover if the windows of various acquired targets

are shown on the same

bearing. the process of time sharing would also be clearly visible.
through whichit is understandable that the result of eventually reliable
vectors will be slow in coming.
sub 3. The use of the "Trial Hanoeuvre".

It is a good system when in the case of the "Trial Hanoeuvre" aode one
automatically proceeds from the present heading and speed. However. in
the trial aode manysyatms still show the previous "Trial Course" and
."Trial Speed". Andin most cases the safe distances to surrounding ships
are found with the "Trial Course". but the "Trial Speed" is not on the
present right speed. Already manytimes these manipulations have led to

dangerousclose-quarters situations.

There are systems with a d namic vector resentation in the "Trial
Hanoeuvra"..in which the vectors leave the present positions of the
targets to showthus. say ten to thirty times as quickly as in reality
the relative or true future movementsof the echoes on the radar screen.
The advantage of this system is that the manoeuvringcharacteristics of
the ownship are more or less included in the "Trial Hanoeuvre". This is
of course splendid provided the user knowswhat the starting points of
the programmedmanoeuvring characteristics
are. Such as: for what rudder
angle or rate of turn has a trial course-change been programmedor. say a
stopping lanoeuvre?
A disadvantage may be that because in the "Trial Hanoeuvre" the vectors
on the radar screen leave the echoes. it may sometimes be difficult to
cinch
vector proceeds from what echo. Especially if many echoes are
D otte zhat
.
I3 ll! I180 happen that in the "Trial Hanoeuvre" new echoes are added
which are not immediately noticed as such.

°‘h¢r iiitcls have a static vector presentation in the "Trial Hanoeuvre"
in which the vectors remain in the present position of the targets on the
radar screen to immediately show the result of the "Trial Hanoeuvre" as
if the ownship is already at once heading on the simulated course or
"“°d13‘01! running the simulated speed. In this case the effective
result of a trial manoeuvrecan only be checked correctly vhgn the

relative vectors are used.

In View of the delay in the movements of the own ship the user himself

should then determine a safety margin as to the future shortest approach
and this again in connection with the safe distance.

Moreoverit should be noticed that the "Trial Hanoeuvrg"passibility has
f°“ﬂ¢ VOIYlittle application on board. One simply changes cogrse and/or

(30)

.u
'x

speed (Ea than looks for the result as :o :32 safe aistance at the
:elac;ve vectors.
_
Corrections are subsequently made then by means or course and/or speed
changes to obtain the safe distance as yet.

gub 5. The false safet

feelin

when usin

"Guard Zones" for automatic

In contrast to the earlier system of Iotron with the Digiplot the system
with "Guard Zones" may be called semi-automatic.

And in this

semi-automatic system a target must cut these "Guard Zones" before it is
automatically presented to the microprocessor for calculation and then
gives s signal of "Target in Guard Zone".
I! a target comes within radar view between the "Guard Zones". it may be
a considerable time before the signal "Target in Guard Zone" can be heard
and the target is acquired. Meanwhilethe object may have arrived at too

short a distance.

In some cases when the echo is too weak or comes within radar view within

the innermost "Guard Zone". the target is not acquired at all and not any
warning signal is heard.
lacal-Decca gives very justly the following warning in its ARPAmanual:

"The (semi-)automatic detection and acquisition facility must always be
considered as an aid but never as a substitute for proper watchkaeping".

Even the fully automatic target acquisition of the earlier system of
Iotron is not infallible. Especially not in the case of weakchoes which
are not at all "automatically acquired" and therefore do not give an
alarm. Consequently the following statement in the Digiplot manual should
be read with great reserve:

"Fully automatic target acquisition provides unattended radar
watch-keepingon both open sea and in restricted waters.........".
sub 5. Judging "Target Trails" (equally time-spaced history spots).

Uith these history spots one should realize that the distance and the
direction between the first two dots (the two leg: showndoc; gfger the
target echo) in the beginning of the tracking do not give reliable
indications about the movementof the echo. As was already described 33;

}, the vector is still unreliable in the beginning of the tracking and
consequently the distance and the direction between the first two dots
after the acquisition are not correct.
sub 6. Realising what log the ARPAis linked to.

The important speed information of the own ship can be intraducgd into
some ARPAmicroprocessors

by means of:

a. Manualadjustment
of the speed in the direction of the heading (single
axis
stabilised).

I3!)

This introduction or the dead reckoning speed through the water is
applied it there is no other possibility. However.if this dead recxonuq

speed through the water is practically correct. the precticlllv
serve {or anti-collision.

correc:

true vectors through the water are also obtained and therefore they cgn
b. A log showing the speed through the water in the direction of the
heading (single axis water stabilised. for examplea pitot log or an

electroeagnetic log).
This aathod also gives the practically correct true vectors through the‘
water and is therefore correct for anti-collision.
"Practically correct true vectors": because whencourse is altered with a
large rate of turn. the vectors becoae unreliable during the process of
turning. This because the athwartships componentis not recorded by the

above logs .

c. In electroeagnetic log or doppler log showing the speed in the headﬂq
and athertahipa direction through the water (double ease water

stabilised).

This aathod would. if the radar is suitable for this. be very good for

anti-collision .

.

d. A doppler log showing the speed in the heading course over the ground

(single axis groundstabilised).

This sethod should in any case be discouraged both for anti-collision
for radar navigation!

and

e. A doppler log showing the speed in the heading course and in the

athwartshipa direction over the ground (double ares ground stabilised).
This aathod gives true vectors over the ground and is therefore correct
for radar navigation. but is no good_£oranti-collision!
f. A geographic "fixed target" (double axes ground stabilised.

with the

"Echo Reference" of Racal-Decca and with the "Autodrift" of Raycas).
This system also shows the true aovenents over the ground and is as such

very goodfor radar navigation. but again unsuitable for anti-collision!
sub 7. Using the various "Navigation Lines" and "Navigation Marks".

Veryoft,n'there is a possibility to makeelectronic dots and/or lines
visible on the ARPAdisplay. For example the "Nav. Lines" of the Digiplot
03 I°tf°ﬂ. the "Nev. Lines" and "True Marks" of the Reycas of Baytheon
and in the case of the Racal-Decca ARPAthe so-called "Elements"

("Straight Lines" and/or "Dots").

The user should be thoroughly aware of:

a. Uhat lines are suitable for the Parallel Index method (PI ngghgd) and
:;t;::§ lines and dots are suitable for the True Tracking aethod (TT
n suitable for the PI method should be "fixed" with regard to the own
3519. as it were sail with the own ship. Thus the "Nev. Lines" of the
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Digiplot are exclusively suitable for PI.

The "Nev. Lines" of Raycas and the "Straight

'

Lines’ of lacal-Decca are

unsuitable for PI. as these lines are fixed with regard to the water.

All lines of the Raycas and Racal-Decca ARPAare therefore unsuitable for
PI and also the "EBL-free" of the two makes. but also the "Acquisition
Exclusion Lines" of Raycas (if not in the 62 node).
The "Acquisition Exclusion Lines" (CV0) Of 38Y¢8| I30 13 ‘hi 42 3049

.=though not intended as such. suitable for PI. as these are "fixed" in the
° 62 node with regard to the own ship.

‘Ins.
‘Q5:
,H;;.b]§
£9;ground.
gag :1 The
method
should
be end
geographically
fixed‘in‘with
regard
to the
Nev.
Lines"
the "True Harks"
of Iaycas end the "Straight Lines" end "Dots" of iacal-Decca can be
ground stabilised. In the case of Iaycas by aeans of the resulting input
of a duel axes ground stabilised doppler log or with "Autodrift" on a
geogrephically "fixed" and suitable object on the radar (buoy. vessel
riding at anchor. an isolated tower or a very small island OtC-)
In this way the "Straight Lines" and "Dots" of Racal-Decca can be ground
stabilised by aeans of the "Echo Reference" on a geographically "fixed"
and suitable object on the radar.

In the standard type of the Iecal-Decca ARPAthe straight lines and dots
can be shifted by aeans of the "I-Y shifts". so that the position of the
true tracks (straight lines) and the conspicuous points such as capes.
buoys and lightvessels (dots) in a fairway can be previously prepared on
the radar display.
'
Once arrived in that fairway. they can. siaply by aeans of the "I-1
shifts". be aade to cover the corresponding conspicuous radar points
after the "Echo Reference" has been applied.



On the standard type of the Baycas an "X-Y shift" of the "Nev. Lines" and
"True Harks" is iapossible. Consequently the planned tracks should be
prepared on the spot by aeans of these "Nev. Lines" and "True Harks" and

at the seas tine one should be carefully on one's guard that the used
Nsv. Lines" and "True Marks" are not geographically replaced on the
radar screen aeanwhile. in consequence of possible current and/or wind
drift. Therefore one should first find a conspicuous point for the
Autodrift and then construct the planned tracks on the radar screen by

aeans of the "Nev. Lines" and "True Marks". However. if for soae reason

the autodrift object should becose a lost target. the "Nev. Lines" and
"True Marks aay drift with regard to the ground (current and/or wind
drift) and should then again be introduced one by one.
All thisr s tine-consuming and is consequently not applied on board.
In the case of Raycas one is for the PI method dependent on the two
"Acquisition Exclusion Lines" in the 62 node ("fixed" with regard to the
own ship).
sub
8. The false safetv f 1‘
h
u "

------r-1r--——-—-————JL_____.___JL_________________________

Points (PC?’)

of the Raeﬁhign;ae:a:sin

the Potential Collision

The PCPfacility provides the user with a visual indiggtign on uh‘;
::“""
‘ ‘°1115i°“ W135‘Pike Place. Assumingthat the target retains
a present course and speed and that the nun ship also maintains its
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;::,

.4 I

;..;

.

rggggg ;; very important. The position of the PC?is greatly

dependent on the log input of the own ship and the tine-lag of the
ad
ocessor system.
Anciﬂgle margin of safety should therefore be taken round this PC?. un;¢,
is difficult to determine by the user by showing the PC? only. One of the

first LIPAassisted collision affords s good example:

"On August 16th 1981 at 07.52 s jetfoil equipped with s conventional
radar and an ARPAconnected to an electromagnetic log was on its way free
Ostend to Dover.

Andwhile crossing at right angles the traffic separation schemeof the
DoverStrut. collided in a position 2.5 miles east-south-east of the HPC
buoy with s cargo ship in the north-east
scheme on its we! to Rotterdam.

lane of the sbove—mentioned
'

The jetfoil entered s fogbsnk 2 minutes prior to the casualty.
The jetfoil is normally travelling at s speed of about 42 knots. This
speed can be reduced to 35 knots leaving the crsft's hull lifted out of
the water. If the speed is reduced under this norm the jetfoil drops down
and becomeswater-borne. enabling it to proceed at only 8 knots.
The cargo ship. automatically plotted. wss showinga north-east true
vector (through the wter).
.
o
At 07.50 course was altered from 270 to 310 in order to cross the T55 st

right angles. The jetfoil was still "on foils" .
The AIPAplot gave a PCP information of the cargo ship just free to

starboard. The echo of the cargo ship being just fine to port of the
course line.

Hhsn finally the echo of the cargo ship remained ahesd instead of
shifting to starboard (eccording tot the PCP). at close range a hard port
rudder was executed in an attempt to pass sstern.

Unfortustely this occurred a few seconds too late".

from the foregoing report it appears that the use of s PC? only is
dangerous. Even if the momentary position of the PCPshould be accurate.
it does not give the user any information about the shortest approach
with regard to the safe distance.
In this case the PADsystem of Sperry is better. If the navigator stays
gutgids
y
. s PAD.he is sure that he stays outside the safe distance chosen
To this PADa certain safety factor has been applied by Sperry to keep

the target absolutely outside the preset ssfe distance in spite of any
inaccuracies of the system.
sub 9. Using the "System Clear" on the Raytheon Razcas.

"SystemClear" resets the RaycssV to the initial turn on state. i.e. all
'°ﬂl°1ng tsrget information and processing is cancelled.
30V0VIr. there say be the danger that together with "System c1¢.r" the
log input is automatically changed into Vﬁanual Log".
If the "Hsnual Log" was not set at the present speed. the plottgd targets
I0! Vfong true vectors and a wrong impression about the surrounding ships
18 Obtained and moreover s wrong "Trial Hanoeuvre". This may contribute
I0 I decision for a dangerous manoeuvre.
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sub 10. Reflex Plotter

on the ARPAdisnlav7

I: is well-knownthat ARPAsystems experience difficulties

with "clutter"

in generel end "see-clutter" in psrticulsr.

As soon es tsrgets get into sesclutter the vectors belonging to then ere
\1ﬂ£1UIBCIdby this sesclutter end the vectors becone unrelisble or even
lesve the tsrgets et greet speeds.
Veryoften the target echo cen still be distinguished fros the reder
screen with the eye end s nsnusl plot could offer e solution for this
circusstence.
_
For this purpose s reflex plotter on the ARPAdisplay could be nscesssry.
The resction to this is of course thst the reflex plotter on the nearest
conventionel rsdsr will serve the purpose. But in prsctice this is hsrdly
ever done. One prefers trying to get the target echo into the processor
egein for one vents to keep informed of the targets with the correct
vectors outside the sesclutter. Therefore it wouldbe recossendsble to
heve e reflex plotter on the ARPAdisplay for this purpose slone.

lowever. such s reflex plotter is hostile to "daylight displsy". it
reeoves e lerge percentage of the light intensity end provides sdditionsl
snnoying reflections.
'

However.first things should cone first!
sub 11. The incompleteness of the ARPAannuals.

The completeness of the ARPAnsnuels occesionnlly leeves Inch to be
desired. Hhens certsin ARPA-enkeis purchssed this ssy led to

dissppointsents whendenonstrstions sre ssde end the (incolplete) lnnusls
ere perused egsin.
_"._.;.:.

Esssples of the omissions ere:
s.
sentioning the nsxinun rste of turn wheneutoastic tracking is
stillNotrelisble.
b. Csn the "Rev. Lines" be used for the PI sethod or for the‘?! sethod?

c. Nosention is ssde thst e groundstebilised displsy is right for rsder
3lV1l|t1¢ﬂ. but is no good for snti-collision.
d. Further omissions ere closely related to what was discussed nub 1 up
to end including sub 10.
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aneral
Although on the one hand the user is warned of dangers which may occur M

implicitly relying on an ARPA.it should be noted that on the other hang
the aanufacturer adds "novel features" which often give the user a false
appearance of accuracy and safety.

Horeover too aany ARPAproceedings can still

be done wrongly by the ujgr

whichany give rise to the risk of collision and/or stranding.
It is true that the ARPAuser should be trained in everything that is
possible and impossible for ARPA.but nnny wrong ARPAproceedings

be aade impossible by the aakerl

Bans llerk.

should

'
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